I suspect, however, that most folks are so nonplussed by my own particular answer [that, essentially, there is no answer], they avoid being reminded of it like the plague.<hr>
Hey Biggie, you still reading here?
I'd like to have a stab at working through the above with you, and maybe others will have something to offer along the way. It would be nice, at least for me, and it would be more conducive to reaching some sort of resolution, if we could just stick to the matter at hand, and refrain from the polemics you so enjoy. I would suggest that if you really do want to find the semblance of an answer to this type of question, you would be better served by not confusing the issue and not complicating the matter with irrelevancy.
If you're up for it, I'd like you to first consider your question and assess what you really want to ask, and how you want to phrase it. As it stands, the conclusion is implicit in the premise: The world is meaningless, and therefore there can be no 'ought'. However, I think the question is flawed in that it means to relate human actions to the world, as opposed to humans. Here's how I think the question you are asking should be phrased:
If meaning is informed by value, and individual human values are arbitrarily arrived at, how might we arrive at a less arbitrary, and so more meaningful (as defined by less meaningless) system according to which humans ought to act?
(Note that we will not be considering free will with regard to the question of the arbitrariness of human values.)
Please indicate if you concur with this phraseology. If you do, perhaps offer your initial thoughts on the matter and we can move on from there.