2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Discussion of the nature of Ultimate Reality and the path to Enlightenment.
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chikoka
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2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

I present the principle of "identity of indecernables"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_of_indiscernibles
The identity of indiscernibles is an ontological principle which states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common
To which comes the question, if the operation of the brain is identical between a zombie (traditional physicalism) and that of what obviously has a consciousness then they are the same thing.Since (i know) obviously i'm not a zombie we are forced into accepting some kind of ontological dualism for the mind/brain which qsr seems to be against.
I may have QSR wrong and they may in fact deny consciosness but that is just self defeating.

Then theres the principle of "sufficient reason".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_ ... ent_reason
The principle of sufficient reason states that anything that happens does so for a reason: no state of affairs can obtain, and no statement can be true unless there is sufficient reason why it should not be otherwise.
If our consciousnesses do not have freewill then what is the reason that they are there for.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by David Quinn »

chikoka wrote:To which comes the question, if the operation of the brain is identical between a zombie (traditional physicalism) and that of what obviously has a consciousness then they are the same thing.Since (i know) obviously i'm not a zombie we are forced into accepting some kind of ontological dualism for the mind/brain which qsr seems to be against.
If one brain generates consciousness and another one doesn't, they are not identical.

chikoka wrote:If our consciousnesses do not have freewill then what is the reason that they are there for.
Consciousness proved to be a superior evolutionary trait. As did a brain sophisticated enough to make "choices".

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chikoka
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

David Quinn wrote:chikoka wrote:
To which comes the question, if the operation of the brain is identical between a zombie (traditional physicalism) and that of what obviously has a consciousness then they are the same thing.Since (i know) obviously i'm not a zombie we are forced into accepting some kind of ontological dualism for the mind/brain which qsr seems to be against.

If one brain generates consciousness and another one doesn't, they are not identical.
I mean if substituting a zombie or a consciousness in *the same human* makes no difference to the behavior (or anything else in the universe) then they are the same.
David Quinn wrote:chikoka wrote:
If our consciousnesses do not have freewill then what is the reason that they are there for.

Consciousness proved to be a superior evolutionary trait. As did a brain sophisticated enough to make "choices".
My question is does consciousness mimic the "billiard ball" mechanical universe we are familiar with.and how would it differ if all the mechanical activities in the brain continued without the need for a user(i.e. it was a zombie). Choices would still be made just like how a kettle can "choose" to turn of once the water starts boiling.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by David Quinn »

chikoka wrote:
David Quinn wrote:chikoka wrote:
To which comes the question, if the operation of the brain is identical between a zombie (traditional physicalism) and that of what obviously has a consciousness then they are the same thing.Since (i know) obviously i'm not a zombie we are forced into accepting some kind of ontological dualism for the mind/brain which qsr seems to be against.

If one brain generates consciousness and another one doesn't, they are not identical.
I mean if substituting a zombie or a consciousness in *the same human* makes no difference to the behavior (or anything else in the universe) then they are the same.
Can't argue with that. But it looks like you are basing all these thoughts on the idea that consciousness is superfluous. As far as I can see, consciousness plays a major role in the way we receive and organize information about the world.

On the other hand, sleeping walking is an interesting phenomenon in that it involves people being able to navigate around the world without actually being conscious, and one could possibly argue from this that consciousness is superfluous. But then again, I doubt that a sleep walker is in a position to learn new things and increase his understanding of the world, let alone implement changes to his behaviour and lifestyle when circumstances demand. I would hazard a guess that a sleep-walker is not really unconscious of the world as such, but his memory is not functioning.

My question is does consciousness mimic the "billiard ball" mechanical universe we are familiar with.
Yes, but instead of billiard balls think of chemical reactions, electronic pulses, data processing, feedback loops, the strengthening or weakening of neural pathways, alert triggers (emotions), etc.

and how would it differ if all the mechanical activities in the brain continued without the need for a user(i.e. it was a zombie). Choices would still be made just like how a kettle can "choose" to turn of once the water starts boiling.
It is in the learning and adapting part of our lives that consciousness performs its main role, it seems to me. When you first learn to ride a bike, you have to concentrate hard on things like your speed, steering and balance. But after a few more times, you never have to give it any more of your attention.

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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

David Quinn wrote:Yes, but instead of billiard balls think of chemical reactions, electronic pulses, data processing, feedback loops, the strengthening or weakening of neural pathways, alert triggers (emotions), etc.
But all this can happen without the need for a "user". Our brains are just elaborate kettles, do you think that a kettle that stops once boiling starts is more conscious than one that doesnt?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Russell Parr »

chikoka wrote:
David Quinn wrote:Yes, but instead of billiard balls think of chemical reactions, electronic pulses, data processing, feedback loops, the strengthening or weakening of neural pathways, alert triggers (emotions), etc.
But all this can happen without the need for a "user". Our brains are just elaborate kettles, do you think that a kettle that stops once boiling starts is more conscious than one that doesnt?
The brain and all of its processes constitute the "user." What makes you assume otherwise?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

bluerap wrote:
chikoka wrote:
David Quinn wrote:Yes, but instead of billiard balls think of chemical reactions, electronic pulses, data processing, feedback loops, the strengthening or weakening of neural pathways, alert triggers (emotions), etc.
But all this can happen without the need for a "user". Our brains are just elaborate kettles, do you think that a kettle that stops once boiling starts is more conscious than one that doesnt?
The brain and all of its processes constitute the "user." What makes you assume otherwise?

By user i mean an *awareness*. Why does the brain and all its processes need to be associated with an awareness it the awareness makes no difference to the organism.Could you say what you understand when someone describes a zombie that *acts* like it has a consciousness. The way you have described a user, "the brain and all its processes", ,what shouldnt *change* for the user to not also simultaneously change ?The water in the cells?tthe food he ate ?All that ,if we take QSR as our starting point would change who we are from one moment to the next. I am aware that brain cells do not get replaced but they can *die*. If you have 10 brain cells in total (say) , which one can you kill and still be you. I'm sure you can (check my wording) kill each (resurrecting it before killing the next) brain cell in turn and still be you, meaning your identity (awareness) is not contained even in part by each celll.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

Quote myself for clarification:
All that ,if we take QSR as our starting point would change who we are from one moment to the next
Our thoghts do indeed change from one moment to the next , but they still remain *mine* (ours). What is the basis for the *me* in mine?
Again : that which doesnt change about me.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Russell Parr »

I'm not sure what the you're getting at. If you take all the brain cells away (and therefore the brain), will there still be an "awareness"?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

bluerap wrote:I'm not sure what the you're getting at. If you take all the brain cells away (and therefore the brain), will there still be an "awareness"?
Thats why i had said to "check my wording".

Its known from experience that there are people living right now with only half a hemisphere (after an operation). What if it had been the other half that had survived?Would he still be the same person? What if they had simply split his brain into two halves and placed each in different bodies? which one would he be?

Do you know there is no way of me telling whether or not i am the only one with a consciousness and that the rest of you simply act like you do.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Russell Parr »

chikoka wrote:Its known from experience that there are people living right now with only half a hemisphere (after an operation). What if it had been the other half that had survived?Would he still be the same person? What if they had simply split his brain into two halves and placed each in different bodies? which one would he be?
But these people do change some, though in a less significant way than our current understanding of the brain would lead us to expect.
Do you know there is no way of me telling whether or not i am the only one with a consciousness and that the rest of you simply act like you do.
Why stop there? We may all be androids controlled by aliens, or actors in the Truman Show (smile for the camera), or computer programs in the Matrix.

All you can be sure of is existence and experience.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

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bluerap wrote:Quote:
Do you know there is no way of me telling whether or not i am the only one with a consciousness and that the rest of you simply act like you do.
Why stop there? We may all be androids controlled by aliens, or actors in the Truman Show (smile for the camera), or computer programs in the Matrix.

All you can be sure of is existence and experience.
Now we're getting somewhere.
There is a way to tell between us being conscious beings and being androids controlled by alliens.As a subset of the univerese there may be no difference , but when you observe the totality of all phenomena (the universe) then you can tell. Same with all the other examples you gave.
But if there is no way to tell the difference between us having consciousnesses and us being zombies (or acting like we are consciouss) then from the viewpoint of the universe , they are the same thing.
bluerap wrote:chikoka wrote:
Its known from experience that there are people living right now with only half a hemisphere (after an operation). What if it had been the other half that had survived?Would he still be the same person? What if they had simply split his brain into two halves and placed each in different bodies? which one would he be?
But these people do change some, though in a less significant way than our current understanding of the brain would lead us to expect.
Just to be tedious could you answer each of the questions i put forward above.


You know there are kettles designed to stop heating when the water in them starts boiling.(maybe by using a bi-metallic strip or something).
You agree that the billiard ball mechanics view of the universe (particularly QSR) states that we are simply elaborate kettles.

Do you believe that the kettle mentioned above is more conscious than one that doesn't stop heating when the water starts to boil?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

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chikoka wrote:Now we're getting somewhere.
There is a way to tell between us being conscious beings and being androids controlled by alliens.As a subset of the univerese there may be no difference , but when you observe the totality of all phenomena (the universe) then you can tell. Same with all the other examples you gave.
But if there is no way to tell the difference between us having consciousnesses and us being zombies (or acting like we are consciouss) then from the viewpoint of the universe , they are the same thing.
What if the aliens programmed the androids to ponder existence and consciousness?
Its known from experience that there are people living right now with only half a hemisphere (after an operation). What if it had been the other half that had survived?Would he still be the same person? What if they had simply split his brain into two halves and placed each in different bodies? which one would he be?
Just to be tedious could you answer each of the questions i put forward above.
Well I'm no brain surgeon, so I can only guess at the details of each of those scenarios. All I know for certain is that the results would differ to some degree, even if only that the vehicles change while the personality and memories somehow stay intact. Think moving your CPU and hard drive from one computer into another.
You know there are kettles designed to stop heating when the water in them starts boiling.(maybe by using a bi-metallic strip or something).
You agree that the billiard ball mechanics view of the universe (particularly QSR) states that we are simply elaborate kettles.

Do you believe that the kettle mentioned above is more conscious than one that doesn't stop heating when the water starts to boil?
Depends on how you define consciousness. If consciousness is the capability of understanding reality, than of course neither kettle has an advantage over the other. But if consciousness is judged by mere functionality, then yes, one kettle is more conscious than the other.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

Bluerap:

In your opinion, what would be the difference between a body that acts intelligently and has a consciousness and a body that acts exactly the same way but has no consciousness (a zombie) ?

Why would evolution favour one over the other?
bluerap wrote:Depends on how you define consciousness. If consciousness is the capability of understanding reality, than of course neither kettle has an advantage over the other. But if consciousness is judged by mere functionality, then yes, one kettle is more conscious than the other.
At least we agree on the first definition.
On the second:

If an ordinary conscious human was equivalent to your conscious (functionality) kettle, What would a zombie human (who simply acts consciously) be equivalent to in terms of "a type of kettle that simply acts consciously (even to that small degree)"?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

Maybe wiki can explain what i'm trying to get at better than me :)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
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A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.[2]
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Russell Parr »

chikoka wrote:
bluerap wrote:Depends on how you define consciousness. If consciousness is the capability of understanding reality, than of course neither kettle has an advantage over the other. But if consciousness is judged by mere functionality, then yes, one kettle is more conscious than the other.
At least we agree on the first definition.
On the second:

If an ordinary conscious human was equivalent to your conscious (functionality) kettle, What would a zombie human (who simply acts consciously) be equivalent to in terms of "a type of kettle that simply acts consciously (even to that small degree)"?
The zombie would be equivalent to the ordinary human, except for different origins. A highly cognitive animal, you could say.

I should point out though that it seems that you tried to imply that "ordinary conscious human" is a human capable of understanding reality, as per the first definition, then equated it to the kettle. Be careful not to arise confusion with such a contradiction.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Russell Parr »

chikoka wrote:Bluerap:

In your opinion, what would be the difference between a body that acts intelligently and has a consciousness and a body that acts exactly the same way but has no consciousness (a zombie) ?

Why would evolution favour one over the other?
The answer to the first question is dependent on the definition of consciousness, as we have been discussing.

As for why evolution (or, more specifically, natural selection) favored the capability of enlightenment in humans.. I think it's simply because evolution favors smarter humans. The capability of enlightenment is more or less a side effect, considering how rare it is, at least for now at our current stage.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

what do you make from this:
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

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chikoka wrote:what do you make from this:
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.
This is like arguing that since a functioning computer is different from a non-functioning one (even though both computers have the same parts), it must be more than the sum of its parts.

It is true in a sense that when all the components are working together the fully-functioning computer is more than the sum of its parts, as it able to provide more services than it can when its parts are all loose and disconnected. But that doesn't mean there exists something magical over and above the sum total of the parts. Computers have no more soul than humans do.

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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

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David Quinn wrote:
chikoka wrote:what do you make from this:
A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.[1] When a zombie is poked with a sharp object, for example, it does not feel any pain though it behaves exactly as if it does feel pain (it may say "ouch" and recoil from the stimulus, or tell us that it is in intense pain).

The notion of a philosophical zombie is used mainly in thought experiments intended to support arguments (often called "zombie arguments") against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism. Physicalism is the idea that all aspects of human nature can be explained by physical means: specifically, all aspects of human nature and perception can be explained from a neurobiological standpoint. Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings its hypothetical possibility would be an argument for a consciousness that is more than the sum of neurological pathways and brain states.
This is like arguing that since a functioning computer is different from a non-functioning one (even though both computers have the same parts), it must be more than the sum of its parts.

It is true in a sense that when all the components are working together the fully-functioning computer is more than the sum of its parts, as it able to provide more services than it can when its parts are all loose and disconnected. But that doesn't mean there exists something magical over and above the sum total of the parts. Computers have no more soul than humans do.

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But both the p-zombie and the human are functional in terms of behaviour.
Since a zombie is physiologically indistinguishable from human beings
They are both wired up and react the same to the universe ,just that one has no consciousness and the other does.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by Diebert van Rhijn »

a hypothetical being that is indistinguishable from a normal human being except in that it lacks conscious experience, qualia, or sentience
How can one talk about a human being minus sentience to be "indistinguishable" in all other aspects? It's sentience which distinguishes us from rocks!

The problem arises when seeing sentience and "conscious experience" as some mysterious function hidden inside some being. But isn't it obvious it's always part and parcel of its functioning, the senses, the neurons, millions of typical behavioral signs and a specific kind of environment and backdrop it's all taking place in?

The P-zombie is dead in the water - philosophically spoken. The contradiction is created inside the hypothesis by asserting highly speculative properties which seem like a re-introduction of the notion of soul.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

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David Quinn wrote:It is true in a sense that when all the components are working together the fully-functioning computer is more than the sum of its parts, as it able to provide more services than it can when its parts are all loose and disconnected.
Even in that sense it wouldn't be true, because the services a fully-functional computer provides would be part of it, and would distinguish it from a non-functional computer.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

im sure you are aware that the brain is in a constant state of flux, water coming in and out of cells, proteins especialy replacing cell membranes, mitochondria and basicaly everything. Since *everything* in the brain is always changing what of 90 yr old jason is the same as he was when he was 5?

Consciousness wise?
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by jupiviv »

chikoka wrote:im sure you are aware that the brain is in a constant state of flux, water coming in and out of cells, proteins especialy replacing cell membranes, mitochondria and basicaly everything. Since *everything* in the brain is always changing what of 90 yr old jason is the same as he was when he was 5?

A 90 year old man is obviously not exactly the same as he was when he was 5. In fact, a person is not exactly the same from one moment to another.

By the way, in response to this, which was your original point:
I mean if substituting a zombie or a consciousness in *the same human* makes no difference to the behavior (or anything else in the universe) then they are the same.
I don't see how that is possible if you define a zombie to be unconscious.

Also,
David Quinn wrote:
My question is does consciousness mimic the "billiard ball" mechanical universe we are familiar with.
Yes, but instead of billiard balls think of chemical reactions, electronic pulses, data processing, feedback loops, the strengthening or weakening of neural pathways, alert triggers (emotions), etc.
Those are the causes of consciousness, rather than consciousness itself. Of course, it depends on the definition of consciousness. I define it to be the awareness of things. A brain that causes this awareness through its functioning may be said to be conscious, but that doesn't mean that a conscious experience somehow *literally* exists inside it.
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Re: 2 Principles to question Q,S and R

Post by chikoka »

jupiviv wrote: A 90 year old man is obviously not exactly the same as he was when he was 5. In fact, a person is not exactly the same from one moment to another.
Try not the same man.period. All the materials he is made from would not be the same as the ones he had when he was 5.(remove the exactly).

Since ,i assume you to think , our consciousnesses are supervention's over the brain, since the whole brain would have changed are you prepared to say he is a totally different person?
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