The Meaning of Life

[Blair]

Notice how Laird never, ever responds to my posts.

The same twit who banned me from his little hole KIR for saying vaginas stink.

Hey Laird, your a fucking joke mate.

Love the beard, you wannabe sack of shit.

[Kunga]

The meaning of life is to authentically be yourself. (That was the first post )
Prince...think about it...why on earth should anyone respond to you when you ooze of personal attacks ?

[cousinbasil]

Cousinbasil,

I think I see what you are saying. But, there is a inherit problem with paradoxical thought. They are fun to think about; but, the recursive logic locks one into an unanswerable question. If I could reword Russells's paradox; it seems that I could just say " The infinite set contains all subsets." Since I can't I have to leave the paradox as is.

The question is whether my statement is true or not? All matter is composed of energy.

If it is true, then, does the statement not encompass all matter in the universe?

If you agree that this statement applies to all matter in the universe, then isn't the statement a universal truism.

If I'm mistaken at lest the thought exercise has been fun. Thank you.

Well, yes, your statement can be true or not! It happens to be true. It can be true or not because it admits of dualism.

Saying cause and effect applies to everything, physical and otherwise (such as all our thoughts are caused, etc.) It does not admit of duality. If it were true about everything, it tells us nothing about any particular thing, since it must be true about every particular thing by definition. We might as well have never heard of it.

An example of this principle is in messaging, where the more often a character appears, the less information any single occurrence carries. It is why in abbreviating, it is usually safer to omit the vowels. Since every word has at least one but there only five possible ones, the occurrence of any one is more superfluous. "E" is the most ubiquitous, therefore the most expendable.

Yes the exercise is fun. Mere exercise often is.

[cousinbasil]

cousinbasil: Simply, all random events have causes because all events do.

Laird: There's that bold assumption. :-)

Well, I disagree. It may be an assumption, but is is hardly bold.

Here's why. No matter what event I can think of, I can think of what would have been at least one of its causes. It seems natural, therefore, to assume that all events have at least one cause. Until, that is, I can think of one or be shown one that has none. Obviously, no one can show me one, since then that person will have had to have done something to cause it to happen. (Here's an example of where David is claiming we are dealing with a logical truth and not an empirical one.)

Next, if any event I can envision has at least one cause, it logically can have more than one, since I can readily think of such examples. It may be a mistaken application of inductive reasoning to leap to saying every event is fully caused, but if so, it should be easy enough to point out the mistake. It turns out there is only one way to do this, however, and that is one must provide an example of an event X that has no causes. This is true obviously since if we can identify even one, and we cannot demonstrate that it had more than one, we can say it only had one cause and was therefore "fully" caused. If we can demonstrate an additional cause, we can claim it only had the two and so on. In a sense, therefore, the concept of "fully" is a moot one.

The ball is rather in the court of the objector, Laird. It is not as if one has a dog in the race. There is no ulterior motive to asserting Causality as discussed here, aside from the fact that while it is an assumption, it appears to be the best one and not [easily] assailable.

[Locke]

Here's why. No matter what event I can think of, I can think of what would have been at least one of its causes.

" Cause" seems to be used as a temporal marker in these situations. If you'll allow; since " cause" attempts no explanation nor definition of the event marked; and because " cause" has no scale. It can be infinitely big and conversely infinitely small. What it is seemingly used for is to mark in time, the exact moment that one state has changed to another state. If this is true can't that word "cause" then be substituted with " Something". Since " something" makes no attempts at definition nor has limits in scale; these two words seem interchangeable in these situations. " Why was the photon emitted at that precise moment? Something happened?"

I may be reaching; but, please consider it.

[David Quinn]

You're chasing a red-herring here. This is an all-or-nothing kind of issue. It doesn't admit of any kind of grey. Either all things are caused, or none of them are. There can be no in between.

David, feeling depressed? :D

This automatically rules out the situation you are trying to imagine - which is that some things could be uncaused.

The reason for this is that causality is ultimately a logical truth, not an empirical one. Causality is literally a corollary of existence.

It is not something which can be proved or disproved empirically. It is either proven logically, or not at all.

OK, so go ahead and prove logically that, ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned, every event is fully caused by prior events.

It has already been logically proven, via the demonstration earlier that it is impossible for a thing to exist in the absence of other things. Already, straight away, with this demonstration alone, uncausality is proven to be utterly impossible, anywhere. The impact of prior causes on the present is thereby proven.

You're conception of causality is still very crude

Why do you do this, man? Is there really any need for this kind of condescension?

I'm just dealing with you honestly. Your conception of casuality is crude, which is what manufactures the "absurdities" and "paradoxes" that you see. Faulty conceptions clashing with each other.

The way you constantly mangle such a glorious concept into a pile of putrid filth simply for the sake of boosting yourself up is objectionable to the extreme.

You're conception of causality is still very crude, which is what generates the "absurdity". There is actually no clash at all between causality and the experience of free will when these things are properly understood.

It wouldn't seem so absurd if the claim was that our wills are under the total control of a higher will, such that our decisions are actually willed by that higher will even whilst we (under the power of that will) believe them to be our own, but to deny the existence of free will at all anywhere in the universe leaves us effectively as unwitting actors acting out a pre-written script - and then you would claim that the script itself wasn't willed... and so we are left with the absurdity of being actors acting out an "unwritten" script. I don't expect you to agree but to me this doesn't add up.

It doesn't satisfy you emotionally. That is what it all comes down to. The pleasure you gain from uncovering truth is far outweighted by numerous other competing desires and pleasures.

Not that you had any choice, of course.

-

[cousinbasil]

Why was the photon emitted at that precise moment? Something happened?

Something, yes, but not just anything, for starters. Let's call this something event W. When we insist that W be a prior event, we mean something rather specific, which narrows down all the possible anythings to a smaller set of possible somethings. W must be an event such that event X falls withing the light cone of W. It turns out this rather strictly limits our list of suspects when we try to determine at least one cause for event X.

My insistence that X has at least one cause W implies logically that the same must be true for W, and in this sense we are implying that every event X has more than one cause.

Let us take that photon which has been emitted. We say it is caused and then try to find its immediate cause, the one most proximal to it in some spatial and/or temporal sense. But consider we need not necessarily find this most proximal cause, event W, to claim X has been caused. Remember, we are claiming X has been caused because we claim every event has been! Therefore, let us take what appears to be "one of" the causes for X. Let us say, event V is that we flipped the light switch to the bulb from which the photon was emitted.

Are you with me so far? If we can say V was a cause for X, then obviously X was caused. If whenever we repeat event V (cause it to happen!), X follows (a photon is emitted), we can reasonably conclude that since the particular photon at the particular event X(0) under consideration was preceded by an event V(0), that V(0) caused X(0), and that in general, X is caused by V.

We may if we wish take an intermediate event W such that W lies within V's light cone, and that X in turn lies within W's light cone. All such events W could be a candidate to be a more immediate cause for X than V is.

Let us say W is the event that a current of at least a minimum magnitude goes through the light bulb's filament. Whenever W happens, X happens. When W does not happen, X does not happen. We could not say this about about event V, since we could happen with the light bulb loosened and so W does not follow V, and X never occurs.

Narrowing events down in this manner always leads one to a best possible candidate for THE cause of an event. But in any case, it seems always possible to think of and postulate A cause.

We don't call the prior event "something" simply because it cannot be just "anything." Not all prior events qualify. And it should be a simple matter to see that our light cone restriction is necessary but not sufficient. A candidate event C for a cause of event X must be more specific. One should like some repeatability, in that if we can cause C to happen, X is more likely to subsequently happen than if C does not happen.

[Carmel]

Laird:
It wouldn't seem so absurd if the claim was that our wills are under the total control of a higher will, such that our decisions are actually willed by that higher will even whilst we (under the power of that will) believe them to be our own, but to deny the existence of free will at all anywhere in the universe leaves us effectively as unwitting actors acting out a pre-written script - and then you would claim that the script itself wasn't willed... and so we are left with the absurdity of being actors acting out an "unwritten" script. I don't expect you to agree but to me this doesn't add up.

Carmel:
Embrace the absurdity! :)

...but, you're right, I don't agree with you. This isn't a strong enough argument to negate the logical viability of causality. Maybe the notion of causality bothers you because you see it as limiting, it makes you feel like a puppet on a string? Is that it? I can see why this idea would be discomforting to people, but I don't view it quite that way.

I find it liberating in the sense that if we become more attuned to the causes of our own(and others) behaviour and attitudes, we can adjust our perceptions accordingly and, to some degree, release ourselves from being affected by said causes. We act, instead of react...

[Locke]

must be an event such that event X falls withing the light cone of W. It turns out this rather strictly limits our list of suspects when we try to determine at least one cause for event X.

Firstly, your analogy is very well reasoned. I appreciate thought and was afraid that a belief in " causality" would limit it; but, you have proven otherwise here.

But, with the fractal logic of "causality" couldn't I extend the light cone of W?
The electrons in the filament heat the wire due to resistance.
The electrons flow due to the circuit that is completed once the light switch is flipped.
The impetus to brighten the room causes me to flip the switch.
Me being born.
Collecting the right amount of star dust on this world to start life.
Stars burning out.
Stars being created.
The universe starts.

These are all in the light cone of the photon being emitted; and, if just one didn't happen the photon wouldn't have been emitted, correct? So, to simplify wouldn't it be correct ( in a causal sense) to say that event W was caused by the beginning of the universe?

[David Quinn]

Which itself was caused, and so onwards into beginningless reality.

-

[guest_of_logic]

cousinbasil: Simply, all random events have causes because all events do.

Laird: There's that bold assumption. :-)

cousinbasil: Well, I disagree. It may be an assumption, but is is hardly bold.

Granted - I misread it out of context (after splitting up your post for response) to mean "all random events are fully caused because all events are fully caused".

{I}f we can identify even one [cause], and we cannot demonstrate that [an event] had more than one, we can say it only had one cause and was therefore "fully" caused. If we can demonstrate an additional cause, we can claim it only had the two and so on. In a sense, therefore, the concept of "fully" is a moot one.

But cousinbasil, you can't seriously be proposing a definition of "fully caused" as "having as many causes as it has", can you? It's "moot" only because it's tautological.

More importantly, though, it's irrelevant to the truth of causal determinism. It can't be used as an argument in support of causal determinism except by indulging in the type of conflation that's David's tendency. Causal determinism entails that an event is fully determined by prior events: saying (tautologically) that an event "has as many causes as it has" has no bearing on the truth of this.

The ball is rather in the court of the objector, Laird. It is not as if one has a dog in the race. There is no ulterior motive to asserting Causality as discussed here, aside from the fact that while it is an assumption, it appears to be the best one and not [easily] assailable.

I've raised (in various guises) the logical possibility that the universe is non-deterministic, in other words that the current state of the universe is not wholly determined by past states of the universe, and until such time as anyone sees their way fit to disproving that possibility, consider your Causality assailed. ;-)

guest_of_logic: OK, so go ahead and prove logically that, ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned, every event is fully caused by prior events.

David: It has already been logically proven, via the demonstration earlier that it is impossible for a thing to exist in the absence of other things. Already, straight away, with this demonstration alone, uncausality is proven to be utterly impossible, anywhere. The impact of prior causes on the present is thereby proven.

But that doesn't even come close to proving what I asked you to prove, David. The first sentence relies on the same conflation that I mentioned in an earlier post, even though the wording of the challenge specifically forbids this. The second two sentences are unresponsive to the challenge, and could even be described as strawmen: the challenge had nothing to do with "uncausality" nor the mere "impact" of prior causes. In case it wasn't clear from the wording, which I phrased in terms that I thought would be most palatable to you, the challenge was to prove the truth of causal determinism - perhaps I should have phrased it simply as that to avoid confusion. If you actually can prove that, though, then I'd suggest adding it to the Arguments section of the Wikipedia article on causal determinism, and adding a note to the article on indeterminism that it's been logically proven false...

[guest_of_logic]

Embrace the absurdity! :)

Heh. Well, like I said, I don't have any foolproof purely logical argument against determinism, but nor have I seen a foolproof purely logical argument for it.

This isn't a strong enough argument to negate the logical viability of causality.

Yep, and I wouldn't expect it to convince a committed determinist - just some food for thought / a perspective.

Maybe the notion of causality bothers you because you see it as limiting, it makes you feel like a puppet on a string? Is that it? I can see why this idea would be discomforting to people, but I don't view it quite that way.

That might play a part. Professor Norman Swartz has an interesting take on this issue in which he argues that the apparent conflict between free will and determinism arises simply because we confuse description with prescription.

I find it liberating in the sense that if we become more attuned to the causes of our own(and others) behaviour and attitudes, we can adjust our perceptions accordingly and, to some degree, release ourselves from being affected by said causes. We act, instead of react...

That might also be possible to a large extent under an non-deterministic universe too - it would just depend on exactly how non-deterministic the universe was.

[Blair]

Go and visit some kids in a cancer ward Laird, and put your argument to them.

[jamec9869]

sometimes i find myself when faced with certain thoughts or situations if i think too deeply about the pertaining matter it ultimately debilitates me from acting decisively in the first place. we're almost forced beyond all recognition of will to choose a moral side as we humans don't really see too much of the gray in between the black and white of good and evil having much effect, but i personally think that the gray area is what holds all truth.






__________________
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[David Quinn]

guest_of_logic: OK, so go ahead and prove logically that, ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned, every event is fully caused by prior events.
David: It has already been logically proven, via the demonstration earlier that it is impossible for a thing to exist in the absence of other things. Already, straight away, with this demonstration alone, uncausality is proven to be utterly impossible, anywhere. The impact of prior causes on the present is thereby proven.

But that doesn't even come close to proving what I asked you to prove, David. The first sentence relies on the same conflation that I mentioned in an earlier post, even though the wording of the challenge specifically forbids this. The second two sentences are unresponsive to the challenge, and could even be described as strawmen: the challenge had nothing to do with "uncausality" nor the mere "impact" of prior causes. In case it wasn't clear from the wording, which I phrased in terms that I thought would be most palatable to you, the challenge was to prove the truth of causal determinism - perhaps I should have phrased it simply as that to avoid confusion.

Why would I want to prove an irrational conception like "causal determinism"?

It isn't true that "an event is fully determined by prior events". Rather, an event is fully determined by the sum total of all its causes, both past and present.

-

[m4tt_666]

guest_of_logic: OK, so go ahead and prove logically that, ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned, every event is fully caused by prior events.
David: It has already been logically proven, via the demonstration earlier that it is impossible for a thing to exist in the absence of other things. Already, straight away, with this demonstration alone, uncausality is proven to be utterly impossible, anywhere. The impact of prior causes on the present is thereby proven.

But that doesn't even come close to proving what I asked you to prove, David. The first sentence relies on the same conflation that I mentioned in an earlier post, even though the wording of the challenge specifically forbids this. The second two sentences are unresponsive to the challenge, and could even be described as strawmen: the challenge had nothing to do with "uncausality" nor the mere "impact" of prior causes. In case it wasn't clear from the wording, which I phrased in terms that I thought would be most palatable to you, the challenge was to prove the truth of causal determinism - perhaps I should have phrased it simply as that to avoid confusion.

Why would I want to prove an irrational conception like "causal determinism"?

It isn't true that "an event is fully determined by prior events". Rather, an event is fully determined by the sum total of all its causes, both past and present.

-

agreed. truth lies within the exact moment an action is perceived to be happening and is immediately falsified by the continuance of time. nothing is 100% true, because honestly, how much can we really trust our five senses? in my opinion, of course.

[guest_of_logic]

Why would I want to prove an irrational conception like "causal determinism"?

If somehow we were able to rewind the universe five years, and then let it continue on its course again, would it follow the exact same course that it followed in the original five years and end up after five years in the exact same state that it is in now?

It isn't true that "an event is fully determined by prior events". Rather, an event is fully determined by the sum total of all its causes, both past and present.

I'm aware that that's your position, which is why the challenge specified, "ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned" i.e. the causes in the present. In other words, the challenge was to prove that if you assume that the causes in the present have already been accounted for - i.e. so that they can be ignored and removed from the sum for the purposes of the proof - then the causes from the past fully determine the event.

[cousinbasil]

cousinbasill: If we can identify even one [cause], and we cannot demonstrate that [an event] had more than one, we can say it only had one cause and was therefore "fully" caused. If we can demonstrate an additional cause, we can claim it only had the two and so on. In a sense, therefore, the concept of "fully" is a moot one.
Laird: But cousinbasil, you can't seriously be proposing a definition of "fully caused" as "having as many causes as it has", can you? It's "moot" only because it's tautological... Causal determinism entails that an event is fully determined by prior events: saying (tautologically) that an event "has as many causes as it has" has no bearing on the truth of this.

Well, it's not tautological. A tautology is a restatement that is unnecessary because it adds nothing. My purpose in the quote above was to render the discussion in a simpler but logically equivalent form. By this I mean that it is meaningless to speak about an event being "fully" caused because that would imply it could be partially caused. In other words, leave the word "fully" out. The discussion is therefore: are all events caused?

The reason I do this should be clear. If you give me any event, all I need to do is give you one cause to show that causal determinism holds, or else you could demand I give you all causes, and if I couldn't, you claim causal determinism does not hold. If I claim it only has the one, you would say "prove it."

With what I say in the quote above, I am denying the possibility an event can be partially caused. If I say CD always holds, it is therefore up to you to give an example in which it does not. You cannot demand I give you all the causes and prove my list is exhaustive, or else claim I have not shown it has been "fully" caused and therefore CD is false.

Are we clear on this? No tautologies here, my friend.

BTW, I read Prigogine's Order out of Chaos, mentioned in the link you gave, a number of years ago. I must say I did not take it to imply the end of determinism. Perhaps it is time for me to revisit it.

[guest_of_logic]

With what I say in the quote above, I am denying the possibility an event can be partially caused. If I say CD always holds, it is therefore up to you to give an example in which it does not. You cannot demand I give you all the causes and prove my list is exhaustive, or else claim I have not shown it has been "fully" caused and therefore CD is false.

The reason that I find this unhelpful is that it avoids the central requirement of a proof of causal determinism: that given the complete set of causes in a system at one time, the subsequent complete set of events in the system at a later time is a given; fixed; predetermined. Given this, there is no need to dispense with a definition of "fully caused": we can meaningful define it such that, given whatever causes an event has, it could have been no other way than the way that it is - that its set of causes "fully" determines it. Given this definition of "fully caused", "partially caused" could be taken as meaning that whatever causes an event has are insufficient to fully determine it: that, if we could rewind the universe such that the same set of causes again occurred, and then replay it, the event in question need not occur again nor with the exact same properties that it had the first time around.

The question of whether the state of the universe at a given time is fully determined by past states of the universe is an empirical one, which is why I don't believe that causal determinism can be proved through "pure logic".

[cousinbasil]

The reason that I find this unhelpful is that it avoids the central requirement of a proof of causal determinism: that given the complete set of causes in a system at one time, the subsequent complete set of events in the system at a later time is a given; fixed; predetermined.

I didn't know the task is to prove causal determinism.

I thought we were dealing with the simpler question of "Are all events caused?" I say yes. You say no. I can give you countless example of events and their causes. All you have to do is give me an example of an event for which no causes can be listed. If I can give you at least one cause, I have voided your example. You might then say, "But you have given me one cause. How do I know the event was fully caused?" This is why I insist beforehand that an event X is either caused or it is not. It cannot be partially caused. It can be partially caused by a specific event W, in that other events besides W went into causing X. But that there is at least this W means that X has been caused.

We are getting bogged down here, I think. For starters, I am simply talking about any event you can give me. Then I am asking, did it have at least one cause. If yes, it has been caused. I therefore induce that all events have at least one cause, ie, that all events are caused. I do not have to prove this. In fact, one cannot prove an induction. Thus, it becomes one's task to disprove it, since inductions can be and often are disproved. It becomes your task, that is, since you are the one who denies my induction.

We'd do better to approach it this way, since it is simpler and more of a logical issue than an empirical one. This is in line with David's reasoning, I believe, and I agree it makes things clearer.

Otherwise, I'd have to ask you what you mean by system. Open? Closed? Isolated?

Keep in mind, to say all things are caused is not to say that all things are predetermined. You do understand this important distinction? The second implies the first, but the first does not imply the second.

[cousinbasil]

By the way, give me an example of a system in which either the complete set of causes is known or a subsequent complete set of effects is known. Here any type of system will do, open, closed, or isolated.

You are making a proof of causal determinism necessitate that one be able to know both complete sets in every type of system in all possible instances, something which you know is not possible even in theory.

Again, you are asking for proof of an induction.

[Blair]

If somehow we were able to rewind the universe five years, and then let it continue on its course again, would it follow the exact same course that it followed in the original five years and end up after five years in the exact same state that it is in now?

If you rewind a movie five minutes, will it play back the same movie?

[cousinbasil]

If somehow we were able to rewind the universe five years, and then let it continue on its course again, would it follow the exact same course that it followed in the original five years and end up after five years in the exact same state that it is in now?

If you rewind a movie five minutes, will it play back the same movie?

prince, I am not sure your example demonstrates anything here. The answer to your question is obviously "yes."

It has no bearing, however, on Laird's question you quote. So let me answer his question in turn. The answer is yes, Laird. Now prove me wrong.

[Carmel]

cousinbasil:
It has no bearing, however, on Laird's question you quote. So let me answer his question in turn. The answer is yes, Laird. Now prove me wrong.

Carmel:
not necessarily. Keep in mind that in Laird's scenario an entirely new cause was introduced to the causal chain/web, a rather drastic one at that; time travel, going back in time five years. It's easily conceivable that this new cause could alter the chain of events, but even if past events changed as a result, this scenario wouldn't contradict causality.

[cousinbasil]

cousinbasil:
It has no bearing, however, on Laird's question you quote. So let me answer his question in turn. The answer is yes, Laird. Now prove me wrong.

Carmel:
not necessarily. Keep in mind that in Laird's scenario an entirely new cause was introduced to the causal chain/web, a rather drastic one at that; time travel, going back in time five years. It's easily conceivable that this new cause could alter the chain of events, but even if past events changed as a result, this scenario wouldn't contradict causality.

Carmel - I think Laird was not proposing time-travel to the past, but you are correct in saying it would not contradict causality. It was merely a tought experiment from our guest-of-logic.