Palestine: from the fall of the Ottomans to Today

[vicdan]

You mean the price as marginal cost approaching the long run average costs? That's called the long run equilibrium and certainly it shows itself to all the commodity markets.

IIRC the actual marginal extraction cost for light crude goes as low as $1/bbl or so in some oil fields, though it's been years since I looked. You can't show oil gravitating to that number, can you? Didn't think so.

There is that funny word in your quote, 'average'. What goes into that average is determined by supply and demand. For example, Alberta tar sands have fairly high extraction cost. They aren't going to be exploited if oil is down to $10/bbl; in fact, oil price has to be about $35-40/bbl, IIRC, before mining tar sands becomes profitable. As such, when the demand goes up and drives up the price, the average extraction cost goes up as well, because more expensive sites get exploited.

No matter how you spin it, there is no such thing as 'real value' of a thing -- precisely because value is a characteristic not of things, but of relationships between people and things.

Marx said that 'normal' and 'average' profit is nothing but selling a commodity at its real value, the crystallization of the total quantity of labor bestowed upon it, which would include way more than the direct production methods and wages.

It's a crystalization of costs in a specific supply/demand context; i.e. for specific curve of commodity supply and a specific curve of commodity demand. See my point about tar sands above.

And it shouldn't be hard to see how even a large profit margin on the long run has to return and tends to return to the workers or their whole general constituency. It's like a thermodynamic law of the preservation of labor value!

You do realize that under standard economic model, efficient free market will always gravitate towards zero profit, right? All the gains will accrue to the populace, in the forms of wages and lower prices.

[guest_of_logic]

I assume that that's an anthropocentric statement.

of course. have you met any other entities capable of holding a moral position and assigning moral valuation lately?

How did morality enter the equation? Your original statement referred to "value" without qualification, and certainly without moral qualification.

Until we meet other lifeforms capable of the same, valuation will necessarily remain an anthropocentric thing.

Morality absent, there's nothing uniquely human about valuing: albeit that other animals may not be particularly conscious of their valuation of things, they nevertheless do value them, for example, food and sex. The biosphere has value to other animals too, regardless of whether they can articulate that value. In that light I'll repeat the question which you ignored:

Why shouldn't we also consider the value of the biosphere to other animals, or even of just other life?

[vicdan]

How did morality enter the equation?

Because the question about biosphere is at its bottom either an anthropocentic utility question (we benefit from a healthy biosphere) or a moral question (we ought to protect the biosphere for its own sake): other species should be treated well either because it benefits us, or because they are moral agents and harming them is immoral. It's either a usefulness-to-us question, or morality-to-them question.

Why shouldn't we also consider the value of the biosphere to other animals, or even of just other life?

OK, let me do a reduction ad absurdum here.

Let's say we recognize animals valuing life. We see a rabbit get attacked by a hawk. The rabbit being a moral agent, we have a moral obligation to save it, comparable to the moral obligation to save a person being attacked.

If you disagree that this is the necessary outcome, i invite you to formulate a coherent normative framework where we have an obligation to save rabbits as species from extinction, but not an individual rabbit from death.

See, there is precedent: our views of genocide. however, the evil of genocide stems from the harm done to individual people, with some other stuff added on top; individual valuation comes first. In your case, you need it the other way around: you need us to have an obligation to save a species, but not an individual.

[guest_of_logic]

How did morality enter the equation?

Because the question about biosphere is at its bottom either an anthropocentic utility question (we benefit from a healthy biosphere) or a moral question (we ought to protect the biosphere for its own sake): other species should be treated well either because it benefits us, or because they are moral agents and harming them is immoral. It's either a usefulness-to-us question, or morality-to-them question.

I agree that it could reasonably be seen as a moral issue, but in the light of your original framing, moral concerns don't need to be introduced. The dichotomy in your last sentence betrays your bias, and my question is essentially questioning that bias: "usefulness-to-us" vs "morality-to-them". Why in considering humans do we take "usefulness" into account whereas in considering animals we instead take "morality" into account? Why, in considering animals, shouldn't we take "usefulness" (to them) into account rather than "morality"?

The line between usefulness and morality is blurry in this situation - for example it could be argued that we consider usefulness-to-us because it is morally right for humans to lead happy lives - so let's not get distracted by issues like that: please focus on my primary concern, which is how you justify your anthropocentric attitude (which I see as basically being: "when it comes to the biosphere, only human utility should be considered, and not animal utility").

If you disagree that this is the necessary outcome, i invite you to formulate a coherent normative framework where we have an obligation to save rabbits as species from extinction, but not an individual rabbit from death.

There's no need for me to formulate that framework, because I can solve the original conundrum. If the hawk were killing purely for pleasure, then I'd agree that we should save the rabbit from death. The truth is that, usually, saving rabbits from hawks is effectively killing hawks.

[vicdan]

I agree that it could reasonably be seen as a moral issue, but in the light of your original framing, moral concerns don't need to be introduced. The dichotomy in your last sentence betrays your bias, and my question is essentially questioning that bias: "usefulness-to-us" vs "morality-to-them". Why in considering humans do we take "usefulness" into account whereas in considering animals we instead take "morality" into account? Why, in considering animals, shouldn't we take "usefulness" (to them) into account rather than "morality"?

Because the only reason for us to care what they find useful, is either its usefulness to us, or our recognition of animals as moral agents.

A tune-up may be useful to a car, but only a lunatic would suggest that this should matter in itself, because cars aren't moral agents. Assuming we agree that animals find survival useful, that still doesn't automatically imply any reason why we should give a fuck. There still has to be a link to us, a way to go from animal well-being to human decision-making. Such link must be either utility or morality; either usefulness or moral obligation to agency.

please focus on my primary concern, which is how you justify your anthropocentric attitude (which I see as basically being: "when it comes to the biosphere, only human utility should be considered, and not animal utility").

i already did -- I have shown that granting animals moral agency is incoherent. However, i don't actually have to justify it. We grant moral agency to other people, but not to the overwhelming majority of the rest of the Universe. The only prima facie consensus is about people being subject to moral concerns. As such, it's incumbent upon you to argue that we ought to extend moral agency to animals, and show how this can be done coherently. Otherwise, the null-hypothesis kicks in, the default assumption that there is no relationship between moral agency and other species.

There's no need for me to formulate that framework, because I can solve the original conundrum. If the hawk were killing purely for pleasure, then I'd agree that we should save the rabbit from death. The truth is that, usually, saving rabbits from hawks is effectively killing hawks.

That's no solution. A hawk kills countless rabbits. Killing the hawk saves multiple rabbits -- just like, say, killing a mass murderer on a shooting spree saves multiple people. Plus, the hawk is the aggressor. :)

And in case you intend to argue that killing hawks will in fact result more rabbit deaths due to the ecology getting unbalanced, this is still an evasion. In a broader picture, if animals are moral agents, then we have a moral obligation to find some way to prevent their killing, e.g. to devise some means by which hawks can be fed, and rabbit population effectively controlled, without killing either rabbits or hawks.

[guest_of_logic]

guest_of_logic: Why, in considering animals, shouldn't we take "usefulness" (to them) into account rather than "morality"?

vicdan: Because the only reason for us to care what they find useful, is either its usefulness to us, or our recognition of animals as moral agents.

I don't see why we need to go so far as to recognise them as moral agents, to me it's enough to recognise them as conscious[*] agents capable of suffering and pain, which can be enhanced or reduced.

[*] Let's not get into an argument about the extent of their consciousness, such as whether they're self-aware to the extent that they can recognise themselves in a mirror - I'm not arguing that their consciousness is identical to ours, just that it exists to a significant enough extent for us to take into account what's useful to them as well as what's useful to humans.

Assuming we agree that animals find survival useful, that still doesn't automatically imply any reason why we should give a fuck.

So why not just go the whole way and say "Assuming I decide that other human beings find survival useful, that doesn't automatically imply any reason why I should give a fuck"? I understand that your response to that would be something like "Other human beings are moral agents though", but what does an agent's capacity for moral action have to do with whether we should pay them consideration? Isn't our own moral agency more relevant, namely our moral imperative to minimise suffering and death - not just for other moral agents but for anything capable of experiencing same?

I have shown that granting animals moral agency is incoherent.

I assume that by "granting" you mean "recognising the existence of in". In other words, your contention is that animals do not possess moral agency. I mostly agree, but I think that some animals have at least rudimentary moral sense. I don't accept one of the premises of your showing, though. You wrote, "The rabbit being a moral agent, we have a moral obligation to save it". Your premise seems to be that moral agents (and, implicitly, no others) are deserving of our concern. It is the implicit part of the premise that I disagree with. Why are moral agents alone deserving of being saved rather than all conscious agents regardless of whether they happen to be moral, so long as they value their own lives?

As such, it's incumbent upon you to argue that we ought to extend moral agency to animals, and show how this can be done coherently.

No, it's not, because I reject your premise that only moral agents are deserving of our concern. To me the key issue is not whether an entity is moral or not, but whether it is conscious and capable of suffering/pleasure, and whether or not it values its life (which I assume to be true by default).

A hawk kills countless rabbits. Killing the hawk saves multiple rabbits -- just like, say, killing a mass murderer on a shooting spree saves multiple people. Plus, the hawk is the aggressor. :)

And in case you intend to argue that killing hawks will in fact result more rabbit deaths due to the ecology getting unbalanced, this is still an evasion. In a broader picture, if animals are moral agents, then we have a moral obligation to find some way to prevent their killing, e.g. to devise some means by which hawks can be fed, and rabbit population effectively controlled, without killing either rabbits or hawks.

Hmm, that's a challenging reply. I have two responses. The first is that I do think that species diversity is important, so that I would not advocate killing all hawks by preventing them from killing rabbits (for food). It's not something that I can justify through logic, it's just that I value that diversity. My second response is that I'm undecided as to whether I think that your moral obligation applies (since to me the capacity for conscious suffering/pleasure is the issue rather than moral agency, and since I attribute that capacity to rabbits and hawks, then it would seem that it must apply). On the one hand, I'd like to think so - the prevention of animal death seems like a worthy moral imperative. On the other hand, I'm loath to advocate that we "get in there and meddle with things" to the extent that the natural environments and/or (feeding/reproduction) habits of animals are changed, because this will potentially reduce their quality of life, and because it is potentially such a huge job that it would cause a reduction in human quality of life. I suppose that given adequate technology, the obligation could be fulfilled non-invasively and with minimal effort - e.g. unmanned helicopters spraying targeted rabbit-fertility-reduction drugs over the entire habitat.

[vicdan]

All your other responses eventually reduce to this issue.

A hawk kills countless rabbits. Killing the hawk saves multiple rabbits -- just like, say, killing a mass murderer on a shooting spree saves multiple people. Plus, the hawk is the aggressor. :)

And in case you intend to argue that killing hawks will in fact result more rabbit deaths due to the ecology getting unbalanced, this is still an evasion. In a broader picture, if animals are moral agents, then we have a moral obligation to find some way to prevent their killing, e.g. to devise some means by which hawks can be fed, and rabbit population effectively controlled, without killing either rabbits or hawks.

Hmm, that's a challenging reply. I have two responses. The first is that I do think that species diversity is important, so that I would not advocate killing all hawks by preventing them from killing rabbits (for food). It's not something that I can justify through logic, it's just that I value that diversity.

Species diversity is most definitely important to us, as we benefit from heterogeneous ecosystem. Monoculture is death. However, if you mean that species diversity is important in itself, then you are right, you cannot justify it through logic.

My second response is that I'm undecided as to whether I think that your moral obligation applies (since to me the capacity for conscious suffering/pleasure is the issue rather than moral agency, and since I attribute that capacity to rabbits and hawks, then it would seem that it must apply). On the one hand, I'd like to think so - the prevention of animal death seems like a worthy moral imperative. On the other hand, I'm loath to advocate that we "get in there and meddle with things" to the extent that the natural environments and/or (feeding/reproduction) habits of animals are changed, because this will potentially reduce their quality of life, and because it is potentially such a huge job that it would cause a reduction in human quality of life.

Like i said, taking this road on animal rights and ecology leads to absurd conclusions.

I suppose that given adequate technology, the obligation could be fulfilled non-invasively and with minimal effort - e.g. unmanned helicopters spraying targeted rabbit-fertility-reduction drugs over the entire habitat.

Should we devote major effort to developing such a technology? And providing we have such a technology, should we use it? Should we become the micromanagers of the ecosystem, fulfilling the role of prey/predator relastionship?

Here is another thing for you to think about: animal cruelty laws. We commonly think that it's about animals, but we ban animal cruelty even as we kill animals for food. What animal cruelty laws are really about is human cruelty. People who wantonly inflict suffering upon animals tend to be more likely to wantonly inflict suffering upon people as well; anti-cruelty stance is an attempt to nip that in the bud, to send the right signal early on.

As such, animal cruelty laws aren't about protecting animals from cruelty, they are about us protecting ourselves from becoming cruel.

[Jason]

Here is another thing for you to think about: animal cruelty laws. We commonly think that it's about animals, but we ban animal cruelty even as we kill animals for food.

No you're absolutely wrong and your logic stinks. Killing and cruelty are not one and the same thing, one does not necessarily entail the other to any great extent as far as many animals go. An unexpected blow to the head kills without cruelty, for example. The process of raising and killing animals for food can be done in a variety of ways, some more cruel than others. Animal welfare laws seek to minimize to an accepted level the amount of cruelty/suffering involved in this process, just as they seek the same for animals which are not being used for food.

What animal cruelty laws are really about is human cruelty. People who wantonly inflict suffering upon animals tend to be more likely to wantonly inflict suffering upon people as well; anti-cruelty stance is an attempt to nip that in the bud, to send the right signal early on.

As such, animal cruelty laws aren't about protecting animals from cruelty, they are about us protecting ourselves from becoming cruel.

Wanton cruelty against animals certainly concerns people for this reason, but people also genuinely care about the welfare of animals too. Don't you feel empathy and compassion for animals Victor?

[vicdan]

Of course. However, empathy is not the basis of laws. Furthermore, satisfying our sense of empathy is itself about us -- about us not feeling the 'proxy suffering'. That's why we don't ban eating animals in general: because as long as the killing takes place far away in a factory farm, we are shielded from this proxy effect.

No matter which way you slice it, animal cruelty laws are about us first.

For as stark illustration that this is the case, consider the fact that animal cruelty laws commonly apply different standards to pets, other domesticated animals, and wild animals. The laws furthermore commonly set different standards for different kinds of animals -- warm- and cold-blooded vertebrates, and invertebrates.

None of this can be explained by how animals feel (except the taxonomic distinction to some small extent), but it can be explained perfectly well by how we feel.

[guest_of_logic]

All your other responses eventually reduce to this issue.

I disagree. You still haven't justified (to my satisfaction anyway) your anthropocentrism, you've merely asserted it several times. Please answer this variation of the questions that I've been posing to you:

Why are moral agents alone deserving of having what's useful for them considered, rather than all conscious agents regardless of whether they happen to be moral?

Species diversity is most definitely important to us, as we benefit from heterogeneous ecosystem. Monoculture is death.

You could substitute "all (or most) species on the planet" for "us". Why didn't you?

However, if you mean that species diversity is important in itself, then you are right, you cannot justify it through logic.

Well, I could make various arguments, but whether they're compelling to any individual will probably depend on that individual's values and perspective on the world. One argument is based on the premise that it is desirable for the world to have as many unique experiences as possible for conscious beings (which is itself based on the premise that experience itself is intrinsically valuable). Since contact with, and - in the case of humans - study of, each different species is a unique experience, it is desirable to have as many unique species as possible. Another argument (but very, very related) requires a less anthropocentric view than yours, and posits that it is desirable in general to have as many unique experiences of self-existence as a different type of consciousness/life available, and since (presumably) each species constitutes a different type of consciousness/life, then the more the variety of species, the better. Basically these reduce down to "variety is the spice of life".

Like i said, taking this road on animal rights and ecology leads to absurd conclusions.

It's complex. Most people would agree that if you injure an animal by hitting it with your car, then the moral thing to do is to provide it with veterinary services to prevent it from dying. Few people would agree though that if a hawk is about to kill a rabbit, you should provide the rabbit with defensive services to prevent it from dying. Somewhere there's a line, and I suspect that it's blurry.

Here is another thing for you to think about: animal cruelty laws. We commonly think that it's about animals, but we ban animal cruelty even as we kill animals for food.

I'm a vegetarian so I escape that particular contradiction (to some extent anyway - I suppose that it could be argued that I could do more to prevent animals from being killed for our food than just ceasing to purchase, support or consume meat products).

What animal cruelty laws are really about is human cruelty. People who wantonly inflict suffering upon animals tend to be more likely to wantonly inflict suffering upon people as well; anti-cruelty stance is an attempt to nip that in the bud, to send the right signal early on.

As such, animal cruelty laws aren't about protecting animals from cruelty, they are about us protecting ourselves from becoming cruel.

Yeah, well, I disagree with your analysis. Your proposed motivation for animal cruelty laws might have some bearing on them, but as far as I'm concerned the primary motivation (at least the reason why I support them) is the one that you identified as what we "commonly think": "that it's about animals".

[brokenhead]

No, it's not, because I reject your premise that only moral agents are deserving of our concern. To me the key issue is not whether an entity is moral or not, but whether it is conscious and capable of suffering/pleasure, and whether or not it values its life (which I assume to be true by default).

But this key issue is not resolved in my view, at least not the way it appears to be resolved in yours.

First of all, no living organism has come into possession of life of its own volition. That is true without the need for for it to be assumed by default.

Secondly, it has been observed that all life is suffering. This does not need to assumed true for the observation to have profound implications. One immediate implication is that every organism is destined to experience suffering due to the fact of its own unchosen existence alone.

Thirdly, it is impossible for a member of any one species to determine the level of "consciousness" of a member of any other species. It is not observed in nature that a predator will attempt to make such a determination before selecting its prey. The sole determination is whether the prey will suffice to satisfy a need, usually that of nourishment.

Fourth, in nature we see in play the principle of kill or die. This could take the form of killing for food or killing for self defense. Sometimes, the purely amoral drive to kill can be to ensure the survival of one's DNA, as when the male of a species might kill the young of a female that are not its own offspring.

From all this we can deduce that morality is not a term we can readily ascribe to organisms outside our own species. Since you have argued in the quote above that this is not the issue, we are left to consider the organisms capacity for suffering/pleasure. I propose that such a consideration is naturally - that is, by nature - limited in scope. We cannot know such things to any degree of certainty, and we observe that the rest of nature appears to be largely indifferent to them.

For instance, livestock are bred for numbers. Many food-producing organisms exist because of man's interference than would exist in the absence of that interference. These organisms are often more well-fed than naturally occurring ones would be. Still, it can be argued that their very existence is a suffering, which, when ended by being slaughtered, lessens the hunger of other life. In addition, if all body parts are utilized, then this lessens the physical suffering of of other life, such as if hide is used for clothing, etc.

What you seem to be doing is applying compassion where nature judges it to be superfluous. Killing an animal wantonly for no reason is not the same as killing it for a purpose. Animal cruelty is really human cruelty as vicdan has observed, but it strikes me that the PETA folks that protest fur coats are more often self-righteous than righteous, and are almost universally blind to the difference.


Although how this applies to this thread is kind of obscure...

[Jason]

Of course. However, empathy is not the basis of laws.

Animal welfare and minimizing animal suffering for the animal's sake are overtly the basis of many laws.

Furthermore, satisfying our sense of empathy is itself about us -- about us not feeling the 'proxy suffering'. That's why we don't ban eating animals in general: because as long as the killing takes place far away in a factory farm, we are shielded from this proxy effect.

Ok, well animal welfare laws are just a way to help to further remove this "proxy suffering" in us then. The same can be said about laws which deal with removing the "proxy suffering" that is caused by cruelty carried out against humans.

No matter which way you slice it, animal cruelty laws are about us first.

If that's the way you wanna spin it then it could be argued that all laws are about us first - everyone is an egoist at heart, we can only ultimately feel our own feelings.

For as stark illustration that this is the case, consider the fact that animal cruelty laws commonly apply different standards to pets, other domesticated animals, and wild animals. The laws furthermore commonly set different standards for different kinds of animals -- warm- and cold-blooded vertebrates, and invertebrates.

None of this can be explained by how animals feel (except the taxonomic distinction to some small extent), but it can be explained perfectly well by how we feel.

It's partly explained by how the animals feel, and partly explained by how we feel about what the particular animal feels. The issue is that the way "we" feel about particular animals can appear inconsistent when compared against other metrics.

[guest_of_logic]

No, it's not, because I reject your premise that only moral agents are deserving of our concern. To me the key issue is not whether an entity is moral or not, but whether it is conscious and capable of suffering/pleasure, and whether or not it values its life (which I assume to be true by default).

[...]
What you seem to be doing is applying compassion where nature judges it to be superfluous.

What I'm doing is questioning why Vic promotes anthropocentrism as opposed to something more species-neutral (I'm not arguing for total neutrality, I'm just curious why Vic is as anthropocentric as he is). He hasn't given me an answer yet. I can think of answers that he might be able to give, which is why I'm so puzzled that he keeps on avoiding the question.

[vicdan]

You still haven't justified (to my satisfaction anyway) your anthropocentrism, you've merely asserted it several times. Please answer this variation of the questions that I've been posing to you:

Why are moral agents alone deserving of having what's useful for them considered, rather than all conscious agents regardless of whether they happen to be moral?

i already addressed that -- I demonstrated that extending this concern to other species leads to absurd conclusions, e.g. our moral obligation to protect rabbits from hawks. If you want to dispute this further, it is now incumbent upon you to at least demonstrate what coherent normative framework we could use to distinguish the two categories of cases (protecting animals from human cruelty vs. protecting animals from animal cruelty); to say nothing of your subsequent obligation to actually argue why we should in fact adopt this framework.

One argument is based on the premise that it is desirable for the world to have as many unique experiences as possible for conscious beings

This is not an argument, this is question-begging. You are in effect simply assuming a variation of your conclusion which is just as untenable as your desired conclusion itself.

Yeah, well, I disagree with your analysis. Your proposed motivation for animal cruelty laws might have some bearing on them, but as far as I'm concerned the primary motivation (at least the reason why I support them) is the one that you identified as what we "commonly think": "that it's about animals".

Then why don't we protect rabbits from hawks? Why do we protect cute furry animals more than ugly slithery animals? Why do we protect big animals, like dogs and cows, more than tiny animals like mice and rats? From the consciousness perspective, they are about equally conscious. In fact, rats are some of the smartest non-primate animals around. Why don't anti-cruelty laws ban conventional mouse- and rat-traps?

No, dude(tte), it's not about animals. It's about us. We like to pretend it's about animals.

[vicdan]

Animal welfare and minimizing animal suffering for the animal's sake are overtly the basis of many laws.

Indeed. And protecting the family is overtly the basis of many anti-gay-marriage laws. That and $5 will buy you a mocha frappuccino at Starbucks.

Again, a simple question: why don't animal cruelty laws commonly ban conventional mouse- and rat-traps? Those are certainly cruel, you know.

Ok, well animal welfare laws are just a way to help to further remove this "proxy suffering" in us then. The same can be said about laws which deal with removing the "proxy suffering" that is caused by cruelty carried out against humans.

Give me some examples.

If that's the way you wanna spin it then it could be argued that all laws are about us first - everyone is an egoist at heart, we can only ultimately feel our own feelings.

And yet laws applying to humans generally have the universality (within a given country) that the laws applying to animals don't. That's the qualitative difference. Judging by our laws, we care about all humans, which suggests that we indeed care about humans' welfare; but our animal cruelty laws only ban certain kinds of cruelty to certain kinds of animals, suggesting that the moral basis for animal cruelty laws is radically different from the moral basis for laws which ban mistreatment of humans.

It's partly explained by how the animals feel, and partly explained by how we feel about what the particular animal feels.

No, the former aspect is wholly superfluous. If we only care about the suffering of animals we care about, then the determinant feature of the composition of those two factors is which animals we care about; because all animals evidence some sort of ability to suffer, they all seek to avoid death, so adding that in is like multiplying an equation by 1 -- it changes nothing but adds useless fluff. Thus introducing animal suffering as an primary rather than derivative) feature not only doesn't add tot he explanatory power of the model, it in fact reduces it.

P.S. You wanted to know about some of the lies I used to tell myself? This topic represents one of them.

[vicdan]

What I'm doing is questioning why Vic promotes anthropocentrism as opposed to something more species-neutral

What I am promoting is totally species-neutral. I advocate not anthropocentrism, but cognition-centrism. So far, we are pretty much the only knows category of life possessing advanced cognition and moral agency. If we encounter (or construct) others, i will happily extend the same consideration to them. In fact, I am rather undecided about apes and some dolphins, because they do seem to possess fairly sophisticated cognition, and thus are very nearly primitive moral agents.

In case you wonder, I consider the key relevant feature of cognition to be reflexivity -- ability to recognize self. Certain experiments show apes and dolphins possessing reflexivity, and no other species apparently.

[guest_of_logic]

Why are moral agents alone deserving of having what's useful for them considered, rather than all conscious agents regardless of whether they happen to be moral?

i already addressed that -- I demonstrated that extending this concern to other species leads to absurd conclusions, e.g. our moral obligation to protect rabbits from hawks. If you want to dispute this further, it is now incumbent upon you to at least demonstrate what coherent normative framework we could use to distinguish the two categories of cases (protecting animals from human cruelty vs. protecting animals from animal cruelty); to say nothing of your subsequent obligation to actually argue why we should in fact adopt this framework.

Your demonstration deals with a separate issue though: the issue of our moral obligation to protect animals from death - clearly this is a morally fraught issue given the existence of carnivores, whose continued life relies on other animals' death. I was originally asking about a simpler issue that is not so morally fraught: why we shouldn't take into consideration the utility of the biosphere to animals, and not just to humans. The two issues can be considered separately, even though they are loosely related.

One argument is based on the premise that it is desirable for the world to have as many unique experiences as possible for conscious beings

This is not an argument, this is question-begging. You are in effect simply assuming a variation of your conclusion which is just as untenable as your desired conclusion itself.

It's not quite question-begging - the premise and the conclusion are different enough to avoid that fallacy, but please recall that I acknowledged that it was a value-based premise: it's "untenable" to you, but that's merely your subjective opinion.

Yeah, well, I disagree with your analysis. Your proposed motivation for animal cruelty laws might have some bearing on them, but as far as I'm concerned the primary motivation (at least the reason why I support them) is the one that you identified as what we "commonly think": "that it's about animals".

Then why don't we protect rabbits from hawks?

Probably because protecting rabbits from hawks would kill off all hawks and unbalance the ecosystem, and because we don't believe that the alternative of intervention of the type that you questioned whether it was our moral obligation to provide is warranted to avoid that unbalancing.

Why do we protect cute furry animals more than ugly slithery animals? Why do we protect big animals, like dogs and cows, more than tiny animals like mice and rats? From the consciousness perspective, they are about equally conscious. In fact, rats are some of the smartest non-primate animals around.

All that means is that we have prejudices.

Why don't anti-cruelty laws ban conventional mouse- and rat-traps?

Because they're imperfect and due for reform. Why, not so long ago, did laws prevent women and blacks from voting? Just because the electoral laws were imperfect, did it mean that we didn't value the democratic process?

No, dude(tte), it's not about animals. It's about us. We like to pretend it's about animals.

Our prejudices influence it, but the primary motivation is animal welfare.

[vicdan]

Your demonstration deals with a separate issue though: the issue of our moral obligation to protect animals from death - clearly this is a morally fraught issue given the existence of carnivores, whose continued life relies on other animals' death. I was originally asking about a simpler issue that is not so morally fraught: why we shouldn't take into consideration the utility of the biosphere to animals, and not just to humans. The two issues can be considered separately, even though they are loosely related.

No, they can't. it's one and the same issue. If we care about what is of value to animals in itself, then the rabbit/hawk question inevitably arises.

Probably because protecting rabbits from hawks would kill off all hawks and unbalance the ecosystem, and because we don't believe that the alternative of intervention of the type that you questioned whether it was our moral obligation to provide is warranted to avoid that unbalancing.

Then why aren't we looking for better alternatives? I am pretty sure not even PETA and ELF would support the notion that we should try to find a way to intervene in the ecosystem so as to keep it running but without violent deaths.

All that means is that we have prejudices.

Meaning, we only care about some animals and not others, and base our animal-cruelty laws upon that distinction. Quod Erat Demonstrandum.

Because they're imperfect and due for reform. Why, not so long ago, did laws prevent women and blacks from voting? Just because the electoral laws were imperfect, did it mean that we didn't value the democratic process?

No, it meant we didn't consider those groups fully human and meriting consideration in themselves. Which is exactly the point.

Our prejudices influence it, but the primary motivation is animal welfare.

So we have two hypotheses:

1) it's all about us.

2) it's about animals in themselves, but applied unevenly because our prejudices influence the matter. Furthermore, we would in fact oppose certain forms of animal-protecting intervention (e.g. eco-safely protecting rabbits from hawks) because, uhhh, because we don't feel like it! Still furthermore, we don't even care about the deaths of some animals we like (like cute cuddly bunnies) as long as it's not us who is doing the cruel, painful killing.

Parsimony, dude. you can pile Pelion upon Ossa, compounding exceptions with further exceptions, devising ever-more-convoluted explanations -- or you can simply bite the bullet and recognize that we are the determinant feature here, not animals.

Shed your illusions, dude. As Quine had demonstrated, the excuses never run out -- you can always introduce yet another modification, no matter how ridiculous, to make your desired conclusion mesh with the surrounding conceptual framework.

[Jason]

Victor, I don't want animals to experience unnecessary or unreasonable suffering - because I feel empathy and compassion for them. Based at least partly on this empathy and compassion, I desire and support laws which prevent unnecessary or unreasonable suffering to animals. Many other people feel the same way. I see no reason why animal welfare laws can't and aren't enacted based on this widespread empathy and compassion for animals.

[Jason]

Animal welfare and minimizing animal suffering for the animal's sake are overtly the basis of many laws.

Indeed. And protecting the family is overtly the basis of many anti-gay-marriage laws. That and $5 will buy you a mocha frappuccino at Starbucks.

Again, a simple question: why don't animal cruelty laws commonly ban conventional mouse- and rat-traps?

General lack of empathy and compassion for mice and rats, and the fact that wild mice and rats in populated areas are usually considered a problem.

Ok, well animal welfare laws are just a way to help to further remove this "proxy suffering" in us then. The same can be said about laws which deal with removing the "proxy suffering" that is caused by cruelty carried out against humans.

Give me some examples.

Laws against assault and rape.

If that's the way you wanna spin it then it could be argued that all laws are about us first - everyone is an egoist at heart, we can only ultimately feel our own feelings.

And yet laws applying to humans generally have the universality (within a given country) that the laws applying to animals don't. That's the qualitative difference.

This drive toward universality is mostly a recent invention, as is the existence of animal welfare laws. Coincidence? You might also want to consider how very differently the law continues to treat children compared to adults, and the possible similarities that can be drawn in regards to animals.

Judging by our laws, we care about all humans, which suggests that we indeed care about humans' welfare; but our animal cruelty laws only ban certain kinds of cruelty to certain kinds of animals, suggesting that the moral basis for animal cruelty laws is radically different from the moral basis for laws which ban mistreatment of humans.

As I already noted, this attempt at less discriminatory laws is mostly recent. Race, sex, religion, class, lineage and more have been the basis for very different treatment under the law for much of history. And despite these attempts to create more "fair" laws, the reality is that most of us still have differing levels of empathy and compassion for specific humans and for specific animals. For example, most of us feel more for our immediate families than for distant strangers, just as we feel more for our pets than unknown wild animals.

[guest_of_logic]

Your demonstration deals with a separate issue though: the issue of our moral obligation to protect animals from death - clearly this is a morally fraught issue given the existence of carnivores, whose continued life relies on other animals' death. I was originally asking about a simpler issue that is not so morally fraught: why we shouldn't take into consideration the utility of the biosphere to animals, and not just to humans. The two issues can be considered separately, even though they are loosely related.

No, they can't. it's one and the same issue. If we care about what is of value to animals in itself, then the rabbit/hawk question inevitably arises.

I think that you're making the resolution of this dialogue to be more black-and-white than it actually is. Let me give you an example of why I think that your reasoning that just because we don't save rabbits from hawks, it is inconsistent for us to care about what is of value to animals in general, is faulty. When we allow human beings to drive around in cars, we are accepting a certain amount of individual deaths. And yet we don't jump in and intervene to save those people by preventing people from driving cars, do we? And why not? Because we accept that for all humans the benefits of transport are worth the acceptance of a certain level of death. This doesn't lead to the conclusion that our concern with what is of value to humans in general is incoherent. In the same way, the acceptance of a certain level of death in the animal kingdom is worth it for all animals because it leads to a balanced, healthy ecosystem: the system has evolved that way and (barring intervention of the type that you canvassed, which is a challenging and interesting question) it works best that way for animals in general, and in the same way, this doesn't lead to the conclusion that our concern with what is of value to animals in general is incoherent, as you seem to want it to.

Probably because protecting rabbits from hawks would kill off all hawks and unbalance the ecosystem, and because we don't believe that the alternative of intervention of the type that you questioned whether it was our moral obligation to provide is warranted to avoid that unbalancing.

Then why aren't we looking for better alternatives?

I'm not sure that any exist. "Leave the ecosystem to its natural functioning" and "Intervene as humans to prevent deaths in the ecosystem" when it comes to our moral obligations re animal death pretty much seem to cover it as far as I can see. Am I missing something?

All that means is that we have prejudices.

Meaning, we only care about some animals and not others, and base our animal-cruelty laws upon that distinction. Quod Erat Demonstrandum.

As I wrote earlier, things aren't perfect. That doesn't change the fact that in general, and despite the imperfections of prejudice, animal cruelty laws exist primarily out of concern for animals, although I take your point that human concerns obviously do come into it. I mean, if you want to play a QRS-like game you could reduce it all down to concern for humans: we are only concerned for animals because their suffering causes us to feel bad, and our real concern is for humans to not feel bad, but that would be a disingenuous manipulation of what it means to be "concerned" (effectively denying that the term "selfless behaviour" has any meaning, when it obviously does - and, to the altruism-deniers of GF: no, I'm not interested in getting into that tired old debate again).

Because they're imperfect and due for reform. Why, not so long ago, did laws prevent women and blacks from voting? Just because the electoral laws were imperfect, did it mean that we didn't value the democratic process?

No, it meant we didn't consider those groups fully human and meriting consideration in themselves. Which is exactly the point.

No, it's not the point. The point is that exceptions don't deny the generalisation.

So we have two hypotheses:

1) it's all about us.

As I wrote above, I accept that human concerns come into it, I just deny that it's all about us.

2) it's about animals in themselves, but applied unevenly because our prejudices influence the matter. Furthermore, we would in fact oppose certain forms of animal-protecting intervention (e.g. eco-safely protecting rabbits from hawks) because, uhhh, because we don't feel like it!

Yeah, just like we oppose certain forms of human-protecting intervention (e.g. banning all cars) because, uhhh, because we don't feel like it! No, we don't just do it because we don't feel like it, we do it because we deem it best (not just for us, but for all animals) to let nature run its course, except where it gets out of balance.

Still furthermore, we don't even care about the deaths of some animals we like (like cute cuddly bunnies) as long as it's not us who is doing the cruel, painful killing.

Still furthermore, we don't even care about the deaths of some humans we like (like Princess Diana) as long as it's not us who is crashing her car.

Parsimony, dude. you can pile Pelion upon Ossa, compounding exceptions with further exceptions, devising ever-more-convoluted explanations -- or you can simply bite the bullet and recognize that we are the determinant feature here, not animals.

As the most conscious and complex life form on the planet (as far as I know), it's sensible that human considerations should be given the most weight. That doesn't mean that we should consider animals only for their utility to us. Really, they're not (as best as I can tell) very different from us in the most important way: capacity to feel and experience, and in particular to suffer and to experience pleasure.

Shed your illusions, dude.

You haven't convinced me that I have any.

As Quine had demonstrated, the excuses never run out -- you can always introduce yet another modification, no matter how ridiculous, to make your desired conclusion mesh with the surrounding conceptual framework.

Yes, and how will we ever know which of us is doing that?

[vicdan]

Again, a simple question: why don't animal cruelty laws commonly ban conventional mouse- and rat-traps?

General lack of empathy and compassion for mice and rats, and the fact that wild mice and rats in populated areas are usually considered a problem.

Exactly. We don't give a fuck about how animals actually feel. What we give a fuck about is which animals we give a fuck about.

It's not about animals' feelings and pain and suffering, it's about our feelings. Our empathy, our guilt, our disgust.

Laws against assault and rape.

They don't remove proxy suffering. They try to prevent actual suffering.

My point was that when it comes to animals, we don't care about how animals in general feel -- we care about how we feel about animals feelings. We don't care if an animal suffers, as long as this suffering doesn't intrude into our personal sphere. In contrast, judging by our laws, we do care about people getting raped or murdered, even people we don't personally care about or for.

This drive toward universality is mostly a recent invention

Exactly. We didn't actually consider blacks or women fully human and fully persons until recently.

as is the existence of animal welfare laws. Coincidence? You might also want to consider how very differently the law continues to treat children compared to adults, and the possible similarities that can be drawn in regards to animals.

You will have a point when child abuse laws only punish abuse of cute children, or only children near cities.

And despite these attempts to create more "fair" laws, the reality is that most of us still have differing levels of empathy and compassion for specific humans and for specific animals. For example, most of us feel more for our immediate families than for distant strangers, just as we feel more for our pets than unknown wild animals.

Yup. And yet we do -- today -- recognize that all people deserve the equal protection of the law, while we do not recognize that about animals. We care about people in themselves, but we do not extend the same sentiment to animals.

[Jason]

Victor, I don't want animals to experience unnecessary or unreasonable suffering - because I feel empathy and compassion for them. Based at least partly on this empathy and compassion, I desire and support laws which prevent unnecessary or unreasonable suffering to animals. Many other people feel the same way. I see no reason why animal welfare laws can't and aren't enacted based on this widespread empathy and compassion for animals.

Mouse traps.

Self-interest and variations in levels of empathy/compassion allow mousetraps to coexist with widespread concern for animal welfare. Just as self-interest and variations in levels of empathy/compassion allow missiles to coexist with widespread concern for human welfare. It's not so black and white Victor.

[vicdan]

I think that you're making the resolution of this dialogue to be more black-and-white than it actually is. Let me give you an example of why I think that your reasoning that just because we don't save rabbits from hawks, it is inconsistent for us to care about what is of value to animals in general, is faulty. When we allow human beings to drive around in cars, we are accepting a certain amount of individual deaths. And yet we don't jump in and intervene to save those people by preventing people from driving cars, do we? And why not? Because we accept that for all humans the benefits of transport are worth the acceptance of a certain level of death.

But we also try to minimize these deaths -- and we do nothing of the sort for rabbits, nor would we even seriously consider doing so.

Bad analogy. if anything, it demonstrates exactly that we don't care about rabbits in themselves, because we don't try to minimize their violent, painful deaths, the way we do with humans.

Then why aren't we looking for better alternatives?

I'm not sure that any exist. "Leave the ecosystem to its natural functioning" and "Intervene as humans to prevent deaths in the ecosystem" when it comes to our moral obligations re animal death pretty much seem to cover it as far as I can see. Am I missing something?

No, your #2 is exactly the alternative i was speaking about. The question is, why aren't we even trying to find a way to protect the rabbits without unbalancing the ecosystem?

But you already know the answer, right? Anyone who suggested that we should try to protect rabbits from hawks would be laughed out of town, for a good reason.

As I wrote earlier, things aren't perfect. That doesn't change the fact that in general, and despite the imperfections of prejudice, animal cruelty laws exist primarily out of concern for animals, although I take your point that human concerns obviously do come into it. I mean, if you want to play a QRS-like game you could reduce it all down to concern for humans: we are only concerned for animals because their suffering causes us to feel bad, and our real concern is for humans to not feel bad, but that would be a disingenuous manipulation of what it means to be "concerned"

There is a qualitative difference. We make laws to protect all people, regardless of how we feel about them individually or collectively. We emphatically do not do that for animals. in fact, animal cruelty laws protect only a tiny minority of animals -- and only from suffering inflicted by humans.

So which hypothesis do you think fits this fact better -- the supposition that we try to minimize animal suffering, or the supposition that we try to minimize our pangs conscience and our corruption by cruelty?

Remember, the number of cases where animals suffer greatly without malicious human intent vastly outnumber the animals who suffer greatly through malicious human intent. Hell, the agricultural combines kill something around ten rodents per acre when harvesting various grains. Do we give a fuck? I mean, seriously, find me someone who is as concerned about dead field rodents as they are about Fluffy the Cat being abused. Even vegetarians like you -- humane! no animal suffering! -- cause with their industrially farmed diet more deaths than would be caused by someone who only ate range-grazed beef (I ran the number once, the latter would cause about 15 times fewer deaths than the former IIRC).

Nobody gives a fuck, because we aren't there when the helpless field mice flee from the giant whirring blades, and then get painfully sliced into a messy blood-and-guts soup.

No, it's not the point. The point is that exceptions don't deny the generalisation.

No, it means that those 'exceptions' aren't in fact exceptions at all, and instead support my point. We haven't even started extending universal moral concern to humans until recently.

As I wrote above, I accept that human concerns come into it, I just deny that it's all about us.

yes, you do. Without any evidence other than hollow proclamations by people of course; but you do deny it.

Yeah, just like we oppose certain forms of human-protecting intervention (e.g. banning all cars) because, uhhh, because we don't feel like it! No, we don't just do it because we don't feel like it, we do it because we deem it best (not just for us, but for all animals) to let nature run its course, except where it gets out of balance.

Right. Which animals is it better for, to die a painful criel death?

We don't really care about whether the rabbits suffer. We could at least try to minimize their suffering, but we think it better that the rabbits die at the claws and beaks and teeth of predators, screaming in desperate agony as their blood leaks out onto the cold earth.

So tell me, what value is more important than the suffering of all those countless animals? What is it about nature running its course that matters so much? Are you now going to claim that the ecosystem has intrinsic valuation, apart from all the animals which comprise it?

Still furthermore, we don't even care about the deaths of some humans we like (like Princess Diana) as long as it's not us who is crashing her car.

Hmmm. You aren't doing too well on analogies. You are getting desperate, dude, grasping at random straws.

You haven't convinced me that I have any.

No, indeed I haven't. :)

As Quine had demonstrated, the excuses never run out -- you can always introduce yet another modification, no matter how ridiculous, to make your desired conclusion mesh with the surrounding conceptual framework.

Yes, and how will we ever know which of us is doing that?

Oh, we could simply compare the two hypotheses, as I did above. The comparison is quite telling. A clean, concise, coherent explanation, vs. a convoluted mess of exceptions and special clauses.

Do you know how I usually explain Quine-Duhem Thesis?

Imagine that you get on your bathroom scale, and -- horror! -- it shows you to be 10lbs heavier. However, you don't have to believe it. You can instead postulate that you gained no weight, but that the gravity field in your bathroom is distorted. You are trying in the living room, with the same result? Why, the distortion field follows your scales around! etc.

The point of QDT is that evidence never compels any specific conclusion. You can always grab some other conclusion, and with enough twisting and turning and spinning, make it fit. An epistemic system can only be judged holistically, on its systemic merit.

[vicdan]

Self-interest and variations in levels of empathy/compassion allow mousetraps to coexist with widespread concern for animal welfare.

No, they don't.

See, we do have humane, non-lethal mousetraps. however, though we could easily minimize mouse suffering by banning regular mousetraps, we do not. Why? because mice are icky, and we don't care about the suffering of icky animals, except perhaps in a most proximate sense, when a mouse is squirming and squealing right in front of you.