Freedom

[vicdan]

Given the developments in the adjacent thread, this seems relevant. The specific topic in the adjacent theread is a bit different, but the principle is the same: letting other people and beliefs and norms define you unconsciously.

What I believe

I believe we are free. There is no higher purpose, no absolute meaning, no cosmic justice. We only have ourselves and each other; our collective wits and strengths and will, and freedom, always and everywhere, freedom. There is no karma or final judgment, no life after death. Death is no more to be feared because we will cease, than we should fear the time before our birth when we didn't exist. We live out our years, making wise and foolish choices, sowing joy and suffering, as best as we know how -- and then we die, and there is nothing afterwards.

The Universe not only doesn't care, but to even speak about it caring or not caring is a category error. Universe simply is -- and within it, us, free to live our lives, to create and love, destroy and hate. We do not have higher meaning enveloping us, but we create our own. We can't help it -- we are, therefore we create. We exude meaning like trees exude oxygen; it is simply what we do, what we are. We are walking, talking, laughing, loving, world-bestriding generators of meaning.

And then we die.

But now, we live, and now, we are free: free to choose our future, free to embrace the existential void, lacking in any higher meaning or purpose or justice, and fill it with ourselves, our strength and will -- and also free to flee from it, to cower in its presence, whimpering for protection, filling it with our fears and weaknesses and delusions and flaws, oh, how many flaws!

I embrace my freedom. I revel in it. I am my existential void. FREEDOM, baby!!!

[maestro]

But now, we live, and now, we are free: free to choose our future, free to embrace the existential void, lacking in any higher meaning or purpose or justice, and fill it with ourselves, our strength and will -- and also free to flee from it, to cower in its presence, whimpering for protection, filling it with our fears and weaknesses and delusions and flaws, oh, how many flaws!

I embrace my freedom. I revel in it. I am my existential void. FREEDOM, baby!!!

What is the nature of this freedom? Is it partial or complete? When I choose something over the other approximately how much is conditioning and how much is a "free" choice?

Are non-living things free? If not then what is special about life? How does freedom fit in with the free will theorem?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem

[vicdan]

What is the nature of this freedom?

Existential. What makes the difference is what value you give to freedom.

Is it partial or complete?

The term 'complete freedom' is as meaningless as 'absolute up'. Freedom exists in context.

Are non-living things free? If not then what is special about life? How does freedom fit in with the free will theorem?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will_theorem

This theorem simply proves that if you are an idiot who rests free will on non-determinism (i.e. if you believe in libertarian free will), then you must accept that quantum entities are as free-willed as you are.

Of course any decent philosophy student could tell you that defining free will through the determinism/randomness axis is a terrible idea which runs afoul basic logic very fast. This commonsensical notion of free will is, in fact, nonsensical.

[maestro]

This theorem simply proves that if you are an idiot who rests free will on non-determinism (i.e. if you believe in libertarian free will), then you must accept that quantum entities are as free-willed as you are.

Of course any decent philosophy student could tell you that defining free will through the determinism/randomness axis is a terrible idea which runs afoul basic logic very fast. This commonsensical notion of free will is, in fact, nonsensical.

What is a logically sound notion of free will. How does life differ from non life such that one has free will and not the other?

[vicdan]

Look up 'compatibilism'.

Free will is a much-investigated problem. There's really a lot of thought on this subject out there, no need to reinvent the wheel.

As to life vs. non-life -- I think that possession of free will is contingent upon agency, which in turn dependent upon one's ability to interact with the world. in short, it's a fuzzy value. I certainly have no problem with the notion that artificial intelligence might possess free will, and in an extremely primitive way, so might a simple thermostat.

At the point,t he conversation is about to segue into philosophy of mind, which will be a huge detour.

[maestro]

As to life vs. non-life -- I think that possession of free will is contingent upon agency,

What is agency? Is it the soul?

which in turn dependent upon one's ability to interact with the world.

Do not non living things interact with the world?

in short, it's a fuzzy value.

Huh?

[vicdan]

What is agency? Is it the soul?

No.

Do not non living things interact with the world?

yes.

in short, it's a fuzzy value.

Huh?

Math talk. Math helps if you are serious about philosophy.

Fuzzy value is one which by its very nature can be partial, ranging from '0' (not at all) to '1' (absolutely yes). A classic philosophical problem, if you start adding grains one by one, at which point does a few grains become a pile of grain? the answer is that the quality of being 'a pile of grain' is a fuzzy value.

[maestro]

What is agency? Is it the soul?

No.

Then?

in short, it's a fuzzy value.

Huh?

Math talk. Math helps if you are serious about philosophy.

Agency is a fuzzy value?

[Shahrazad]

It sounds to me like he's using agency to mean "a conscious entity", and consciousness comes in different degrees. For example, a rat is more conscious than a tree, and a tree is more conscious than a rock.

[maestro]

If so then he is saying the difference between living and non living is consciousness and unconsciousness. But then that is simply redefining living as conscious and non-living as unconscious, it does not address the question: At which point does the freedom arise?

The crux of the free will theorem is that If humans have some free will, then so will their (non conscious) sub-components.

In short it cannot happen that free will arises in a complicated apparatus formed out of (non-free or causal) components.

[vicdan]

If so then he is saying the difference between living and non living is consciousness and unconsciousness.

Certainly not. In fact, i find the difference between living and non-living to be largely irrelevant. The difference between consciousness and unconsciousness is the atomic issue here, and that difference is a matter of degree. The life issue is a red herring -- your red herring.

But then that is simply redefining living as conscious and non-living as unconscious, it does not address the question: At which point does the freedom arise?

Agency, which is more than consciousness, but related to it. Agency is the ability to affect the world; ability to act -- to perceive, process information, and send out a response designed to affect future perceptions. Agency is the ability to participate.

The crux of the free will theorem is that If humans have some free will, then so will their (non conscious) sub-components.

No, the crux of the free-will theorem is that libertarian free will is bullshit. Free will theorem is the reductio ad absurdum of libertarian free will -- it shows that if you accept LFW, then you must accept absolutely absurd conclusions about free-will nature of quantum entities.

you are stuck thinking about free will in libertarian (philosophical, not political, term) sense. Think outside your box. Follow the link I gave you, for starters.

In short it cannot happen that free will arises in a complicated apparatus formed out of (non-free or causal) components.

You totally misunderstood that theorem, and you are mangling a whole bunch of stuff in the process.

[maestro]

Think outside your box. Follow the link I gave you, for starters.

Why can we not investigate this question,with precise definitions and a clear logical thought process without hiding behind dense philosophical articles?

Setting aside any theorem, can you describe a way in which, freedom of choice arises in a mechanism which is comprised of causal sub-parts with no such freedom?

[Animus]

Vicdan is essentially arguing for natural autonomy. It is caused, but due to its complexity and our limited scope it appears unpredictable. The compatibalist approach is flawed in that it tries to bring notions of libertarianism into the framework of determinism and by definition they are contradictory. The view of natural autonomy is Pseudo-FreeWill. It isn't genuine, just tricky language.

Take for example Dennett's book "Freedom Evolves" it follows this convoluted outline of multiple-worlds and "could have done otherwise" and builds a zig-zagging path around truth to come up with evolving freedom. The view is essentially a pigeon hole of reality. It considers things that appear to us as more complex or unpredictable to have obtained some degree of freedom. Whereas that is a mere fact of our perception. I don't think Dennett actually believes in genuine free-will, he calls it the kind that matters. I think he is pandering to a traditional audience which is why his books tend to be soft on traditional beliefs by comparison to his comtemporaries.

On the other hand Dennett's pals the Churchlands go for the throat in refuting free-will. Henrik Walter calls compatibalism "libertarian delusions" and argues for a concept of "natural autonomy" without the misleading use of language.

The problem with any kind of freedom, be it compatibalism or libertarianism, is that it is nomologically inconsistent at bottom.

[vicdan]

Why can we not investigate this question,with precise definitions and a clear logical thought process without hiding behind dense philosophical articles?

That article is not dense. it is large, but it is written in layman's English. Your unwillingness to read it indicates exactly the problem here -- you aren't interested in investigating the issue, you are interested in bullshitting. You don't want to understand, you want to socialize (in a rather unusual way, but I suppose it's the way you are most familiar with).

Setting aside any theorem, can you describe a way in which, freedom of choice arises in a mechanism which is comprised of causal sub-parts with no such freedom?

let's start from the other end. I will show you why the colloquial account of free will is inadequate.

Joe is deciding whether to have eggs or oatmeal for breakfast. He likes eggs more, so he decides to have eggs. In fact, suppose that this is a deterministic universe, and his decision to have eggs was inevitable. Was it a free-willed decision? Not according to the LFW account. But now suppose it's a world with non-deterministic aspects, like ours, and Joe had a probability of choosing either eggs or oatmeal. he again chooses eggs, his choice being randomly affected. Was this a free-willed decision? How about if we make randomness explicit, and have Joe toss a quantum coin (i.e. truly random, not a pseudo-random one) to make his choice. Now that we recognize a coin toss as the source of his 'choice', can we still regard it as a free choice under LFW model? Of course not.

The point here is: neither determinism nor non-determinism, nor any combination thereof, adequately capture LFW.

The canonical answer to this is to reject causal closure of the Universe, to claim that the source of our free will is soul, or some reasonable facsimile thereof. However, this merely amounts to saying "and here, magic happens" -- no explanation is given of this magical mechanism, neither determinism nor randomness, by which a free-willed decision can be made.

The thing to understand first, then, is that any account of free will based on non-determinism is incoherent.

Do you see why your demand for a clear definition first was so ridiculous? if you are trying to understand free will, positing what you intend to discover is idiocy; you are simply prejudging your own conclusions.

Now, onwards to an alternative account.

LFW sees freedom of will as contingent upon freedom from determination. An alternative is to see it as being free from coercion, i.e. intentional manipulation by other agents. This is a compatibilist alternative, which rejects as false the determinism/free will dichotomy.

To aid your understanding, think about it this way. Suppose Universe is wholly deterministic. Are you therefore lacking in free will because you are subject to the control of the laws of nature? Ah, but why 'subject'? You aren't merely a splinter of wood floating on the ocean's surface, being battered about by the waves but unable to affect them. You are a part of those laws of nature -- a participant, not subject! To say that your future choices are determined by laws of nature is to say that they are, in part, determined by you!

Spend some time thinking about it, dude. Try to understand the falsehood of the subject/object dichotomy, and the nature of the subject-vs-participant contrast.

[vicdan]

Vicdan is essentially arguing for natural autonomy. It is caused, but due to its complexity and our limited scope it appears unpredictable.

No. I do not ground free will in intractability. That's a cheap cop-out for those trapped by their enculturated intuitions.

Take for example Dennett's book "Freedom Evolves" it follows this convoluted outline of multiple-worlds and "could have done otherwise" and builds a zig-zagging path around truth to come up with evolving freedom. The view is essentially a pigeon hole of reality. It considers things that appear to us as more complex or unpredictable to have obtained some degree of freedom. Whereas that is a mere fact of our perception. I don't think Dennett actually believes in genuine free-will, he calls it the kind that matters.

Dennett doesn't believe in any 'genuine' will. He rejects the very concept, the very distinction between genuine and non-genuine (e.g. p-zombies) will, instead adopting the notion of stances -- physical, design, intentional, and personal. A stance is simply a predictively useful, pragmatic accounting of the observed person. it doesn't impute any 'genuine' will to them, and rejects the very concept of 'genuine' will as incoherent. The very distinction between crypto-dualists like Chalmers (and his Hard Problem of Consciousness) and physicalists like Dennett, Quine, and myself, is that the former can't help but play the metaphysical word games while presuming they are discussing noumenal reality.

On the other hand Dennett's pals the Churchlands go for the throat in refuting free-will. Henrik Walter calls compatibalism "libertarian delusions" and argues for a concept of "natural autonomy" without the misleading use of language.

The use of language is perfectly adequate. We use concepts like 'freedom' and 'choice' in a very concrete and important way, and usage determines meaning. What fails is the colloquial accounting of the underlying mechanism of these notions, but that merely calls for better accounting thereof, not for rejecting that language altogether.

The problem with any kind of freedom, be it compatibalism or libertarianism, is that it is nomologically inconsistent at bottom.

How so?

[maestro]

To aid your understanding, think about it this way. Suppose Universe is wholly deterministic. Are you therefore lacking in free will because you are subject to the control of the laws of nature?
Ah, but why 'subject'? You aren't merely a splinter of wood floating on the ocean's surface, being battered about by the waves but unable to affect them. You are a part of those laws of nature -- a participant, not subject!

To say that your future choices are determined by laws of nature is to say that they are, in part, determined by you!

Spend some time thinking about it, dude. Try to understand the falsehood of the subject/object dichotomy, and the subject-vs-participant contrast.

Is not the concept of a participant or the "you" superfluous. The universe as a whole acts on the whole, any part cannot act independently.

Roughly consciousness is a kind of feedback system, where a part strives to preserve its structural integrity through sensing, feedback and memory. Its actions seem to have intent, mainly of self structural preservation, but they are not free.

LFW sees freedom of will as contingent upon freedom from determination. An alternative is to see it as being free from coercion, i.e. intentional manipulation by other agents. This is a compatibilist alternative, which rejects as false the determinism/free will dichotomy.

Distinction between agent and other influences is superfluous. If intentional action is determined then an agent is no better than any other system. For example if I wanted to ski and had to cancel it due to rain, was my hand forced by the weather agent (Zeus perhaps).

That article is not dense. it is large, but it is written in layman's English. Your unwillingness to read it indicates exactly the problem here -- you aren't interested in investigating the issue, you are interested in bullshitting. You don't want to understand, you want to socialize (in a rather unusual way, but I suppose it's the way you are most familiar with).

This is an academician's tactic, to cover up his lack of understanding by throwing dense/huge texts at you. If you are clear about something it should be explicable in simple and straightforward language.

[vicdan]

This is an academician's tactic, to cover up his lack of understanding by throwing dense/huge texts at you. If you are clear about something it should be explicable in simple and straightforward language.

And it is, dude. That article should take you all of 10 minutes to read. if your threshold for 'simply explicable' is lower than that, you are in much deeper trouble than not understanding free will -- it means you have the attention span of a crackhead couch potato.

it's not an academician's trick. I am not an academician, at least not in philosophy. It's a 'trick' or someone who has seen the same stupid square wheel reinvented dozens of times, and who would rather not go through the same sophomoric contortions again.

You don't want to understand, however. You want to socialize. You want to be paid attention to. If you want to understand, familiarizing yourself with the previous work, even on a most superficial level, is the most straight-forward way to start. If you wanted to understand, you would have tried to educate yourself.

[maestro]

Indeed, all the answers are out there somewhere, no doubt already mulled over by smart philosophers. No need to think or clarify your thoughts.

[vicdan]

Oh, thinking is a must -- to clarify; i.e. take what others came up with, and make it better. However, there has to be a starting point to improve upon, and the more improved already, the better.

Stand on the shoulders of giants, instead of wanking off. That's what people do when they genuinely want to understand -- they build upon prior thought, and add their own contributions.

Those who are just wankers, instead demand that they be coddled with attention and spoon-fed knowledge.

[maestro]

I have read what others have to say about the matter, and the link which so smugly posted is one of the first any web search on the matter will reveal.

You only know something if you can explain it clearly to another person. Giving references and making vague statements is not it (although this happens a lot in academia).


My time is better spent in discussing this topic with others than you, whose main aim is to attack people and get a rise out of them, and to show off your (imaginary) superior knowledge. Seems like this is the way in which your will to power works.

[vicdan]

I have read what others have to say about the matter, and the link which so smugly posted is one of the first any web search on the matter will reveal.

That's why I gave it to you, dude. I googled 'compatibilism' and grabbed the first decent link which came up. Duh.

You only know something if you can explain it clearly to another person. Giving references and making vague statements is not it (although this happens a lot in academia).

i also gave you an explanation -- a rather lengthy one, as far as discussion boards go -- but you seem to have decided to ignore it.

My time is better spent in discussing this topic with others than you, whose main aim is to attack people and get a rise out of them, and to show off your (imaginary) superior knowledge. Seems like this is the way in which your will to power works.

Then why the fuck did you respond? i started this thread, you know. Yours was the very first response, and that response made it quite clear that you weren't interested in discussion, not possessed of any familiarity with the topic.

But you didn't want to explore the subject, did you? You just wanted to wank around; to socialize in a particularly dysfunctional way.

Go play in a sandbox, dude.

[David Quinn]

Victor, you might have to face the possibility that your own use of language isn't very clear. It is often difficult to discern what you are actually arguing for, no matter what the subject is. Perhaps, deep down, you do this deliberately, so that when people are unable to comprehend your comments, it gives you the opportunity to abuse them.

Let's see if I can translate your point of view into plain-speak:

Genuine free will is impossible under any scenario, whether it be in a deterministic or non-deterministic universe.

At the same time, we are not simply automatons who respond in knee-jerk fashion to outside agencies. We can repond intelligently to events and participate meaningfully in shaping the future, due to the complexity of the human brain and its ability to assess incoming information in a sophisticated manner. We are part of the universe and its laws, not helpless outside agencies being buffeted by them.

So we have free will in a practical sense, even though there are antecedents causes to our every decision. To all intents and purposes we have the ability to make decisions that affect the future, even though this is ultimately an illusion.

Is that close to what you are arguing?

You state in your opening article that our freedom is a product of there being no higher purpose to the universe (which is obviously true), but you're not so clear on the origin of our choices and what implications that has on our notions of freedom.

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[vicdan]

Victor, you might have to face the possibility that your own use of language isn't very clear. It is often difficult to discern what you are actually arguing for, no matter what the subject is. Perhaps, deep down, you do this deliberately, so that when people are unable to comprehend your comments, it gives you the opportunity to abuse them.

Let's see if I can translate your point of view into plain-speak:

Genuine free will is impossible under any scenario, whether it be in a deterministic or non-deterministic universe.

Wrong already. The very calling of it 'Genuine free will' is what is being disputed. I call it 'Libertarian Free Will' for a reason -- it's one specific conceptualization of free will.

You are also wrong in that it's only impossible in a physically causally closed universe. if souls really exist on a separate plain of reality, it's posible that the LFW model is correct. it's just a totally incoherent argument, as it is being made.

At the same time, we are not simply automatons who respond in knee-jerk fashion to outside agencies. We can repond intelligently to events and participate meaningfully in shaping the future, due to the complexity of the human brain and its ability to assess incoming information in a sophisticated manner. We are part of the universe and its laws, not helpless outside agencies being buffeted by them.

Yup.

So we have free will in a practical sense, even though there are antecedents causes to our every decision. To all intents and purposes we have the ability to make decisions that affect the future, even though this is ultimately an illusion.

Nope.

Is that close to what you are arguing?

No. See my note on your 'genuine free will' passage. You are stuck in noumenal thinking, as always.

You state in your opening article that our freedom is a product of there being no higher purpose to the universe (which is obviously true), but you're not so clear on the origin of our choices and what implications that has on our notions of freedom.

That's because the OP was intended not as a philosophical treatise on the nature of free will, but as a manifesto of a sort. The purpose was to directly attack the enculturated shackles which, once you realize that there is no higher meaning or purpose, still stand between us and the open-armed embrace of freedom -- the "Freedom is a burden, I want my mommy!" attitude which pervades so must existentialist thought.

[Joe-Draper]

Freedom to me is not to be influenced by someone else's idea over your own, if your idea is best. Freedom is emotional detachment. Freedom is absolute truth, free from worldly attachments. Truth is reality, reality is you. Freedom is individual, free from delusion.

Truth is freedom!

Freedom is free from egotical mind-set, it is geniune contentment of the spirit, an acceptance of your whole being.

Freedom fears no one!

Joe

[David Quinn]

Victor, you might have to face the possibility that your own use of language isn't very clear. It is often difficult to discern what you are actually arguing for, no matter what the subject is. Perhaps, deep down, you do this deliberately, so that when people are unable to comprehend your comments, it gives you the opportunity to abuse them.

Let's see if I can translate your point of view into plain-speak:

Genuine free will is impossible under any scenario, whether it be in a deterministic or non-deterministic universe.

Wrong already. The very calling of it 'Genuine free will' is what is being disputed. I call it 'Libertarian Free Will' for a reason -- it's one specific conceptualization of free will.

I'm sure you understood what I meant - namely, free will operating independently of all antecedent causes. Free will that is genuinely free.

We're not going to have a semantic argument, are we?

You are also wrong in that it's only impossible in a physically causally closed universe. if souls really exist on a separate plain of reality, it's posible that the LFW model is correct. it's just a totally incoherent argument, as it is being made.

These hypothetical souls would also either exist in a deterministic or indeterministic universe (or some combination of the two). As such, the positing of them solves nothing. I agree that the arguments used to support genuine free will (or LFW, as you call it) are incoherent.

So we have free will in a practical sense, even though there are antecedents causes to our every decision. To all intents and purposes we have the ability to make decisions that affect the future, even though this is ultimately an illusion.

Nope.

So we don't have the ability to make decisions that affect the future ...?

Is that close to what you are arguing?

No. See my note on your 'genuine free will' passage. You are stuck in noumenal thinking, as always.

I don't know even know what noumenal thinking means. Uncovering what is real, perhaps.

You state in your opening article that our freedom is a product of there being no higher purpose to the universe (which is obviously true), but you're not so clear on the origin of our choices and what implications that has on our notions of freedom.

That's because the OP was intended not as a philosophical treatise on the nature of free will, but as a manifesto of a sort. The purpose was to directly attack the enculturated shackles which, once you realize that there is no higher meaning or purpose, still stand between us and the open-armed embrace of freedom -- the "Freedom is a burden, I want my mommy!" attitude which pervades so must existentialist thought.

So what is freedom then? The ability to cope with a meaningless, purposeless universe?

You're very vague on the issue's nitty-gritty.

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