I'll quote a bit from section 3.2, page 14 to give you an idea how the topic is approached.
3.2 Randomness is Indeterminism?
The comparative neglect of the concept of randomness by philosophers is in large part due, I think, to the pervasive belief in the pernicious hypothesis that a physical process is random just when that process is indeterministic. Hellman, while concurring with our conclusion that no mathematical definition of random sequence can adequately capture physical randomness, claims that ‘physical randomness’ is “roughly interchangeable with ‘indeterministicâ€â€™ (Hellman, 1978, 83). Indeterminism here means that the complete and correct scientific theory of the process is indeterministic. A scientific theory we take to be a class of models (van Fraassen, 1989, ch. 9). An individual model will be a particular history of the states that a system traverses (...)
Is it plausible that the catalogue of random phenomena we began with can be simply unified by the assumption that randomness is indeterminism? It seems not. Many of the phenomena we enumerated do not seem to depend for their randomness on the fact that the world in which they are instantiated is one where quantum indeterminism is the correct theory of the microphysical realm. One can certainly imagine that Newton was right. In Newtonian possible worlds, the kinds of random phenomena that chaotic dynamics gives rise to are perfectly physically possible; so too with random mating, which depends on a high-level probabilistic hypothesis about the structure of mating interactions, not low-level indeterminism. Our definition of indeterminism made no mention of the concept of probability; an adequate understanding of randomness, on the other hand, must show how randomness and probability are related—hence indeterminism cannot be randomness. Moreover, we must at least allow for the possibility that quantum mechanics will turn out to be deterministic, as on the Bohm theory (Bell, 1987b).
Finally, it seems wrong to say that coin tossing is indeterministic, or that creatures engage in indeterministic mating: it would turn out to be something of a philosophical embarrassment if the only analysis our profession could provide made these claims correct.
One response of behalf of the pernicious hypothesis is that, while classical physics is deterministic, it is nevertheless, on occasion, a useful idealisation to pretend that a given process is indeterministic, and hence random. I think that this response confuses the content of concepts deployed within a theory, like the concept of randomness, with the external factors that contribute to the adoption of a theory, such as that theory being adequate for the task at hand, and therefore being a useful idealisation. Classical statistical mechanics does not say that it is a useful idealisation that gas motion is random; the theory is an idealisation that says gas motion is random, simpliciter. Here, I attempt to give a characterisation of randomness that is uniform across all theories, regardless of whether those theories are deployed as idealisations or as perfectly accurate descriptions. We must also be careful to explain why the hypothesis that randomness is indeterminism seems plausible to the extent that it does. I think that the historical connection of determinism with prediction in the Laplacean vision can explain the intuitive pull of the idea that randomness is objective indeterminism. I believe that a historical mistake still governs our thinking in this area, for when increasing conceptual sophistication enabled us to tease apart the concepts of determinism and predictability, randomness remained connected to determinism, rather than with its rightful partner, predictability.
