know 'self' as hallucination = enlightenment.

[Sphere70]

How can a picture "be there", filling the space, while "passed out of all relation to something outside"? How could such picture still be "sensuous" or identifying anything at all? The reverse might actually happen: all innumerable but undeniable relations to any "outside" revealing inherent emptiness of each and every picture and experience.

Maybe he uses the word 'sensuous' as defined in the first paragraph of the dictionary instead of the other definition which it lists (which implies a pleasurable experience)?:

The first definition being:
'relating to and affecting the senses rather than the intellect'

Of course although I personally find the distinction not to be there. Eitherway it implies "something outside" affecting the senses as well as the side of the senses themselves and their internal structures and relations with each other. It seems almost as if Schopenhauer is trying to get to a sense of the causeless and timeless without facing the truth it would be just another sense in the end: meaningless without being able to connect it to something.

To me it just sounds like an explanation of the quality from functioning without the created interpreter called self. There is a seeing without the intermediate step of a someone who sees and who will consequently apply its abstract knowledge during a moment when the need for it is not there.

[Trevor Salyzyn]

so it's not possible to be enlightened - know truth before my delusion alters it?

You aren't enlightened, and you've admitted as such. You also agreed that unless you are enlightened, you can't know what enlightenment is. So, why on earth would you value it? You are valuing something that you call enlightenment, but simultaneously apprehend that it isn't valuable, since it's not enlightenment. You aren't walking a fine line here. You have embraced a contradiction.

being free of that self-conscious loop. that would be enlightenment. reality as it is.

I see no reason to call that enlightenment, any more than I see any reason to call freedom from the delusions of self, or freedom from any other of the million delusions people can have, enlightenment. Don't you sense that you're diluting all meaning from the word by calling this enlightenment, then that enlightenment?

if you don't think enlightenment is possible, what is?

It's possible to get rid of delusions. It's possible to experience altered states of consciousness. It's possible to free yourself from work. It's possible to live a simple life of quiet meditation. It's possible to experience the fruits of meditation. It's possible to starve yourself in spirit or flesh. It's possible to be a solitary hermit. It's possible to take asceticism to the absolute extremes. It's possible to think logically. It's possible to live in the moment. It's possible to be compassionate. It's possible to seek truth. People usually mean one of these things when they recommend enlightenment. Why seek enlightenment when it means so many different things?

I don't call any of these things enlightenment. There's simply no need. I've already given them perfectly adequate names that don't cause confusion.

What I might call enlightenment is something that goes by many names and descriptions, but all names point at one difficult-to-grasp thing, something the average person does not know what by this is meant, because they have not experienced it. Nirvana, Buddha-consciousness, ultimate liberation, the perfection of wisdom, heaven... to an enlightened man, these concepts cause no confusion whatsoever.

my concepts need to be destroyed as they replace previous ones, until i finally learn to stop having concepts as opposed to experience.

Why would you ever want to stop having concepts? Apart from whether or not someone has called that enlightenment in front of you, do you think that is a worthwhile exercise?

how about the reality of constant flux, or the non-existence of 'things'? not a belief in it it, but the actual?

You are trying to separate truth from belief, which is impossible. Only a belief can be true or false. What you've got here isn't even a thought.

does 'self' for you mean simply experience as it is gathered from your perceptions, or perhaps the experience of experience, ie, thoughts/feelings about it?

There is absolutely nothing you will experience that cannot be labelled 'self'. It's a very clumsy name for a concept, since it excludes nothing. Getting rid of it is intellectual suicide. It's also impossible, unless you're one of those zombies.

isnt logic only applicable to man-made structures?

I'd be careful with the word "only", since there is literally nothing you would ever be able to exempt from logic if this were true. You will never escape man-made structures, even if you turn all your structures into water.

is reality a man-made structure, or only knowable as such?

Would it make a difference?

[Diebert van Rhijn]

There is a seeing without the intermediate step of a someone who sees and who will consequently apply its abstract knowledge during a moment when the need for it is not there.

It sure can appear that way. Doesn't mean some truth is uncovered! It's just a technique, a visual effect of a crossed mind's eye. And by the way: applying abstract knowledge is never "during the moment", and where lies that moment in the first place? All interpretation happens later, just like you are interpreting it as "seeing without seer", which sounds still quite abstract and deductive.

[cousinbasil]

It's possible to get rid of delusions. It's possible to experience altered states of consciousness. It's possible to free yourself from work. It's possible to live a simple life of quiet meditation. It's possible to experience the fruits of meditation. It's possible to starve yourself in spirit or flesh. It's possible to be a solitary hermit. It's possible to take asceticism to the absolute extremes. It's possible to think logically. It's possible to live in the moment. It's possible to be compassionate. It's possible to seek truth. People usually mean one of these things when they recommend enlightenment. Why seek enlightenment when it means so many different things?

I don't call any of these things enlightenment. There's simply no need. I've already given them perfectly adequate names that don't cause confusion.

Well, one wouldn't want to call any of these things enlightenment, since enlightenment would preclude some of them and perhaps include the rest, which would make none of them the equivalent of enlightenment.

Let's take the ones that enlightenment would include (seeking truth, being compassionate, etc.) A jury or ordinary men and women can seek the truth, but since they are ordinary, they are not enlightened. Forrest Gump is compassionate, and , well, he's a "slow" person.

Anyone can assume a martial-arts stance. But that does not replace the concept of Tai Chi, for example, or render it inconsequential or meaningless.

I wouldn't be so quick to throw away the idea of enlightenment simply because I am aware I have not reached it.

[Sphere70]

There is a seeing without the intermediate step of a someone who sees and who will consequently apply its abstract knowledge during a moment when the need for it is not there.

It sure can appear that way. Doesn't mean some truth is uncovered! It's just a technique, a visual effect of a crossed mind's eye. And by the way: applying abstract knowledge is never "during the moment", and where lies that moment in the first place? All interpretation happens later, just like you are interpreting it as "seeing without seer", which sounds still quite abstract and deductive.

For the subjective person a truth might very well be uncovered - not as a calculus with a neat answer in the end, but as living.
And a study of the, sometimes stumbled, descriptions from the many sages claiming "enlightenment" this seems to be what is happening to the body and its relation to the mind - do you deny that it seems from their words that a actual shift of how the workings of the body/mind functions change from how it seems to function in many other people - might they be a low grade thinker or a heavy thinker? That is, memory seem to still record events as regular, and when a demand arises, like a question from a second person, the answer comes out easily and uncontrived. Will with others the mind seems constantly active, never giving the underlying quality of potent spirit (insert preferred word) the chance to do its work.
And true, there is really just one moment and to cut it up in time is another of minds great trick - but again, there is a qualitative difference of being constantly focused on this experience of psychological time and interpretations derived from it rather then to "experience" the timelessness of the reality.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

There is a seeing without the intermediate step of a someone who sees and who will consequently apply its abstract knowledge during a moment when the need for it is not there.

It sure can appear that way. Doesn't mean some truth is uncovered! .

For the subjective person a truth might very well be uncovered - not as a calculus with a neat answer in the end, but as living.

The seeing arises with the seer. That is what ultimately can be seen. An example of a living truth might therefore be to go blind.

And a study of the, sometimes stumbled, descriptions from the many sages claiming "enlightenment" this seems to be what is happening to the body and its relation to the mind - do you deny that it seems from their words that a actual shift of how the workings of the body/mind functions change from how it seems to function in many other people - might they be a low grade thinker or a heavy thinker?

Truth has everything to do with relations: how knowing relates to feeling, to mind, to body and with all interactions to the surroundings.

Rationality is therefore in my view not just the intellectual component but achieving a superior ratio, the proportional, which can be expressed through geometry, art, science just as proper as through words and actions. There is no rule book but once it's seen it's recognized, at first by reason alone, but intuitively later on.

That is, memory seem to still record events as regular, and when a demand arises, like a question from a second person, the answer comes out easily and uncontrived. Will with others the mind seems constantly active, never giving the underlying quality of potent spirit (insert preferred word) the chance to do its work.

There's some dissociative element at work in many of these cases. Perhaps it's also the result of a less tight grip on things. Again I think this just can enable more clarity of mind in cases our grip is suffocating. I don't think it's liberation yet.

And true, there is really just one moment and to cut it up in time is another of minds great trick

Mind is what mind does. One could even question if there's "one moment". From the dual perspective there's unity and diversity, sure. Beyond that there cannot be even unity anymore.

there is a qualitative difference of being constantly focused on this experience of psychological time and interpretations derived from it rather then to "experience" the timelessness of the reality

Yes, being "constantly focused" sounds like some kind of clinging in a case where a firm grasp would be sufficient and more effective.

[Bobo]

The transition which we have referred to as possible, but yet to be regarded as only exceptional, from the common knowledge of particular things to the knowledge of the Idea, takes place suddenly; for knowledge breaks free from the service of the will, by the subject ceasing to be merely individual, and thus becoming the pure will-less subject of knowledge, which no longer traces relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, but rests in iixed contemplation of the object presented to it, out of its connection with all others, and rises into it.

A full explanation is necessary to make this clear, and the reader must suspend his surprise for a while, till he has grasped the whole thought expressed in this work, and then it will vanish of itself.

If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes the common way of looking at things (...)

(...) but he is pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge. This, which in itself is so remarkable (which I well know confirms the saying that originated with Thomas Paine, Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas), will by degrees become clearer and less surprising from what follows. It was this that was running in Spinoza's mind when he wrote: Meus aeterna est, quatenus res sub aeternitatis specie concipit (Eth. V. pr. 31, Schol.)[4] In such contemplation the particular thing becomes at once the Idea of its species, and the perceiving individual becomes pure subject of knowledge. The individual, as such, knows only particular things; the pure subject of knowledge knows only Ideas. For the individual is the subject of knowledge in its relation to a definite particular manifestation of will, and in subjection to this. This particular manifestation of will is, as such, subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason in all its forms; therefore, all knowledge which relates itself to it also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and no other kind of knowledge is fitted to be of use to the will but this, which always consists merely of relations to the object. The knowing individual as such, and the particular things known by him, are always in some place, at some time, and are links in the chain of causes and effects. The pure subject of knowledge and his correlative, the Idea, have passed out of all these forms of the principle of sufficient reason: time, place, the individual that knows, and the individual that is known, have for them no meaning. When an individual knower has raised himself in the manner described to be pure subject of knowledge, and at the same time has raised the observed object to the Platonic Idea, the world as idea appears complete and pure, and the full objectification of the will takes place, for the Platonic Idea alone is its adequate objectivity. The Idea includes object and subject in like manner in itself, for they are its one form; but in it they are absolutely of equal importance; for as the object is here, as elsewhere, simply the idea of the subject, the subject, which passes entirely into the perceived object, has thus become this object itself, for the whole consciousness is nothing but its perfectly distinct picture. Now this consciousness constitutes the whole world as idea, for one imagines the whole of the Platonic Ideas or grades of the objectivity of will, in their series passing through it. The particular things of all time and space are nothing but Ideas multiplied through the principle of sufficient reason (the form of the knowledge of the individual as such), and thus obscured as regards their pure objectivity. When the Platonic Idea appears, in it subject and object are no longer to be distinguished, for the Platonic Idea, the adequate objectivity of will, the true world as idea, arises only when the subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely; and in the same way the knowing and the known individuals, as things in themselves, are not to be distinguished.


[4] I also recommend the perusal of what Spinoza says in his Ethics (Book II., Prop. 40, Schol. 2, and Book V., Props. 25-38), concerning the cognitio tertii generis, sive intuitiva, in illustration of the kind of knowledge we are considering, and very specially Prop. 29, Schol.; prop. 36, Schol., and Prop. 38, Demonst. et Schol.

Ethics II.

Prop. XL. Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Proof.—This proposition is self-evident. For when we say that an idea in the human mind follows from ideas which are therein adequate, we say, in other words (II. xi. Coroll.), that an idea is in the divine intellect, whereof God is the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far as he is affected by the ideas of very many particular things, but only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Note I.—I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours ; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called secondary derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded, and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled transcendental, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in the II. xvii. note) within itself at the same time ; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused ; if this number of images, of which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II. Prop. xvii. Coroll., and xviii.) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, &c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here ; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call general, such as man, horse, dog, &c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (e.g. colour, size, &c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree ; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body ; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature ; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note II.—From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions :— (1.) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II. xxix. Coroll.) ; I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience.[4] (2.) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II. xviii. note). I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3.) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II. xxxviii. Coroll., xxxix. and Coroll. and xl.) ; this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first ; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six ; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.

Ethics V.

Prop. XXV. The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge.

Prop. XXVI. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind.

Prop. XXVII. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

Prop. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge.

Prop. XXIX. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Proof.—In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time, and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (V. xxi. II. xxvi.). But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration (I. Def. viii. and explanation). Therefore to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity, but it possesses such power, because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (II. xliv. Coroll. ii.), and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity (V. xxiii.), for besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind (II. xiii.). Therefore this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Q.E.D.

Note.—Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways ; either as existing in relation to a given time and place, or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature. Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real, we conceive under the form of eternity, and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we showed in II. xlv. and note, which see.

Prop. XXX. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.

Prop. XXXI. The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Proof.—The mind does not conceive anything under the form of eternity, except in so far as it conceives its own body under the form of eternity (V. xxix.) ; that is, except in so far as it is eternal (V. xxi. xxiii.) ; therefore (by the last Prop.), in so far as it is eternal, it possesses the knowledge of God, which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II. xlvi.) ; hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable of knowing everything which can follow from this given knowledge of God (II. xl.), in other words, of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see Def. in II. xl. note. ii.), whereof accordingly the mind (III. Def. i.), in so far as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause of such knowledge. Q.E.D.

Note.—In proportion, therefore, as a man is more potent in this kind of knowledge, he will be more completely conscious of himself and of God ; in other words, he will be more perfect and blessed, as will appear more clearly in the sequel. But we must here observe that, although we are already certain that the mind is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, yet, in order that what we wish to show may be more readily explained and better understood, we will consider the mind itself, as though it had just begun to exist and to understand things under the form of eternity, as indeed we have done hitherto ; this we may do without any danger of error, so long as we are careful not to draw any conclusion, unless our premisses are plain.

Prop. XXXII. Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

Prop. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal.

Prop. XXXIV. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions.

Prop. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Prop. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity ; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Prop. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Prop. XXXVIII. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

[m4tt_666]

what we perceive to be matter, sound and light exist not only in this reality, but simultaneously in an infinite spectrum of energy and therefore could be experienced in an infinite number of ways, consciousness being the tool, since consciousness is created out of electricity, as is everything else at a more fundamental level and consciousness being the most fundamental level of humanity and all of perceived life.

[ONE]

Know 'self' as hallucination = enlightenment.

Know 'God' as 'self' = Everything as ~One.~


*No confusion or ego required for mathematical formula, just the reduction of multiplying complexities and the return to Divine Simplicities.

K.I.S.S. (Keep It Simple Savant's)

~O.N.E.~