Man and Woman's Evolution

[cousinbasil]

The concept C is the conscious entity A. Look at it this way - if conscious entity A exists, then A must be conscious of something - B. Therefore, the concept of B is already there, in that B already appears to A. There is no need of a C.

I am simply looking at what is "already" there. The concept of B is not B itself. And if A can potentially have other concepts, I am not equating the concept of B with A itself - I am thinking it must be separate from A somehow, a separate thing, so that is what I am calling C.

If there is no potential for other concepts, then perhaps it doesn't matter. If there is, then we could even call that potential C - i, e, a third thing. If it is the potential we are calling C, then we are introducing the concept of time (change), which I have been trying to avoid, since so far we haven't needed it. But it seems useful, if not necessary, to distinguish A from the concept of B. Otherwise, A and B would be on different footings, as it were, one a concept and one not a concept. It would preclude A from being self aware, would it not? Since then we would be back to the logically untenable situation where the concept is identical with the thing. That would imply that consciousness did not require something other than itself to be conscious of, which we have already agreed is required.

In other words, for consciousness to conceive of something other than itself, it must have a priori self-awareness if only in indirect relationship to the other thing. Otherwise A=A is meaningless.

To me, it seems that 3 (three) is logically irreducible, no matter how you attack things. This is the entirety of my point. Even in day-to-day experience we require A=A, which in turn requires at the very least A, something which is not A, and the thing doing the distinguishing. Otherwise, a wave function would never "collapse" as it does in QM. You cannot simply override this by equating the thing which is not A with the thing doing the distinguishing (the observer) as you are trying to do in the quote above.

[cousinbasil]

I wanted to stress that I am making A not identical with the concept of B as a logical prerequisite, not a spatial or temporal one as such. (Ontological arguments make me queasy, but there you have it.) Else-wise we would just have B and the concept of B and nothing else. Of course this is no different than postulating having just A and the concept of A and nothing else, since that is just switching arbitrary labels.

For a minute, let's assume that is what we have, just A and the concept of A. One thing is a concept and the other is not in this case, from our original chain of reasoning. This must be so because the relationship is not symmetrical. One is a concept of the other, the vice versa does not apply. We cannot say that A is the concept of anything, unless we are content with saying the concept of A can in turn have a concept, which is nothing other than A itself. We are thus left with just the Tao, not dualism, since each thing is the complement and not the opposite of the other.

But that obviously presupposes that a concept must be conscious as well. I am rejecting this for simplicity reasons if nothing else. Whether or not I do reject this, we would still have A and the concept of A and nothing else. I am stuck here because I cannot say the concept of A is a property of A. Then A would be self aware which IN THIS SCENARIO is impossible, since it would only have itself (by our own hypothesis) to form a concept of which subverts the principle A=A. So if we want the possibility that A is self aware, we cannot allow B to be the just concept of A. We need B to be something which is not A and not the concept of A. Thus we would have A and B, neither of which can be a concept of anything (each other included). But since A is aware of B, we are forced to introduce C - a third thing, namely A's concept of B.

Result: if we want to allow self-awareness, we must reject the hypothesis that we can have only A, the concept of A, and nothing else. Otherwise we are stuck with ONLY self-awareness, but of an untenable form which logically negates A=A, our prime logical definition of awareness itself.

All I am saying is that for logical consistency, and to allow for self-awareness, we need three (3) things at minimum for there to be consciousness or awareness at all.

This argument is by no means original with me and I see no way around it.

[cousinbasil]

Where did everybody go...?

@jupviv:

There is no need of a C

I am trying to show that there is need of a C. What do you think?

[Kelly Jones]

K: If there is a parameter in the program(in the computer) that defines what consciousness is, such as "the state of identifying things accurately, and making logical deductions" (for argument's sake), and at a certain point in the program, a function sends a request to confirm whether consciousness exists (0 for no, 1 for yes), then the computer could easily printout a "1", given sufficient data.

J: This is really the same argument put in a different way. There is still no way of knowing for sure whether it is confirming that fact to itself, i.e, whether it is conscious that it is saying "yes"(or even "no"). And based on what we know about computers, a computer can't do that.

I think your lack of a definition of consciousness makes you see a fundamental difference in consciousness between humans and computers.

For instance, one assumes (some) humans have some degree of consciousness, based on personal experience, but there is no way of knowing for sure that they are. Even if one asks them to confirm it, they may be "printing out" a programmed response, and be lying unknowingly. Even if they had a definition for consciousness, they mightn't be able to answer correctly, which would make them essentially unconscious (i.e. irrational). Calculating isn't the same as consciousness (reasoning). Note that, even if one defined consciousness precisely, absolutely, and as a principle, the quandary would still be that one could never personally confirm it in any other instance than oneself (and even then, may be wrong, since calculating isn't the same as reasoning).

K: And, if the program then included a function to send a request to confirm whether the computer could remember "to itself" what it had just done, it could easily answer that affirmatively.

J: That would be impossible, on simple logical grounds.

It's not only possible, but realistic. In my thoughts, I frequently send requests to confirm whether I can remember what I have just done. It's an essential function. Sometimes I answer affirmatively, sometimes not, especially if I have several different weak concepts in the forming train of thought. I don't do it to affirm my consciousness per se, however that is a by-product.

K: The human mind does work mechanically like a computer processor, only slower. Our memories are also stored in particular areas, and we run on programmable lines that change according to the inputs given. Basically, I mean. A computer, if given information about what constitutes it as an unified entity, would have a self: the CPU and motherboard, cabling, ports, the peripherals, and so forth.

J: Assuming that by "human mind" here you mean the brain, then that is not really consciousness, because that too is a concept appearing to mind(i.e, you are conscious of it). Or at least, the brain can't arbitrarily and in and of itself, be labeled "consciousness." Anyone who tries to do so would be contradicted on all sides - literally.

The assumption wasn't necessary to understand the mechanistic nature of mental processing. There is no soul there. It's all plain shuffling of data, stimulation of one thing by another - in a word, causation. So, with regard to the inputs or peripherals, I experience correlating thoughts with certain experiences, which presumably come from beyond me. So they are inputs, and are stored somewhere in my mind, since they can return. It is a reasonable theory that the inputs are facilitated by different senses, which in turn makes it a reasonable theory that computers have senses, a structural organising system, and coordination by the CPU using different self-like unifying objects. It even has a name for itself, differentiating itself from other computers.

K: Well, holding impressions, storing data, retaining continuity, are all essentially the same as human conscious memory.

J: The computer or rock isn't "doing" any of that stuff, because it isn't conscious. It isn't conscious of any of those things.

I don't see you offering a definition of consciousness to support that theory. It is a theory, isn't it?


.

[jupiviv]

I think your lack of a definition of consciousness makes you see a fundamental difference in consciousness between humans and computers.

I do have a definition of consciousness - all definitions, or all the things that appear to mind. And I'm not seeing any difference between a computer's consciousness and human consciousness, because computers do not appear to have consciousness to start with.

For instance, one assumes (some) humans have some degree of consciousness, based on personal experience, but there is no way of knowing for sure that they are. Even if one asks them to confirm it, they may be "printing out" a programmed response, and be lying unknowingly.

Those are empirical claims and must be dealt with by science. Logically, however, a person isn't lying or stating things based on programming, to the degree they are conscious.

And, if the program then included a function to send a request to confirm whether the computer could remember "to itself" what it had just done, it could easily answer that affirmatively.

That would be impossible, on simple logical grounds.

It's not only possible, but realistic. In my thoughts, I frequently send requests to confirm whether I can remember what I have just done. It's an essential function. Sometimes I answer affirmatively, sometimes not, especially if I have several different weak concepts in the forming train of thought. I don't do it to affirm my consciousness per se, however that is a by-product.

It's impossible on logical grounds because there is no way for us to know for sure that the computer has a self, and moreover it's impossible for us to build a self/consciousness into the computer, because we cannot perceive ourselves. The conscious element in the computer or any other thing would also be our conscious element, so we can't separately create it.

I find it hard to understand how exactly you send requests to yourself to confirm what you have just done, and how you can answer negatively if you don't remember what you've done. You probably suffer from some kind of multiple personality disorder if you really do this(seriously; I don't mean that as an insult or personal attack.)

Assuming that by "human mind" here you mean the brain, then that is not really consciousness, because that too is a concept appearing to mind(i.e, you are conscious of it). Or at least, the brain can't arbitrarily and in and of itself, be labeled "consciousness." Anyone who tries to do so would be contradicted on all sides - literally.

The assumption wasn't necessary to understand the mechanistic nature of mental processing. There is no soul there. It's all plain shuffling of data, stimulation of one thing by another - in a word, causation.

Again, when you are talking about "mental processing" you probably mean the brain, or something similar. I can only repeat my former argument.

The computer or rock isn't "doing" any of that stuff, because it isn't conscious. It isn't conscious of any of those things.

I don't see you offering a definition of consciousness to support that theory. It is a theory, isn't it?

Well, so far as we know(based on empirical data), a computer or a rock isn't conscious. They may well be actually conscious, but aren't letting us know that. The things a computer or rock or cat "does" isn't appearing to their minds, so they aren't doing those things, because there is no "they".

[jupiviv]

I am simply looking at what is "already" there. The concept of B is not B itself. And if A can potentially have other concepts, I am not equating the concept of B with A itself - I am thinking it must be separate from A somehow, a separate thing, so that is what I am calling C.

The concept of "B" is "A" being conscious of "B".

[cousinbasil]

The concept of "B" is "A" being conscious of "B".

Right. That's what I am calling "C."

I know I made it too wordy in the last couple of posts, but I was trying to build a rigorous argument.

It's important that we have (at minimum) three things vis a vis consciousness and not two things. As you said here, the concept of B is A being conscious of B. But A cannot be the same thing as this concept. A IS consciousness. B is required to give A at least one thing to be conscious of. B is represented in consciousness A by a concept. Which is the third thing C.

Easy analogy: Let a mirror represent consciousness A. Take any object to represent B, let's say B is for "ball." You are saying that's two things, a mirror and a ball. I am saying the ball's reflection (image) is a necessary third thing, C.

[Robert]

The concept of B is not B itself.

Hello cousinbasil. You don't happen to go by the name "jamest" elsewhere in another forum by any chance, do you? That above quote is very familiar to me...

[jupiviv]

@cousinbasil how is A being conscious any different from A itself? It doesn't matter what A is being conscious of. The point is that it is being conscious.

[cousinbasil]

@cousinbasil how is A being conscious any different from A itself? It doesn't matter what A is being conscious of. The point is that it is being conscious.

Exactly my point, jup. It is being conscious. A = consciousness. It doesn't matter what it is being conscious of - we just said there had to be a second thing which we called B.

All I am saying is this is not enough. Because if A is conscious (or is consciousness itself), and it is conscious of B, then it must have a concept of B. The concept of B is not consciousness itself, nor is it identical with B. It must be another thing entirely, a third thing C.

The reason I keep insisting on this point, is that otherwise you seem to be saying that one's memories are identical with his numerous I's, that the entirety of oneself is just this serial overlaying of I's which are none other than memories themselves.

I think this is false. I think in each memory instance, you have three things, not two. You have the thing in itself, the concept attached to it, and the thing that attaches and /or stores or otherwise somehow contains the concept.

There has to be something apart from the series (or continuum) of memories, a separate I, that does the remembering.

[cousinbasil]

The concept of B is not B itself.

Hello cousinbasil. You don't happen to go by the name "jamest" elsewhere in another forum by any chance, do you? That above quote is very familiar to me...

Hi Robert. No, I limit my pedantry to GF.

[jupiviv]

@cousinbasil, you are saying that the concept B is not consciousness itself, but I am defining it to be consciousness itself. The concept B is basically the appearance of B to the mind of A, and since the mind itself is nothing but the appearance of things, the concept B(which itself is an appearance) is the consciousness of A. No third entity is needed here.

The things that appear to the mind may change, but the mind itself doesn't change, which is precisely why it can understand the change(time.)

[cousinbasil]

@cousinbasil, you are saying that the concept B is not consciousness itself, but I am defining it to be consciousness itself. The concept B is basically the appearance of B to the mind of A, and since the mind itself is nothing but the appearance of things, the concept B(which itself is an appearance) is the consciousness of A. No third entity is needed here.

The things that appear to the mind may change, but the mind itself doesn't change, which is precisely why it can understand the change(time.)

The way I see it, that is contradictory. You are saying "the mind of A." That's two things right there, A and the mind of A, which are perceiving thing B. Three things!

The closest you can get to having your definition be correct - that is, in tune with the way things actually operate - is if you define A not to be an entity, but consciousness itself. Then you might claim this consciousness is none other than the concept of B. That's only two things. I think that is what you are saying, am I getting it right? I am asking is two things sufficient?

To get at the crux of my argument, let us pare EVERYTHING away such that nothing exists in the world except consciousness A and the thing it is conscious of (namely, B). If as you say this consciousness A IS PRECISELY the concept of B, I am asking you logically where it resides. Because you are saying all we need is B and the concept of B. If that can exist by itself - just those two things - then what is to keep us from concluding that the concept of B is a property of B? It is logically consistent, because in our world we have decided - per jupviv - that only these two things need exist.

I am harping on this for several reasons. One is that I have always wondered how Christianity (the Roman Catholic Church specifically) embraced the idea of a Trinity, or a triune godhead, when it historically sprang from a monotheistic tradition. In addition, I noticed that the attempt to physically describe motion in terms of position and momentum ultimately must take the role of the observer (consciousness) into consideration. (Three things at base, not two things.)

[jupiviv]

@cousinbasil, you are saying that the concept B is not consciousness itself, but I am defining it to be consciousness itself. The concept B is basically the appearance of B to the mind of A, and since the mind itself is nothing but the appearance of things, the concept B(which itself is an appearance) is the consciousness of A. No third entity is needed here.

The things that appear to the mind may change, but the mind itself doesn't change, which is precisely why it can understand the change(time.)

The way I see it, that is contradictory. You are saying "the mind of A." That's two things right there, A and the mind of A, which are perceiving thing B. Three things!

I defined A to be an ideal conscious being, and I define mind to be consciousness too. So there is no contradiction.

[cousinbasil]

I defined A to be an ideal conscious being, and I define mind to be consciousness too. So there is no contradiction.

Okay, but you are agreeing with me whether you know it or not from what you say here.

I can accept mind being defined as consciousness. And A to be any ideal conscious being. I prefer the term "entity" because "being" implies time. So far we are just using logic and we have not needed the concept of time, which I think is important to note. In addition, an entity can be living but doesn't have to be, whereas "being" connotes a living thing, and life as we know it implies time.

You are saying this being or entity A is identical with consciousness, that it is one thing and not two. Then we required B so that A has something to be conscious of. We agree that without B, A cannot be conscious of itself (self aware) because it would have nothing from which to differentiate itself.

We are not requiring B itself to be conscious. As soon as we require B as a necessity since a conscious A cannot stand alone without it, we have the concept of B. You are equating the concept of B with A itself, consciousness.

But I am saying this is LOGICALLY incomplete. For A cannot logically be merely the concept of B. Think about it. If it has something which is not itself (B) to be aware of, it also now CAN be aware of itself because it now can perceive something it itself is not. Therefore, the concept of B cannot be identical with A (consciousness). Since consciousness now can be self-aware, which would result in the concept of A. Since the concept of A cannot be identical with the concept of B, logically it cannot be A, and it obviously cannot be B. So again, you have at least three things.

You cannot have A being conscious of B without allowing for self awareness, which means TWO THINGS alone is insufficient for the existence of awareness.

[jupiviv]

I can accept mind being defined as consciousness. And A to be any ideal conscious being. I prefer the term "entity" because "being" implies time. So far we are just using logic and we have not needed the concept of time, which I think is important to note. In addition, an entity can be living but doesn't have to be, whereas "being" connotes a living thing, and life as we know it implies time.

As far as I'm concerned, entity and being mean the same thing. Even something that doesn't have life must exist in time.

You are saying this being or entity A is identical with consciousness, that it is one thing and not two. Then we required B so that A has something to be conscious of. We agree that without B, A cannot be conscious of itself (self aware) because it would have nothing from which to differentiate itself.

No, A cannot be conscious of itself.

But I am saying this is LOGICALLY incomplete. For A cannot logically be merely the concept of B. Think about it. If it has something which is not itself (B) to be aware of, it also now CAN be aware of itself because it now can perceive something it itself is not.

That doesn't follow. Consciousness by definition must be of something that is not consciousness, so there can never be a consciousness of consciousness.

[cousinbasil]

That doesn't follow. Consciousness by definition must be of something that is not consciousness, so there can never be a consciousness of consciousness.

We might have to agree to disagree here, jup. "I think therefore I am" to me sounds like self awareness. To me, consciousness can be aware of itself as long as it has something it is not from which it can distinguish or differentiate itself. If there is nothing but it, it cannot be either conscious or self-conscious. As soon as there is B, consciousness can be aware of it, but only in relation to something - which in this case must be itself. If A is conscious of B in relation to itself, then it must be conscious of itself in relation to B.

I am just using logic. You said here:

As far as I'm concerned, entity and being mean the same thing. Even something that doesn't have life must exist in time.

Not in a purely abstract world. In the real world, yes. But so far we do not have to introduce time because nothing is changing. We are trying to LOGICALLY pin down the minimum requirements for consciousness. If we could logically demonstrate it, it cannot change, therefore, no time.

[jupiviv]

We might have to agree to disagree here, jup. "I think therefore I am" to me sounds like self awareness.

Descartes said that, but he was wrong.

To me, consciousness can be aware of itself as long as it has something it is not from which it can distinguish or differentiate itself.

Why? There is no reason for saying this. Saying that consciousness exists because something other than consciousness exists would be introducing a causal relationship between the two things, and that would mean that there is first only consciousness, and then, only the something-other-than-consciousness.

The existence of consciousness means that there is also something other than consciousness at the same time, just like the existence of any other thing means that there is also consciousness at the same time.

[quote="cousinbasil]

As far as I'm concerned, entity and being mean the same thing. Even something that doesn't have life must exist in time.

Not in a purely abstract world. In the real world, yes. But so far we do not have to introduce time because nothing is changing. We are trying to LOGICALLY pin down the minimum requirements for consciousness. If we could logically demonstrate it, it cannot change, therefore, no time.[/quote]

You'll have to say why you think "being" implies time and not "entity".

[cousinbasil]

cousinbasil: To me, consciousness can be aware of itself as long as it has something it is not from which it can distinguish or differentiate itself.

jupviv: Why? There is no reason for saying this. Saying that consciousness exists because something other than consciousness exists would be introducing a causal relationship between the two things, and that would mean that there is first only consciousness, and then, only the something-other-than-consciousness.

I didn't use the word "because" anywhere.

And for a reason. Let's not get bogged down with what came before what - then we are speaking of a sequence of events, which implies time and thus causality. I am simply speaking about what are the necessary things required for there to be consciousness at all. If they are not present (extant), there can be no consciousness AND IT REMAINS THAT WAY: no change means no time and therefore no causality. If they are there there is consciousness. That's it, argument established, QED. From that point on, change things all you want, my point has been made.

The existence of consciousness means that there is also something other than consciousness at the same time, just like the existence of any other thing means that there is also consciousness at the same time.

Again, I agree but this does not invalidate anything I am trying to assert.

You'll have to say why you think "being" implies time and not "entity".

I tried to indicate that above when I said "being" connotes a living thing.

Remember, I am trying to make an abstract argument and point out a logical truth. I am not concerned with the "real" world yet where time exists because things can change. I am comparing two abstract setups in which I am trying to assemble the necessary ingredients for consciousness to exist, and then count those components. That is all, nothing else. What I think I have done so far is to show there has to be a minimum of three things foe consciousness or awareness to exist even in this abstract and purely logical world. It then must be so in any real world because it must be so period. Do you follow?

[jupiviv]

@cousinbasil, there is no purely logical world separate from the 'real' world. The real world and the logical world are one and the same. Anything that exists must exist in time, and so will have a beginning and an end in time. A 'purely logical' entity also has a beginning and an end, but not in time.

Change is basically the perception of various things appearing to our minds. What we call 'change' is really our mind itself, being conscious of various things. This doesn't mean that a thing stops being itself after it no longer appears to our mind. A red ball at 5 pm is still a red ball at 5 pm, at 6 pm.

[cousinbasil]

@cousinbasil, there is no purely logical world separate from the 'real' world. The real world and the logical world are one and the same. Anything that exists must exist in time, and so will have a beginning and an end in time. A 'purely logical' entity also has a beginning and an end, but not in time.

Here's what you just said:
1. A 'purely logical" entity does not have a beginning and end in time. [your last sentence]
2. Anything that exists must exist in time, and so will have a beginning and end in time. [next to last sentence]
Therefore, according to you, a purely logical entity cannot exist.

What about the idea 1+1 = 2? Is that not a purely logical entity? It is abstract and does not change. Surely it exists, does it not?

You are getting us hung up on the concept of time which is totally beside the point which we are discussing. All I am doing is making a logical argument. It doesn't matter if we call consciousness a being or an entity. I am simply trying to show that there is a minimum number of "things" in our hypothetical discussion for there to be (exist, live, it doesn't matter) this thing we are referring to as "consciousness." My argument - which I believe is logically sound - is that there must be at least three things.

It is either logically sound or it is not. If not, I am asking you why not?

[jupiviv]

Here's what you just said:
1. A 'purely logical" entity does not have a beginning and end in time. [your last sentence]
2. Anything that exists must exist in time, and so will have a beginning and end in time. [next to last sentence]
Therefore, according to you, a purely logical entity cannot exist.

A purely logical entity may be manifested as an entity in time, like the number "1", or a circle, etc. And in the same way, every entity that exists in time is also a purely logical entity - e.g, a boy who is 9 years old in 1999 will always be a boy who is 9 years old in 1999.

I started talking about time and change because you brought them into the discussion.

I am simply trying to show that there is a minimum number of "things" in our hypothetical discussion for there to be (exist, live, it doesn't matter) this thing we are referring to as "consciousness." My argument - which I believe is logically sound - is that there must be at least three things.

I already have shown in my previous posts that your argument is flawed. But for the sake of convenience I'll repeat - the existence of consciousness by itself means that there is something other than itself, so the introduction of a thing besides consciousness and non-consciousness doesn't follow.

[cousinbasil]

I already have shown in my previous posts that your argument is flawed. But for the sake of convenience I'll repeat - the existence of consciousness by itself means that there is something other than itself, so the introduction of a thing besides consciousness and non-consciousness doesn't follow.

Well, you certainly haven't showed it to my satisfaction. In fact, you really haven't addressed it. Let me try to put it more succinctly if you are having difficulty following it, as I suspect you are.

We both agree we must have consciousness and something else. If it were just one thing (A), it could not be consciousness because A would have nothing to be conscious of. It could not be conscious (aware) of itself since it would have nothing from which to differentiate itself. It requires something which is not itself, which we are calling B.

So far, all we need assume about B is that it is not A. You seem to want to say B is not conscious, not another instance of consciousness. Very well, that just makes things easier, but by no means is it a necessary condition of B. So let's not argue over that.

We thus have A and B. Here's where you are not seeing the logical implication.

If we have A which is conscious of B, IT MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF B IN RELATION TO SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT B.

THERE IS ONLY ONE THING WHICH IS NOT B, AND THAT IS A ITSELF. So if A is aware of B, it must be aware of B in relation to itself.

IF A IS AWARE OF B IN RELATION TO ITSELF, IT MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF ITSELF IN RELATION TO B.

THEREFORE, A must have CONCEPTS, which are things SEPARATE from itself and from B. The concept CANNOT be the thing in itself.

You have argued that the concept of B is nothing other than consciousness A. This cannot be correct. For if A is consciousness it must also have a concept of itself (A). According to you, this concept of A would also be nothing other than A itself. That would make concept of A = concept of B, since they would both be identical with A itself.

Surely you must see the contradiction in your line of reasoning.

If not, consider this. Since consciousness A is now aware of two things separately, it now must have a concept of A PLUS B, or the abstract awareness of 2-ness, since it now knows there is a B which is not itself (A). This concept of 2-ness is an abstract concept which CANNOT be the same as the concept of 1-ness, which A now also must logically have.

So jupviv, can you not agree that the existence of [at least] one concept means that we have [at least] one thing which is not identical to A and not identical to B?

This third thing would not arise if we had not made our first thing A "consciousness" to begin with.

We agreed that A could not in fact be consciousness if we don't also have B, something (anything) A is not. I am further observing we cannot just have A and B if one of them is consciousness - we MUST have a third thing.

[jupiviv]

Cousinbasil, I don't think you're making any effort to actually understand my argument, because it is enough to disprove your argument. But I'll repeat it again in the context of what you said.

You seem to want to say B is not conscious, not another instance of consciousness.

It may be another instance of consciousness, but that's not the point. The point is that there is something else other than consciousness A, which we both apparently agree on.

If we have A which is conscious of B, IT MUST BE CONSCIOUS OF B IN RELATION TO SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT B.

Not necessarily. There may be a third entity C, which is also not A, and A may be conscious of B in relation to C.

IF A IS AWARE OF B IN RELATION TO ITSELF, IT MUST ALSO BE AWARE OF ITSELF IN RELATION TO B.

But this doesn't follow. If A is to be aware of itself in relation to B, then it must first be aware of itself, and how is this possible, since A is already itself...! A fingertip cannot touch itself because it itself is the phenomenon of touching. Awareness itself presumes the existence of something other than yourself, as you agree, so how can you be aware of yourself?

You have argued that the concept of B is nothing other than consciousness A. This cannot be correct. For if A is consciousness it must also have a concept of itself (A). According to you, this concept of A would also be nothing other than A itself. That would make concept of A = concept of B, since they would both be identical with A itself.

In this case(where there are many concepts), all the concepts are part of A, or to put it in another way - all the concepts individually are A itself. The concept of the "I"(the concept that A has of itself) is only an element of consciousness, since there are many other concepts.

Since consciousness A is now aware of two things separately, it now must have a concept of A PLUS B, or the abstract awareness of 2-ness, since it now knows there is a B which is not itself (A).

This concept, again, would be a concept, i.e, something that appears to the mind of A. So A would never really be aware of itself and B together, or itself and B separated from each other, because it would never be aware of itself.

[cousinbasil]

But why are you assuming A cannot be aware of itself? If it has anything other than itself from which it can distinguish itself, it can be self aware. You have said Descartes was wrong. How so? Your view depends on his being wrong, and I don't know why you think he is wrong.

To put it another way, A needs a B so it has something to be aware of. But in relation to what? A has to have something from which it can distinguish B. If there is just A and B as you suggest, then A MUST be distinguishing B from A (itself.) But if it can distinguish B from itself, then it follows that it must be able to distinguish itself from B. It would be the same thing. But that means it has to be just as aware of itself as it is of B.

Look - you and I can both distinguish ourselves from other things. I am not my keyboard, for example. I know I exist (Descartes); thus I must be self-aware. I may not know exactly what I am, but that is hardly the point. I don't know exactly what my keyboard "is" either. But I have a concept of both the keyboard and myself - I am conscious of both things. And to extend this to the argument I have been making, my concept of my keyboard and my concept of myself are not the same thing. Both are concepts, yes, but not the same concept. If they were exactly the same thing, they would be utterly useless.