Wisdom of the Infinite Regress

[guest_of_logic]

Just to trying to narrow it down a little: would you still object if instead of "it decays at some random time x in an infinity of time" the stipulation were "it decays at some random time x in one hour of time"?

[Blair]

They are one and the same, Laird.

Whittle it down, you will still find the same "thing", that thing you are, that thing you wish not to be.

[chikoka]

Just to trying to narrow it down a little: would you still object if instead of "it decays at some random time x in an infinity of time" the stipulation were "it decays at some random time x in one hour of time"?

It *could* decay in 1 hour but that is not guaranteed.
Its possible that it could never decay after any amount of time ,even after an infinity of time.
Your arguments needed for it to *definitly* decay after some time (infinity), but current theory says it doesnt have to.

[guest_of_logic]

guest_of_logic: Just to trying to narrow it down a little: would you still object if instead of "it decays at some random time x in an infinity of time" the stipulation were "it decays at some random time x in one hour of time"?

chikoka: It *could* decay in 1 hour but that is not guaranteed.

It seems to me that you're simply not using your imagination. The particle and the laws of physics that apply to it are largely irrelevant: what's relevant is the principle and whether it can reasonably be imagined as being implemented in some way. Here's one way in which the principle could be implemented: consider randomly throwing a dart at a line 60 centimetres long. This line contains an infinity of points, and the dart will hit one random point out of that infinity, which could be used to simulate the decay of a particle at a random time in the hour by associating the point along the 60 centimetres of the line with a corresponding moment from the start of the 60 minutes of the hour. The means of association are not important but for the sake of example, a machine could be constructed with a rod that starts at the leftmost point on the line and moves continuously at a rate of 1 centimetre per minute until it hits the dart, at which point the particle is deemed to have decayed.

Your arguments needed for it to *definitly* decay after some time (infinity), but current theory says it doesnt have to.

Current theory is only partly relevant. What's far more relevant is whether the principle behind the stipulation is sound. This is where I disagree with what you wrote in your previous post:

"it decays at some random time x in an infinity of time"

[This is] as arbitrary as you hitting a monkey as you go back in time.

Plainly the two are not as arbitrary as one another. Your "hitting a monkey" stipulation says something directly about the nature of that which is at issue - the origin of time: it stipulates directly that time has an origin (at a monkey). In other words, it directly contradicts the thesis of beginningless by stipulating a "monkeyed" beginning.

My stipulation on the other hand doesn't directly contradict the thesis, instead it accepts the thesis of beginningless for the sake of argument, and goes on to show through imagination that the thesis results in a paradox. The only question is whether the principle behind the imagined elements can be reasonably entertained, and it's my position that it can; that there is nothing innately illogical or unreasonable in principle about a particle that decays at some random point in an infinity of time, even if no such particle actually exists. For evidence from the real world that the principle of this stipulation has some empirical support, consider the dart analogy above. I take this analogy as strong evidence that the property of my imaginary particle is reasonably stipulated.

I want to make one other point. There is another way in which the two stipulations are not comparable: yours is definitively illogical - time and monkeys are entities from incompatible categories and as such it is illogical to posit a monkey as the beginning of time - whereas mine contains no illogicalities that I can see.

[chikoka]

This line contains an infinity of points, and the dart will hit one random point out of that infinity, which could be used to simulate the decay of a particle at a random time in the hour by associating the point along the 60 centimetres of the line with a corresponding moment from the start of the 60 minutes of the hour.

The problem with this is that you used the phraise "will hit one random point".
There are as many points in that line as there are points in an infinity of time so at first look your proof looks valid. But the manner in which you selct points is not truley random.You have essentialy picked a way of choosing points which by definition means its not random.Randomness ,or the phenomena of its manifestation is not caused by definition. Randomness has no "will" and so you cant "*will* hit one *random* point".
By definition randomness uses a "might" in its formulation and not a "will"
You could have used one of the many algorithms computer scientists use to simulate random numbers to pick a point insteadt of a dart but these algorithms are really not random at all.

Your use of a dart instead of an algorithm is a bit ad hominem because people usualy call it random because of the number of factors involved in a throw.
If you were rigorous in your formulation and you introduced randomness in one of those factors then the dart "might" not even be thrown.
Which level would you introduce randomness into the dart example and could you show that it would still result in the dart definitly hitting a point?

You should have used an algorithm to choose decay points fairly from an infinity of past time in the OP, randomness is not one because it might simply *not* pick a point.

I have a feeling that using an algorithm is also flawed which is why you never used it but cant nail it right now.

[guest_of_logic]

There are as many points in that line as there are points in an infinity of time so at first look your proof looks valid.

Interestingly, you didn't raise an objection that I suspected that you might raise: that the line contains an infinity of points in a finite space, whereas the concept in question (an infinite past, presumably with an infinite future too) pertains to an infinity of points in an infinite space, so the two aren't exactly analogous. If you had raised that objection, then I would have agreed with you that it's relevant and that my analogy isn't perfect, but that I think that this analogy at least counts, as I wrote in my previous post, as "strong evidence" for the soundness of the original stipulation, if not as conclusive proof. In any case, I think that I've met an appropriate level of proof given the circumstances.

Your use of a dart instead of an algorithm is a bit ad hominem because people usualy call it random because of the number of factors involved in a throw.

I think you mean something other than "ad hominem" there (possibly "ad hoc" but that doesn't seem to fit either) - in any case, I think I understand what you mean.

Which level would you introduce randomness into the dart example and could you show that it would still result in the dart definitly hitting a point?

Try this: the line is bent into a circle. A man is placed in the centre of the circle, blindfolded, and spun around. After being spun around, he then throws the dart. If the dart doesn't hit the line directly then a line is drawn from the centre of the circle through the point on the floor where the dart hits, and where that radial line intersects the circular line is deemed to be the point that the dart hit the circular line.

[chikoka]

Spinning a guy to determine "random" points is not really random at all.
Its just that there are many factors involved so it seems "unpredictable" even though idealy it is.
Try using real random variables by using alpha decay or something simmilar.
It is the nature of real random variables that in their range you have as a subset the null set.

Just as a question do you beleive something would be random if the sample space contains 1 element?
Would you consider it random if it contained 0 elements?

I'm starting to see what david means when he says there is no such thing as "constrained" randomness.

Maybe the way out would be to define different powers of randomness defined by the cardinality of the sample space.
There may be other factors to include in calculating the randomness power of which certain arrangements might lead to what we call "free will".

I dont know.

[guest_of_logic]

Hi chikoka,

Sorry I've taken such a horribly long time to respond to you - I actually forgot that it was my turn to respond. In a way, though, it's good that so much time has passed because I now have a bit more perspective on things. In particular, I've realised that it's very simple to avoid all need for my decaying-particle thought experiment and to explain the paradox more directly.

Forgetting the question as to whether a decaying particle has, due to the specifications of its decay, already decayed by now, let's ask instead: given an infinite past, how far back in time can we go and still have that condition (an infinite past) obtain? Would the past have been infinite yesterday? Well, one day from infinity is still an infinity, so, yes, it would have been infinite yesterday. How about last week? Again, one week from infinity is still an infinity, so, again, yes, it would have been infinite yesterday. How about a century ago? Sure, same answer. A millennium ago? Again, yes - and so on and so on: we can keep on going back and back, discovering always that no matter how far we go back, at that point in time the past would still have been infinite. This is, in other words, to say that we can go back infinitely far and the past will still be infinite, and this is the same paradox that my thought experiment was intended to convey: an infinity preceded by an infinity.

Now, there is a potential objection to this: one might say, "Ah, but this reasoning could equally be applied to an infinite future, thus raising through paradox doubt as to the validity of the notion of the future being infinite - and yet you in fact do not doubt the validity of such a thing: surely this indicates either a problem with your reasoning or a double standard?" And in fact it does seem true that reasoning like this could be applied to the future to arrive at the paradox of, rather than an infinity preceded by an infinity, an infinity followed by an infinity. There is, though, a key difference here: in the case of an infinite future, we are at no point obliged to accept the existence of an actual infinity, as we are in the case of an infinite past.

The infinity of the future is never actualised - it is a potential infinity only: it is an infinity that is forever approached (as time continues) but is never reached and "completed". An infinity of the past, however, is actual: the amount of time that has passed is actually infinite - it is a "completed" infinity. Thus, when we look into the future to see how far ahead we can travel and still have an infinite future ahead of us, we are at no point obliged to actualise the "as far as we like" in the notion, "We can travel as far as we like into the future and still have an infinite future ahead of us", as an "actual infinity": we can simply leave it as it is - "as (finitely) far as we like".

One might argue that in the case of an infinite past, even though such a thing necessitates that actual infinities exist, that just because such things exist, we are not obliged in any case to convert the "as far as we like" in the notion, "We can travel as far as we like back into the past and still have an infinite past behind us", into an actual infinity. This is a fair enough argument, but in response to such an argument let me just suggest that the very fact that actual infinities allow for such a paradox is reason enough to doubt their existence - an existence that is necessitated by the notion of an infinite past.

Hopefully that explains the paradox a little better, and avoids the need for further back-and-forth over the thought experiment that I constructed to originally convey it. I'll in any case answer the questions that you put to me in your last post:

Just as a question do you beleive something would be random if the sample space contains 1 element?

No. There is no true choice in one option.

Would you consider it random if it contained 0 elements?

No. Same reason.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Hi Laird, I know we've covered this before but in case Chick won't be back as quickly as you, I'd like to try to add something again nevertheless.

An infinity of the past, however, is actual: the amount of time that has passed is actually infinite - it is a "completed" infinity.

Of course each and every moment could be seen as causally "completed". But aren't you confusing some collection of stored memories or measurements about a projected past with the general idea of a past itself? Since the amount of information contained within some infinite past time will never be known, there will be no real difference with a supposed infinite amount of future and our limited projections into that.

And as I told you before, there is no reason to believe the past would remain always fixed and the future eternally uncertain. That's only a possible perspective but not of infinite certainty. While causality surely is.

[guest_of_logic]

Of course each and every moment could be seen as causally "completed".

So far so good.

But aren't you confusing some collection of stored memories or measurements about a projected past with the general idea of a past itself? Since the amount of information contained within some infinite past time will never be known, there will be no real difference with a supposed infinite amount of future and our limited projections into that.

I'm not sure what information or knowledge has to do with it - the only information I'm using is that of the past's duration being infinite. What else is relevant? The real difference to me between a past infinity and a future infinity has nothing to do with information or knowledge and is solely to do with the arrow of time: due to the direction of that arrow, a past infinity has been fully actualised whereas a future infinity is potential only.

And as I told you before, there is no reason to believe the past would remain always fixed and the future eternally uncertain. That's only a possible perspective but not of infinite certainty. While causality surely is.

I don't know how, though, as a determinist, you could entertain the notion of an unfixed past. Under determinism, the past determines the present, so if the past is not fixed, then how can the present be?

[cousinbasil]

I don't know how, though, as a determinist, you could entertain the notion of an unfixed past. Under determinism, the past determines the present, so if the past is not fixed, then how can the present be?

Hi Laird
Before philosophical issues such as determinism can be addressed, it may be useful to observe some facts. First, the past, in its entirety, can never be known. Second, there is no sense whatsoever in which even the majority of the past can be known. Third, no matter how tiny a portion of the past can be known, the portion of the present that can be known is even smaller, since what we take for a knowledge of the present is almost exclusively a collection of assumptions about the past.

In addition, the extent of the past can not be demonstrated, even if sound arguments are made that something like a Big Bang occurred, or philosphical arguments are made for an infinite past.

So we are almost entirely ignorant of the details of the past and present, and only have theories as to what the future may hold. Therefore, espousing anything like determinism is suspect at best, and only marginally useful for navigating our own personal environments. Belief in it may cause us to be wrong only one time in ten instead of one time in a thousand, so it may have some survival value, but is entirely lacking as any kind of philosophical approach for realizing the truth.

Given that we live our lives within mental frameworks built on unsupported assumptions concerning vicissitudes of personal experience, we cannot even logically think the past is "fixed" in any way considering how limited our knowledge of it must be.

For example, who hasn't learned something and thought, "Well that changes everything"? Because if we learn a fact, it can only even possibly be a fact if it is about the past. Therefore, the act of learning it has changed the past. The past having been changed, what we take for the world in the present has been changed. In addition, it is therefore possible and even likely the way we react to future events will never be the same as before the past was thusly changed.

I am only considering what can be known, not even the vastly smaller set of things that one does know.

Determinsim is the baby blanket for weak philosophy - assuming there is such a thing as sound philosophy.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

I'm not sure what information or knowledge has to do with it - the only information I'm using is that of the past's duration being infinite. What else is relevant?

All we know about the past is a collection of memories or recordings projected, modeled upon what we believe to be backwards in a flow of time.

All we know about the future is a collection of anticipations or predictions projected, modeled upon what we believe to be forwards in a flow of time.

It's not the duration of the past which should be considered: does it have any objective duration to start with? Duration starts obviously while measuring it.

I don't know how, though, as a determinist, you could entertain the notion of an unfixed past. Under determinism, the past determines the present, so if the past is not fixed, then how can the present be?

If for some reason the past would change, that change will determine the present (and it might not be possible to perceive the change!). Since we cannot speak of the present being "fixed" as it would need a relative point of orientation to be fixed in regard to, the issue does not rise. Another way of looking at it might be to see past, present and future change together, since the moment is "completed" and contains as such its own cause and effect: past and future.

[chikoka]

Hi laird

I totaly understood what you meant from the OP which is basicaly contained in the same statement you said later on:

You can think of it like this: regressing into an infinite past, one will never reach infinity; how then can one have come from that which can't be reached?

I dont have problems with your line of reasoning , just with the tool you chose to use.
remember i also dont beleive in an infinite past esp. since the logic used to justify its existence is flawed.

Cause and effect (causality) can never be proved and i think david did not understand hume fully here.
There is no cause and effect, only correlation.
One moments associations can correlate with the next moments associations.
Thats all we can ever know.
Just because two adjacent moments correlate does not justify using "loose" language such as one led to the other.As i said all we can know is that they correlate.
Similarly this does not mean there can not be a first moment since using language such as correlation we are not required to have anything leading up to anything.
Cause and effect is dead and only correlation exists.
This is taking the QSR doctrine that the universe is a block universe,

[cousinbasil]

Cause and effect is dead and only correlation exists.

So even if we did have a video of OJ killing his wife, it would only be evidence that slicing off her head was correlated to her death, not that it caused her death. So "if the glove doesn't fit, we must acquit" becomes "no cause and effect, guilty verdict we reject."

[chikoka]

Cause and effect is dead and only correlation exists.

So even if we did have a video of OJ killing his wife, it would only be evidence that slicing off her head was correlated to her death, not that it caused her death. So "if the glove doesn't fit, we must acquit" becomes "no cause and effect, guilty verdict we reject."

If were to be rigid then yes.

[chikoka]

..or legal law could be updated by saying certain correlations are incriminating.

[cousinbasil]

Chikoka, if you are saying it is impossible in principle to identify all the causes of a given effect, I could agree with that.

[chikoka]

cause and effect (the traditional variety) can never be proved because it is impossible to prove that all that exists includes other moments than the one which you are in now.

So my previous attack on cause and effect can be ,in fact, strengthened.
Not even correlations can be proved because you don't know if there "are" other moments other than this one and the one you remember could be a temporally now illusion.

cousinbasil

Does relativity mean that the universe is not a simple 4D block universe since what occurs concurrently with one observer does not have to for another.
I know you are the one who studied physics , and does it have any bearing on proving that other moments other than the present existed or will exist?

[guest_of_logic]

Hi cousinbasil,

I agree with some of what you wrote. I think, though, that some of your statements against determinism are a little strongly worded, don't you? You say that in "navigating our own personal environments", determinism is only "marginally" useful, which seems to me to be a fair bit under-appreciative: for example, that my computer is for the most part deterministic is much more than "marginally" useful to me as a computer programmer. By the way, when you wrote, "Belief in it may cause us to be wrong only one time in ten instead of one time in a thousand", did you mean to write, "Belief in it may cause us to be wrong only one time in a thousand instead of one time in ten"?

The thing you wrote that I most disagreed with was this: 'For example, who hasn't learned something and thought, "Well that changes everything"? Because if we learn a fact, it can only even possibly be a fact if it is about the past. Therefore, the act of learning it has changed the past'. From my perspective, it's not the past itself that has changed, but only that which is known about it.

Perhaps, though, your position is that the past has no existence except as a memory/knowledge in the minds of conscious beings, which seems to me to be a very radical position to take: it seems to deny the possibility of the effects of causes outside of consciousness. Is this truly what you meant?

Hi Diebert,

All we know about the past is a collection of memories or recordings projected, modeled upon what we believe to be backwards in a flow of time.

All we know about the future is a collection of anticipations or predictions projected, modeled upon what we believe to be forwards in a flow of time.

So, if you're not sure that these are the correct models, then what other models can you conceive of that don't destroy your notion of the "transcendent" (if that word fits; perhaps better is "always-applicable") nature of causality?

It's not the duration of the past which should be considered: does it have any objective duration to start with? Duration starts obviously while measuring it.

I disagree: in this case, that which is measured precedes (or "precedes") the act of measuring.

Laird: I don't know how, though, as a determinist, you could entertain the notion of an unfixed past. Under determinism, the past determines the present, so if the past is not fixed, then how can the present be?

Diebert: If for some reason the past would change, that change will determine the present (and it might not be possible to perceive the change!).

Your speculation that the past could change implies, though, in contrast to what you implied in your previous statements, that the past has some kind of objective existence, in which case its duration would be an objective fact too.

Since we cannot speak of the present being "fixed" as it would need a relative point of orientation to be fixed in regard to, the issue does not rise. Another way of looking at it might be to see past, present and future change together, since the moment is "completed" and contains as such its own cause and effect: past and future.

You're talking about the possibility of reverse temporal causality, right? - the future affecting the past, whether that's through "time travel to the past" or some other reverse causal means? I can't see what else you could mean, but if there's another possibility then please go ahead and share it.

Hi chikoka,

I totaly understood what you meant from the OP which is basicaly contained in the same statement you said later on:

You can think of it like this: regressing into an infinite past, one will never reach infinity; how then can one have come from that which can't be reached?

I dont have problems with your line of reasoning , just with the tool you chose to use.
remember i also dont beleive in an infinite past esp. since the logic used to justify its existence is flawed.

OK, cool.

Cause and effect (causality) can never be proved and i think david did not understand hume fully here.
There is no cause and effect, only correlation.

Hmm, that seems to be faulty logic. I'm not sure how you get from "We cannot prove X" to "X does not exist" (where X is causality).

One moments associations can correlate with the next moments associations.
Thats all we can ever know.
Just because two adjacent moments correlate does not justify using "loose" language such as one led to the other.As i said all we can know is that they correlate.

Yes, that's all we can know, but to assume causality can be pretty handy, can't it? Most of our technology is predicated on that assumption, isn't it?

Similarly this does not mean there can not be a first moment since using language such as correlation we are not required to have anything leading up to anything.

That's interesting - if we abandon causality in favour of correlation then the arguments against a start of time don't apply any more. I'm just not sure how sound it is to abandon causality like that when so much of our daily functioning depends on assuming it.

[cousinbasil]

Perhaps, though, your position is that the past has no existence except as a memory/knowledge in the minds of conscious beings, which seems to me to be a very radical position to take: it seems to deny the possibility of the effects of causes outside of consciousness. Is this truly what you meant?

Not really - but I will have to qualify that. I hope I can make the way I see it sound a bit less convoluted.

Anything that happens of which one can be aware must exist either directly or indirectly in one's consciousness. If that seems to be obvious, consider how that limits what can get there. One cannot know causes that one has not perceived oneself, interpreted from a physical record such as a photograph or audio recording, or accepted as valid based on another person's report - and that other person is subject to the same limitations, naturally.

What one does with knowledge obtained in this manner is deceptive - one can base one's entire notion of history on the reading of a finite number of sources. In fact, this is invariably what one does - in conjunction with perhaps an academic course or two delivered by people who, again, are subject to these same limitations.

The reality can be someone serving a life term, based on being convicted through the good faith effort of a group of people who in turn based conviction on the testimony of witnesses who later recant. But let me change that history! They are each killed before they can recant. Is the person in jail guilty or not guilty? You, as a newspaper reader, know of this person's story by following the news. You believed he was guilty. If the witnesses recant, you believe just as strongly he is not and that the system should free him. Perhaps you even attend a rally urging the courts to reopen his case - curiously, to get rid of any lingering cognitive dissonance, you are even more convinced of his innocence after you attend the rally than before. Yet had the recanting witness met with mysterious ends before they could come forward, and that fact never come to light, you would have remained convinced the guy got what he deserved, that is, when you think about it.

Do you see what my point is? It does make sense to believe the past has an existence outside the memory/know conscious beings. My example elsewhere of photons arriving here millions of years after being emitted by a suitably distant galaxy would actually make it mandatory to conclude such an independent past. That is, if one is convinced a Primordial Consciosness such as a Creator's did not precede everything. ("He knows each of the stars in the sky - He calls them by name.")

But in everyday practice, everything about which we can even theoretically have incontrovertible knowledge has already happened, that is, is part of the past. We get this knowledge by the limited means I have listed above. We must satisfy ourselves with knowing proximate causes, for the most part, for those few effects which ever enter our awareness. Daily we encounter people who see things differently from how we see them, and usually these people do not even agree with each other. In practice, what is theoretically possible to know is seldom known by anyone, and I think if you examine this theory, which is based on philosphical speculation, more closely, it becomes suspect.

[chikoka]

chikoka wrote:
Cause and effect (causality) can never be proved and i think david did not understand hume fully here.
There is no cause and effect, only correlation.

Hmm, that seems to be faulty logic. I'm not sure how you get from "We cannot prove X" to "X does not exist" (where X is causality).

Fine it is faulty logic but to stress my point:

The theory of causality is on as firm a ground as that of the theory that blue flying elephants cause rain.

You cannot prove causality without using causality so its pointless trying.i.e. the past has *caused* you to beleive in causlality.(Circular reasoning).
If causality cannot be proved then what *causes* rain can also never be proved.

That's interesting - if we abandon causality in favour of correlation then the arguments against a start of time don't apply any more. I'm just not sure how sound it is to abandon causality like that when so much of our daily functioning depends on assuming it.

How do you know that since there is no way of knowing if the past ever existed and for experiencing it to say "much of our daily function depends on assuming it"?

[ravedigger3]

chikoka... can you please write something sensible???

[guest_of_logic]

William Lane Craig's arguments against an infinite past are far better than that which I presented in my opening post. He's a powerful thinker.

(Sorry to dredge up an old thread but I really do think the article is worth it. I hope you guys agree)

[Dan Rowden]

Craig? Really, Laird? Mate, stop with this God shit, please. Get a grip. Craig is a oft' refuted philosophical dilettante.

[guest_of_logic]

Hmm, that's a particularly dismissive response, Dan. I get the sense that you didn't even read the paper. The arguments in it really are powerful, not to mention that it deals well with objections made by others. Could you please do me a favour and at least read it?

As for God, I seem to remember (I last read the paper in its entirety some time back) that He is mentioned only in the conclusion, so don't fear that you're going to have to deal with a lot of theism if you do read the paper.

As for "philosophical dilettante", I know that you and WLC have widely different perspectives, but disagreement needn't stop you from recognising his talent as a thinker. Just sayin' - even though I know it's pointless to do so. ;-)