Man and Woman's Evolution

[Diebert van Rhijn]

if the computer were conscious, it would have concepts, and that would mean the computer was conscious(at least to some degree).

My point was that consciousness neither is nor resembles an advanced and complex computer, although many people do think so. Consciousness and a computer are just two different things.

With your logic I could say: "A mind doesn't use any reasoning at all. It just does what it does, without any consciousness of what it does. Consciousness and mind are just two different things."

One way to address this, is to describe the appearance of reasoning you notice occurring in or as result of the mind. For example: there's a basic comparison, deduction or conclusion about something, some kind of weighing process.

Then I will show you a computer appearing to compare factors, reaching some concluding result of a calculation based on various inputs after weighing all the factors. The question remains: why would the mind and a computer be two completely different things as they show the same behavior in principle?

And in case you bring up concept, this is nothing but a model or matrix which a computer memory holds as well and sometimes displays on a screen. For example the avatar icon representing yourself, or a username representing your identity.

[jupiviv]

With your logic I could say: "A mind doesn't use any reasoning at all. It just does what it does, without any consciousness of what it does. Consciousness and mind are just two different things."

But I'm defining mind as consciousness. The only other reasonable way it can be defined is as the brain or maybe the head.

One way to address this, is to describe the appearance of reasoning you notice occurring in or as result of the mind.

The "appearance of reasoning" doesn't make any sense. What does the appearance of reasoning appear to?

Then I will show you a computer appearing to compare factors, reaching some concluding result of a calculation based on various inputs after weighing all the factors. The question remains: why would the mind and a computer be two completely different things as they show the same behavior in principle?

No they don't exhibit the same behaviour, because the computer isn't conscious. It has no consciousness of what it is doing, or why. I can say that consciousness and a rock both show the same behaviour, because both can fall down a cliff, but that wouldn't be right.

And in case you bring up concept, this is nothing but a model or matrix which a computer memory holds as well and sometimes displays on a screen.

A rock has memory too - e.g., a pebble may hold the memory of the waves of a river, or of a tree in a forest existing as one of the components of the rock. What differentiates the rock's memory from the memory of a conscious being?

[Kelly Jones]

Kelly: Philosophically, I have nothing more to learn, but the larger component of enlightenment is having the courage to live by it. Learning to abandon old false habits, neuron by neuron, second by second.

Carmel: res ipsa loquitur

Yes, it does, but not in the way you believe it does. The reason I have nothing more to learn in a philosophical sense is because I understand the essence of wisdom. It's simple enough - the nature of reality. If one has any doubt about it, or thinks it may change, then one hasn't reached the end-point of the all-important, most basic philosophical enquiry. This is something you have missed seeing, which causes you to think that it is impossible to have a complete understanding of that nature.

It's not a statement of arrogance, in the slightest.

That's all I really need to know. You're "enlightened" in the same way that jupiviv is "enlightened". You believe you have nothing more to learn therefore, you won't learn anything more.

Why do you feel compelled to misrepresent me? Earlier you recall that I mentioned I did have more to learn....

.... in a scientific sense, primarily about how to drop habitual delusions in the dynamic chaos of everyday life, but in a less important sense, about how to do finite things like learn the parameters of a computer program - that sort of thing.

You are forever doomed to remain a preacher and that is why I consider it a waste of time trying to discuss anything with you.

For someone who champions lack of bias, being objective, and the scientific method, you sure have a strange way of showing it.


.

[Carmel]

Kelly:
Yes, it does, but not in the way you believe it does. The reason I have nothing more to learn in a philosophical sense is because I understand the essence of wisdom. It's simple enough - the nature of reality. If one has any doubt about it, or thinks it may change, then one hasn't reached the end-point of the all-important, most basic philosophical enquiry. This is something you have missed seeing, which causes you to think that it is impossible to have a complete understanding of that nature.

Carmel:
How would you know what I know about the nature of reality? Are you psychic?

Kelly:
Why do you feel compelled to misrepresent me? Earlier you recall that I mentioned I did have more to learn....

.... in a scientific sense, primarily about how to drop habitual delusions in the dynamic chaos of everyday life, but in a less important sense, about how to do finite things like learn the parameters of a computer program - that sort of thing.

Carmel:
So why not focus your attention on those things and quit stalking me around here? Not only have you had the last word in every discussion we've had, but you've initiated every contact. Even when I've repeatedly ignored you, you have interjected yourself between me and dialogues I was having with other members. It's obnoxious. This is why I don't deem you to be wise. There is more to wisdom than intellectual understanding. At this point, I consider you to be an evangelist, not a sage. If you are really are so wise as you claim, then I would certainly seek you out and ask for your input, but you never give me the space to do that.

Carmel:

You are forever doomed to remain a preacher and that is why I consider it a waste of time trying to discuss anything with you.

Kelly: For someone who champions lack of bias, being objective, and the scientific method, you sure have a strange way of showing it.

Carmel:
Don't worry about me. Focus on yourself or promoting wisdom. I have no doubt that you understand the philosophical concepts that are espoused here quite well. I think it would be benefical to everyone if you spent more time and energy on the promotion of those concepts.

[Kelly Jones]

Kelly: The reason I have nothing more to learn in a philosophical sense is because I understand the essence of wisdom. It's simple enough - the nature of reality. If one has any doubt about it, or thinks it may change, then one hasn't reached the end-point of the all-important, most basic philosophical enquiry. This is something you have missed seeing, which causes you to think that it is impossible to have a complete understanding of that nature.

Carmel: How would you know what I know about the nature of reality? Are you psychic?

Because, as I explained in the previous post to my last reply, you wrote in response to my question:

Kelly: Can I ask, how wise do you think you are?

Carmel: compared to whom? It's a relative matter and it's clear to me that we have different conceptions of what wisdom is. Also, it's not as though the state of wisdom or enlightenment is static. What can be gained, can be lost. Furthermore, everyone, even the wisest people have blind spots, that includes you, me and everyone here...and there.

This tells me that you don't yet perceive the profound substratum that is the source, and actual existence, of enlightenment.

Enlightenment isn't something to be gained, in the sense of a finite object. Rather, it is about understanding the nature of reality, which is everpresent, and literally the nature of everything. Delusion and false thinking closes the mind to perception of reality ---- and yet, such delusion is actually reality as well.

Because of this, you can't see why I'm promoting masculinity, and pointing to the drawbacks of feminine psychology. You can't see the point. That's fine - it's your prerogative to be uninterested in perceiving the true face of reality. I won't trouble you to change that perspective, if you're comfortable with it.

Kelly: Why do you feel compelled to misrepresent me? Earlier you recall that I mentioned I did have more to learn...... in a scientific sense, primarily about how to drop habitual delusions in the dynamic chaos of everyday life, but in a less important sense, about how to do finite things like learn the parameters of a computer program - that sort of thing.

Carmel: So why not focus your attention on those things and quit stalking me around here?

Don't be childish, Carmel. I'm not stalking you. You're an adult engaging in open discussion of your own choice. No one is forced to participate, and whoever chooses can bow out at any time. If you don't want to engage me in discussion, then that's fine. I won't ask you for any responses.

Not only have you had the last word in every discussion we've had, but you've initiated every contact.

I doubt this.

Even when I've repeatedly ignored you,

I don't know about that. To me, it looks like you ignore those comments that show an argument of yours to be mistaken. This, for instance.



May I gently remind you that you promised to respond to this post 2 weeks ago?

Were you ignoring that post? Why, may I ask?

you have interjected yourself between me and dialogues I was having with other members. It's obnoxious.

If you don't like the discussion, just bow out.

This is why I don't deem you to be wise. There is more to wisdom than intellectual understanding. At this point, I consider you to be an evangelist, not a sage. If you are really are so wise as you claim, then I would certainly seek you out and ask for your input, but you never give me the space to do that.

I've never claimed to be a sage. I'm a concept auditor.

Focus on yourself or promoting wisdom. I have no doubt that you understand the philosophical concepts that are espoused here quite well. I think it would be benefical to everyone if you spent more time and energy on the promotion of those concepts.

I do, by engaging with people who are holding onto false and unhelpful concepts. As I have been doing with yourself. But I'm growing tired of your stalling tactics and unwillingness to engage in a thoughtful adult way with simple, clear ideas. So, I'm quite happy to pull the plug. It's obviously fruitless to continue this discussion.


.

[Carmel]

Kelly:
Enlightenment isn't something to be gained, in the sense of a finite object. Rather, it is about understanding the nature of reality, which is everpresent, and literally the nature of everything. Delusion and false thinking closes the mind to perception of reality ---- and yet, such delusion is actually reality as well.

Carmel:
I understand the concepts that are espoused here, it's really not difficult and I've asked other people who have attained some degree of wisdom for their input. They allow me the space to do that. If you want to be "perceived" as being "wise", you might try emulating their behaviour. You keep missing the fact that "wisdom", which was the term being discussed, entails far more than intellectual knowledge and that you are not the ultimate authority on what "wisdom" is comprised of. "Wisdom" is a relative concept, not an absolute one.

Kelly:
Because of this, you can't see why I'm promoting masculinity, and pointing to the drawbacks of feminine psychology. You can't see the point. That's fine - it's your prerogative to be uninterested in perceiving the true face of reality. I won't trouble you to change that perspective, if you're comfortable with it.

Carmel:
Masculinity has drawbacks too, but you're under the delusion that this isn't so. I'm all for "rationality", which is not synonymous with the word "masculinity", in case you're confused about that.


Carmel:Not only have you had the last word in every discussion we've had, but you've initiated every contact.
Kelly:I doubt this.

Carmel:
I know this. I think you know it, too.

Kelly:
Were you ignoring that post? Why, may I ask?

Carmel:
The same reason I always ignore you. To avoid being stalked.

Carmel:
[quote]you have interjected yourself between me and dialogues I was having with other members
Kelly:
If you don't like the discussion, just bow out.

Carmel:
You missed the point. You're meddlesome, you have no concept of appropriate psychological boundaries. You do stalk me and interfere in my communication with others, but don't "grok" that there is anything wrong with your behaviour because of your psychological issues.

Kelly:
But I'm growing tired of your stalling tactics and unwillingness to engage in a thoughtful adult way with simple, clear ideas. So, I'm quite happy to pull the plug. It's obviously fruitless to continue this discussion.

Carmel:
So pull the plug. That'd be a first.

edit: typo

[Carmel]

cousinbasil:
Yes, well I would want that to be a part of any useful definition of personal freedom. I have no desire to be free of my feelings, just to be in control of them. I think they are as necessary as water, but like water, they can drown you. I am not about to move into a desert just to make sure I do not drown. Freedom is having a hand on the faucet.

Carmel:
That's an effective analogy. There are various opinions here about the role emotions play with regard to the attainment of wisdom, ranging from complete asceticism; ridding oneself of all emotion, to a more balanced approach like the one you ascribe to. I'm more inclined towards your view. Emotions play an integral role in the human experience.

I think that there is a direct relationship between the emotions and our conscience and if one is completely severed from them, s/he would have difficulty distinguishing between "right" and "wrong", (not to say that there is an absolute right or wrong).

[Diebert van Rhijn]

One way to address this, is to describe the appearance of reasoning you notice occurring in or as result of the mind.

The "appearance of reasoning" doesn't make any sense. What does the appearance of reasoning appear to?

It's a sensible way to approach the concept of reasoning, as a qualitative, descriptive attribute. Especially since reasoning has a purpose and an outcome or conclusion, the whole process becomes also an appearance that way.

Reason is naturally based on consciousness, like logic is based on identity.

the computer isn't conscious. It has no consciousness of what it is doing, or why.

But one could program the computer to state otherwise.

And do you know what you are doing, for example what your internals are up to right now, or your heart beat, and why that is? All the things you think you are doing and the reasons for it, only mean something in a self-referential conceptual world. In itself that doesn't make you different from a computer shifting bits around. If the earth moves, you still move with it, just like that computer.

What differentiates the rock's memory from the memory of a conscious being?

Nothing, there's only a difference in capacity and speed. Consciousness seems but an artifact of this. A rocky sediment has been called slow life by some, perhaps one could also call it low consciousness. If you talk slow and loud enough it might actually "hear" you, that is: influenced by you and react.

[jupiviv]

It(the appearance of reasoning) is a sensible way to approach the concept of reasoning, as a qualitative, descriptive attribute. Especially since reasoning has a purpose and an outcome or conclusion, the whole process becomes also an appearance that way.

There is no "concept" of reasoning. Reasoning itself is all concepts.

Reason is naturally based on consciousness, like logic is based on identity.

No, reason *is* consciousness, and logic *is* identity....unless by "based" you mean "is the same as."

But one could program the computer to state otherwise.

Exactly - we would be programming the computer, which it couldn't possibly be conscious of.

And do you know what you are doing, for example what your internals are up to right now, or your heart beat, and why that is? All the things you think you are doing and the reasons for it, only mean something in a self-referential conceptual world. In itself that doesn't make you different from a computer shifting bits around. If the earth moves, you still move with it, just like that computer.

I know that anything that I know, or could know, or have known, is not me - for the same reason that a fingertip cannot touch itself. Rather, I myself am the "knowing." To address your argument more directly - the very fact that you can perceive some kind of programming that supposedly controls you, means that you are already outside that programming to some extent. This is what is meant when Buddhist writings talk about the Buddha transcending cause and effect. He wasn't magically lifted out of the world which caused him suffering. He simply became fully conscious of it.

By the way, what I call my body, and all its attributes, isn't really "me"(i.e, consciousness). Otherwise I couldn't perceive it in any manner. However, I can identify it with myself for the purposes of convenience, just like I can identify a tree with myself for the purposes of convenience.

What differentiates the rock's memory from the memory of a conscious being?

Nothing, there's only a difference in capacity and speed. Consciousness seems but an artifact of this. A rocky sediment has been called slow life by some, perhaps one could also call it low consciousness. If you talk slow and loud enough it might actually "hear" you, that is: influenced by you and react.

That's a rather glib response. An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being. And it also may have a "fast life."

Actually, it was a trick question - the rock doesn't have any memory at all. We only say that it has memory because *we* perceive it that way, just like with a hard disk or DVD.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

No, reason *is* consciousness, and logic *is* identity....unless by "based" you mean "is the same as."

Ultimately everything we know is consciousness, but the idea is to separate one thing from another, otherwise reason will not be born. Reasoning is an activity which by definition can result in "wrong" or "good" answers. While consciousness is below and beyond that.

But one could program the computer to state otherwise.

Exactly - we would be programming the computer, which it couldn't possibly be conscious of.

It doesn't matter who did the programming, the point is that the computer would end up stating it's conscious and confirming that to itself with no way to verify outside its parameters. It's a good parable.

By the way, what I call my body, and all its attributes, isn't really "me"(i.e, consciousness).

But it's not something separate from the perceptions either. Since it doesn't make sense to suggest a separate location for it, the reasonable conclusion is to see it as arising out of the processing. Which would imply all complex processing would create some degree of consciousness or inner model-reflection. Like DNA replicators would arise out of complex chemical reactions.

An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

It might be interesting to state an example.

the rock doesn't have any memory at all. We only say that it has memory because *we* perceive it that way, just like with a hard disk or DVD.

But *we *perceive in the same way: our own memory can compare and call the eroded rock "memory" because impressions are being conserved in similar ways.

Essentially my point is to stop focusing so much on that "mirror", saying "everything is mirror" or "reflection = reflection", wiping as you go. One step further there's the realization there's no mirror in the first place. It's only there because one is still clenching at duality and all its things.

[Kelly Jones]

No, reason *is* consciousness, and logic *is* identity....unless by "based" you mean "is the same as."

Ultimately everything we know is consciousness, but the idea is to separate one thing from another, otherwise reason will not be born. Reasoning is an activity which by definition can result in "wrong" or "good" answers. While consciousness is below and beyond that.

Taking the first part of your first sentence: If we don't know truly (i.e. our knowledge is not reason-based), we aren't conscious.

Diebert: But one could program the computer to state otherwise.

Jupta: Exactly - we would be programming the computer, which it couldn't possibly be conscious of.

Diebert: It doesn't matter who did the programming, the point is that the computer would end up stating it's conscious and confirming that to itself with no way to verify outside its parameters. It's a good parable.

I agree with that. Whatever causes consciousness, such as another conscious being or not, is irrelevant to being conscious. One doesn't have to fall into the delusion of free will, and to think that one's true and accurate knowledge is one's own doing, to be conscious. If one is programmed to believe one is being rational, and that one's knowledge is true and accurate, when one isn't, and when it isn't, then so be it.

Jupta: By the way, what I call my body, and all its attributes, isn't really "me"(i.e, consciousness).

Diebert: But it's not something separate from the perceptions either. Since it doesn't make sense to suggest a separate location for it, the reasonable conclusion is to see it as arising out of the processing. Which would imply all complex processing would create some degree of consciousness or inner model-reflection. Like DNA replicators would arise out of complex chemical reactions.

I think what Jupta's getting at is the function of identity, which is what enables reason (and therefore consciousness). Weininger talks of this being the essence of "I", and I agree with it. It's not the same as belief in free will (ego). The "ideal ego" (Weininger's term) is the function of reason (that something is; I am that).

Jupta: An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

Diebert: It might be interesting to state an example.

I think he means mere storage and retrieval of information (like an inert gas's behaviour) doesn't equate to identity (remembering something as itself, in relation to everything else, i.e. a relationship to the Totality).

Jupta: the rock doesn't have any memory at all. We only say that it has memory because *we* perceive it that way, just like with a hard disk or DVD.

Diebert: But *we *perceive in the same way: our own memory can compare and call the eroded rock "memory" because impressions are being conserved in similar ways.

Yes, we're no different to rocks in how impressions are stored. But rocks don't have abstract imagination, to conceive of identities without experiencing them sensorily.

Essentially my point is to stop focusing so much on that "mirror", saying "everything is mirror" or "reflection = reflection", wiping as you go. One step further there's the realization there's no mirror in the first place. It's only there because one is still clenching at duality and all its things.

Or rather, the mirror and its reflections is itself the pure formless lotus.


.

[jupiviv]

Ultimately everything we know is consciousness, but the idea is to separate one thing from another, otherwise reason will not be born.

Agreed.

Reasoning is an activity which by definition can result in "wrong" or "good" answers. While consciousness is below and beyond that.

Whatever contributes to the creation of consciousness is good, and whatever doesn't is bad.

It doesn't matter who did the programming, the point is that the computer would end up stating it's conscious and confirming that to itself with no way to verify outside its parameters. It's a good parable.

The computer may state it is conscious(even when it is actually not), but it would only confirm that fact to itself if it is actually conscious. All we know for sure is that it is stating that it is conscious, not that it is confirming that to itself.

it(consciousness) is not something separate from the perceptions either.

But it is separate from the things that are perceived.

Since it doesn't make sense to suggest a separate location for it, the reasonable conclusion is to see it as arising out of the processing.

How? This "processing" too is something you are perceiving.

An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

It might be interesting to state an example.

A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc. My point was that your definitions of larger and faster memory, slower life, etc. were very vague in the post, so they could be used in numerous ways.

the rock doesn't have any memory at all. We only say that it has memory because *we* perceive it that way, just like with a hard disk or DVD.

But *we *perceive in the same way:

Perceive in what way? The rock doesn't perceive anything at all, and neither do cats or trees. A cat acts entirely on instinct, as far as we know.

our own memory can compare and call the eroded rock "memory" because impressions are being conserved in similar ways.

Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.

Essentially my point is to stop focusing so much on that "mirror", saying "everything is mirror" or "reflection = reflection", wiping as you go.

I'm not saying that everything is a mirror.

[Kelly Jones]

The computer may state it is conscious(even when it is actually not), but it would only confirm that fact to itself if it is actually conscious.

No, it could be programmed to state, and confirm that. Very easy to get the printout "I confirm I am conscious", or to confirm something that isn't actually the experience of consciousness. Doesn't mean anything.


The following shows an internal contradiction (assuming that "conscious being" you mean presence of "I"):

J: An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

D: It might be interesting to state an example.

J: A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc. My point was that your definitions of larger and faster memory, slower life, etc. were very vague in the post, so they could be used in numerous ways.

[snip]

J: Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

No, reason *is* consciousness, and logic *is* identity....unless by "based" you mean "is the same as."

Ultimately everything we know is consciousness, but the idea is to separate one thing from another, otherwise reason will not be born. Reasoning is an activity which by definition can result in "wrong" or "good" answers. While consciousness is below and beyond that.

Taking the first part of your first sentence: If we don't know truly (i.e. our knowledge is not reason-based), we aren't conscious.

Perhaps non-reason-based-knowledge could be called opinion instead, like how Spinoza defined it. This includes whatever is presented by the senses and any other speculative conjecture or emotional reaction to that.

I think what Jupta's getting at is the function of identity, which is what enables reason (and therefore consciousness).

But Jup is saying something different: he's saying that consciousness equals reason and identity is logic. That kind of language is blurring the distinctions which are definitely there.

I think he means mere storage and retrieval of information (like an inert gas's behavior) doesn't equate to identity (remembering something as itself, in relation to everything else, i.e. a relationship to the Totality).

But it does equate because information only exists in relation to a context. The gas or anyting else just doesn't have the complexity in whatever memory ability to make the complex comparison needed to identify anything at all but the simplest, lowest level continuation of form (repeat of self-form; affirmation).

Yes, we're no different to rocks in how impressions are stored. But rocks don't have abstract imagination, to conceive of identities without experiencing them sensory.

You're just saying a rock doesn't have a complex information structure as far as we can tell. But one could for example carve it with a laser-beam and use it as memory that way. And again, it doesn't matter the information comes from us, it might be any source of information. And indeed rocks do record extremely low degrees of information. The "abstract imagination" is what makes complex information hubs functional. It's just not developed that way in a rock.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

All we know for sure is that [that computer] is stating that it is conscious, not that it is confirming that to itself.

We could also witness an input device registering the statement of consciousness and relaying it back to the computer, comparing it with the statement (which is what computers do, comparing and shifting stuff internally) and state "affirmative" when there's a match. Isn't that self-confirmation?

it(consciousness) is not something separate from the perceptions either.

But it is separate from the things that are perceived.

Those things are only imagined to be, and as such only imaginary separated.

]Since it doesn't make sense to suggest a separate location for it, the reasonable conclusion is to see it as arising out of the processing.

How? This "processing" too is something you are perceiving.

It's not possible to detach that perception from the process, this can be confirmed and understood internally. But outwardly it can also be deduced somewhat from the fact consciousness only takes place where there's a certain amount of processing and decreases when input and output are seriously restrained.

An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

It might be interesting to state an example.

A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc.

Those don't have a larger and faster memory capacity than conscious beings! In potential there's space but there's not comparable content and speed going on.

The rock doesn't perceive anything at all, and neither do cats or trees. A cat acts entirely on instinct, as far as we know.

There's with all those examples a complex range of subtle reactions going on. Your perceptions are not that different, just a bit more convoluted, really. Why is it so important to invent a "special" element that makes your perception fundamentally different? Perhaps you're a cat-growing tree growing on a rock.

Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself.

Or the illusion of 'I' is tied to the processing of memory. For example a group identity if forged and maintained by sorting through common memories together.

[Kelly Jones]

Jupta: No, reason *is* consciousness, and logic *is* identity....unless by "based" you mean "is the same as."

Diebert: Ultimately everything we know is consciousness, but the idea is to separate one thing from another, otherwise reason will not be born. Reasoning is an activity which by definition can result in "wrong" or "good" answers. While consciousness is below and beyond that.

Kelly: [Italicising and...] Taking the first part of your first sentence: If we don't know truly (i.e. our knowledge is not reason-based), we aren't conscious.

Diebert: Perhaps non-reason-based-knowledge could be called opinion instead, like how Spinoza defined it. This includes whatever is presented by the senses and any other speculative conjecture or emotional reaction to that.

I don't think one could rightly call the lack of reason consciousness, in any meaningful way. It's a stumbling haze of error, a whirlpool of electrochemical signals. It's more like water tumbling down a rockface, because it must, and because it has no will.

Kelly: I think what Jupta's getting at is the function of identity, which is what enables reason (and therefore consciousness).

Diebert: But Jup is saying something different: he's saying that consciousness equals reason and identity is logic. That kind of language is blurring the distinctions which are definitely there.

Well, from my perspective (and I'm not entirely sure what Jup means), it sounds right. Pure truth, however, might not include reason, but is still consciousness.

Kelly: I think he means mere storage and retrieval of information (like an inert gas's behavior) doesn't equate to identity (remembering something as itself, in relation to everything else, i.e. a relationship to the Totality).

Diebert: But it does equate because information only exists in relation to a context. The gas or anyting else just doesn't have the complexity in whatever memory ability to make the complex comparison needed to identify anything at all but the simplest, lowest level continuation of form (repeat of self-form; affirmation).

It sounds like you're agreeing with me (?)

Kelly: Yes, we're no different to rocks in how impressions are stored. But rocks don't have abstract imagination, to conceive of identities without experiencing them sensory.

Diebert: You're just saying a rock doesn't have a complex information structure as far as we can tell. But one could for example carve it with a laser-beam and use it as memory that way. And again, it doesn't matter the information comes from us, it might be any source of information. And indeed rocks do record extremely low degrees of information. The "abstract imagination" is what makes complex information hubs functional. It's just not developed that way in a rock.

I don't think a rock's complex molecular structure is anywhere near the complexity needed for abstract imagination (i.e. consciousness). I think the difference here is that a rock is storing a lot of material simultaneously, but abstract imagination can compare and relate imaginary impressions to each other, distinguishing them. A rock will be forced to react differently, say, from the pressures of wind to the pressures of a sledge hammer, but it couldn't choose to react differently by force of will (conception).


.

[mensa-maniac]

Someone stated that consciousness is below reason, not true at all. Because one has to be conscious first to be able to reason!

Then someone else said, consciousness equals reason. Everyone is at different levels of consciousness, you only need to look at I.Q to know this to be true. And since the levels are different the reasoning would naturally differ also, thus creating differences, but you have created a very interesting logic here that I am challenged to answer because now you have me thinking. I would think that the only way that consciousness could equal reason if there was no other reasonable indisputable answer.

Donna Thompson

[jupiviv]

The computer may state it is conscious(even when it is actually not), but it would only confirm that fact to itself if it is actually conscious.

No, it could be programmed to state, and confirm that. Very easy to get the printout "I confirm I am conscious", or to confirm something that isn't actually the experience of consciousness. Doesn't mean anything.

It still wouldn't confirm that fact to itself, if it actually isn't conscious(since if it isn't actually conscious, then it wouldn't have a self).

The following shows an internal contradiction (assuming that "conscious being" you mean presence of "I"):

J: An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

D: It might be interesting to state an example.

J: A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc. My point was that your definitions of larger and faster memory, slower life, etc. were very vague in the post, so they could be used in numerous ways.

[snip]

J: Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.

As I said elsewhere, the rock or computer or whatever else(which isn't conscious) doesn't actually have a memory at all, and the term "memory" may be used only for the sake of convenience. I was actually showing the vagueness of Diebert's usage of the term.

[jupiviv]

All we know for sure is that [that computer] is stating that it is conscious, not that it is confirming that to itself.

We could also witness an input device registering the statement of consciousness and relaying it back to the computer, comparing it with the statement (which is what computers do, comparing and shifting stuff internally) and state "affirmative" when there's a match. Isn't that self-confirmation?

See my previous post.

it(consciousness) is not something separate from the perceptions either.

But it is separate from the things that are perceived.

Those things are only imagined to be, and as such only imaginary separated.

No they are really separate. Consciousness must be conscious of something, therefore there must be things separate from it.

]Since it doesn't make sense to suggest a separate location for it, the reasonable conclusion is to see it as arising out of the processing.

How? This "processing" too is something you are perceiving.

It's not possible to detach that perception from the process, this can be confirmed and understood internally. But outwardly it can also be deduced somewhat from the fact consciousness only takes place where there's a certain amount of processing and decreases when input and output are seriously restrained.

Since you haven't answered my question, I can't respond to this.

A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc.

Those don't have a larger and faster memory capacity than conscious beings! In potential there's space but there's not comparable content and speed going on.

They do. Anything with a surface area which is bigger than ourselves has a larger memory, and possibly even a faster one, than us. Of course, I'm using your definition of "memory" here.

The rock doesn't perceive anything at all, and neither do cats or trees. A cat acts entirely on instinct, as far as we know.

There's with all those examples a complex range of subtle reactions going on.

Reactions are not the same as perception.

I think the problem here is that you are changing the definitions of things to suit your arguments, but those definitions are not clear. You have to be a bit clearer about what you are defining things like "memory", "perception" etc. to be, and why.

Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself.

Or the illusion of 'I' is tied to the processing of memory.

How do you know this, or how have you deduced this?

[Kelly Jones]

The computer may state it is conscious(even when it is actually not), but it would only confirm that fact to itself if it is actually conscious.

No, it could be programmed to state, and confirm that. Very easy to get the printout "I confirm I am conscious", or to confirm something that isn't actually the experience of consciousness. Doesn't mean anything.

It still wouldn't confirm that fact to itself, if it actually isn't conscious(since if it isn't actually conscious, then it wouldn't have a self).

If there is a parameter in the program that defines what consciousness is, such as "the state of identifying things accurately, and making logical deductions" (for argument's sake), and at a certain point in the program, a function sends a request to confirm whether consciousness exists (0 for no, 1 for yes), then the computer could easily printout a "1", given sufficient data.

And, if the program then included a function to send a request to confirm whether the computer could remember "to itself" what it had just done, it could easily answer that affirmatively.

The human mind does work mechanically like a computer processor, only slower. Our memories are also stored in particular areas, and we run on programmable lines that change according to the inputs given. Basically, I mean. A computer, if given information about what constitutes it as an unified entity, would have a self: the CPU and motherboard, cabling, ports, the peripherals, and so forth.

The following shows an internal contradiction (assuming that "conscious being" you mean presence of "I"):

Block quote starts here
J: An unconscious thing may well have a far larger and faster memory than a conscious being.

D: It might be interesting to state an example.

J: A computer's memory, newly formed silt, water, amber, etc. My point was that your definitions of larger and faster memory, slower life, etc. were very vague in the post, so they could be used in numerous ways.

[snip]

J: Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.
Block quote ends here

J: As I said elsewhere, the rock or computer or whatever else(which isn't conscious) doesn't actually have a memory at all, and the term "memory" may be used only for the sake of convenience. I was actually showing the vagueness of Diebert's usage of the term.

Well, holding impressions, storing data, retaining continuity, are all essentially the same as human conscious memory. The only difference is in the detailed nature of the latter, which comes from having so many senses. We pick up a lot more data, and our ability to distinguish and categorise coherently has given rise to the complex.


.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

I don't think one could rightly call the lack of reason consciousness, in any meaningful way. It's a stumbling haze of error, a whirlpool of electrochemical signals. It's more like water tumbling down a rockface, because it must, and because it has no will.

Conscisousness is consciousness, as Jup would agree, no matter how many rocky surfaces it has to cascade from. One could talk about a lack or stream or a high dose of obstructive landscape, this is all naturally relative.

Kelly: I think he means mere storage and retrieval of information (like an inert gas's behavior) doesn't equate to identity ( remembering something as itself)

Diebert: The gas or anyting else just doesn't have the complexity in whatever memory ability to make the complex comparison needed to identify anything at all but the simplest, lowest level continuation of form (repeat of self-form; affirmation).

It sounds like you're agreeing with me (?)

A low level of self-affirmation I regard as identity, it persists that way, physically (un)even, however briefly, in relation to some context, whatever that context may be. Without the context the whole issue is non-existent of course.

I think the difference here is that a rock is storing a lot of material simultaneously, but abstract imagination can compare and relate imaginary impressions to each other, distinguishing them. A rock will be forced to react differently, say, from the pressures of wind to the pressures of a sledge hammer, but it couldn't choose to react differently by force of will (conception).

Just because your own wind and sledge hammers carving you are more obscured doesn't make it any essentially different.

[Kelly Jones]

I don't think one could rightly call the lack of reason consciousness, in any meaningful way. It's a stumbling haze of error, a whirlpool of electrochemical signals. It's more like water tumbling down a rockface, because it must, and because it has no will.

Conscisousness is consciousness, as Jup would agree, no matter how many rocky surfaces it has to cascade from. One could talk about a lack or stream or a high dose of obstructive landscape, this is all naturally relative.

Yes. I guess we're trying to do the impossible, which is to define consciousness in a way that isn't merely a synonym of reason / truth (that is to say, God).

Kelly: I think he means mere storage and retrieval of information (like an inert gas's behavior) doesn't equate to identity ( remembering something as itself)

Diebert: The gas or anyting else just doesn't have the complexity in whatever memory ability to make the complex comparison needed to identify anything at all but the simplest, lowest level continuation of form (repeat of self-form; affirmation).

Kelly: It sounds like you're agreeing with me (?)

Diebert: A low level of self-affirmation I regard as identity, it persists that way, physically (un)even, however briefly, in relation to some context, whatever that context may be. Without the context the whole issue is non-existent of course.

Hmm. Are you saying that a rock retains general continuity of form because it affirms itself to be so? Wouldn't that require an act of will and the ability to choose another form out of imagined alternatives?

Kelly: I think the difference here is that a rock is storing a lot of material simultaneously, but abstract imagination can compare and relate imaginary impressions to each other, distinguishing them. A rock will be forced to react differently, say, from the pressures of wind to the pressures of a sledge hammer, but it couldn't choose to react differently by force of will (conception).

Diebert: Just because your own wind and sledge hammers carving you are more obscured doesn't make it any essentially different.

Yes, essentially there is no difference between one formation of causes and another. But some causes aren't conscious, otherwise the Totality would be conscious. Yet consciousness is selective, so the Totality cannot be conscious. It seems I've wound up contradicting my first statement in this post, but there, I was talking about consciousness' knowledge of its own nature (its essence, rather than its characteristic difference from other forms that have the same essence).


.

[cousinbasil]

J: Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.

But usually there are more than one of the I's. If they are compatible, everything is OK. If not, we have a power struggle, or possibly an identity crisis in bad cases, maybe even a good old fashioned nervous breakdown if two or more of the I's can't fight nice. Each memory has an I associated with it as it comes on board, or perhaps several. The memory and the I are not the same thing. The illusion that they are identical is powerful, since one can mentally juxtapose two entirely different memories, and realize the I's cannot have been the same as each other. ("I can't believe we did that," etc...)

The I associated with a given memory doesn't even have to be conscious, apparently, since people can recall things that "came on board" during anesthesia.

Consciousness must be conscious of something, therefore there must be things separate from it.

Let's say that again more slowly: consciousness must be conscious of something, therefore there must be at least one thing separate from it. If consciousness were all there were, it would logically not have something separate from it to be conscious of, in which case it could not then be consciousness. So the minimum set-up is consciousness (A), the thing which is not consciousness (B), and of course the concept (C) of B which then must arise within the now-conscious A.

Of course, you were speaking of people, but this is the idea behind a triune godhead.

So which is the smallest number? 0, 1, 2 or 3. (Nihilist, monotheist, dualist, trinitarian.)

[jupiviv]

If there is a parameter in the program(in the computer) that defines what consciousness is, such as "the state of identifying things accurately, and making logical deductions" (for argument's sake), and at a certain point in the program, a function sends a request to confirm whether consciousness exists (0 for no, 1 for yes), then the computer could easily printout a "1", given sufficient data.

This is really the same argument put in a different way. There is still no way of knowing for sure whether it is confirming that fact to itself, i.e, whether it is conscious that it is saying "yes"(or even "no"). And based on what we know about computers, a computer can't do that.

And, if the program then included a function to send a request to confirm whether the computer could remember "to itself" what it had just done, it could easily answer that affirmatively.

That would be impossible, on simple logical grounds.

The human mind does work mechanically like a computer processor, only slower. Our memories are also stored in particular areas, and we run on programmable lines that change according to the inputs given. Basically, I mean. A computer, if given information about what constitutes it as an unified entity, would have a self: the CPU and motherboard, cabling, ports, the peripherals, and so forth.

Assuming that by "human mind" here you mean the brain, then that is not really consciousness, because that too is a concept appearing to mind(i.e, you are conscious of it). Or at least, the brain can't arbitrarily and in and of itself, be labeled "consciousness." Anyone who tries to do so would be contradicted on all sides - literally.

Well, holding impressions, storing data, retaining continuity, are all essentially the same as human conscious memory.

The computer or rock isn't "doing" any of that stuff, because it isn't conscious. It isn't conscious of any of those things.

[jupiviv]

Memory again is nothing but the "I" itself. We have memories when we can think of any situation in relation to ourselves.

But usually there are more than one of the I's.

There appear to be, yes.

If they are compatible, everything is OK. If not, we have a power struggle, or possibly an identity crisis in bad cases, maybe even a good old fashioned nervous breakdown if two or more of the I's can't fight nice. Each memory has an I associated with it as it comes on board, or perhaps several.

You're thinking of memory as the events that you are conscious of, whereas I find that it is more accurate to simply define it as the state of being conscious itself. In other words, memories are nothing but concepts - things that appear to mind.

And the "I" is not that popular amongst humans as a rule. Most humans either are very unconscious to begin with, or want to become unconscious through the course of their lives.

Let's say that again more slowly: consciousness must be conscious of something, therefore there must be at least one thing separate from it.

I wouldn't say "at least one thing", because "1" is, again, a concept. If the number system were structured differently, then "1" may not have been the least. Let's just say that it is logically binding that consciousness and everything else except consciousness must exist together.

So the minimum set-up is consciousness (A), the thing which is not consciousness (B), and of course the concept (C) of B which then must arise within the now-conscious A.

The concept C is the conscious entity A. Look at it this way - if conscious entity A exists, then A must be conscious of something - B. Therefore, the concept of B is already there, in that B already appears to A. There is no need of a C.