GENIUS FORUMS

The following is a paraphrased argument I had made on another thread.

Causality, while true, doesn't explain anything to me. A thing being universally true doesn't necessarily give one insight into the underpinnings of the universe as a whole.

My example was that all things are made of energy. If I imagine the Big Bang theory of the universe to be most likely; then, everything in the universe is the same energy in different forms. This is as true a statement as all things are caused. But, adherence to this statement can be, as Laird said, dogmatic

Why don't stars in a galaxy follow gravitational rules that we observe locally? " It doesn't matter; the galaxy is me and I am the galaxy"
How does a star produce its energy? " It doesn't matter; the star is me and I am the star"
How do cells transfer energy? " It doesn't matter; the cell is me and I am the cell"

What can I learn if I know that all things originate from the same energy? I just accept it and move on; rather than try to build a philosophy upon the statement.

In each case that I say " It doesn't matter, The _____ is me and I am the _____" ; some would just replace the answer with "causality."

What can be learned from that? It just seems like the easy way out.

Laird wrote:I'm conceiving of random as being not fully determined by prior events. I'm conceiving of pre-determined as being fully determined by prior events. In other words, if X is random, then it is incorrect to say, "X occurred wholly because of events prior to it"; if X is pre-determined then it is correct to say, "X occurred wholly because of events prior to it, or in general wholly because of the past state of the universe", as in the Laplace quote that Locke provided us with.

These conceptions refer only to temporal causality, and ignore other things that you refer to as causes, such as the components of X and the relationship between X and the rest of the universe at the moment it exists, so bear that in mind when interpreting "wholly" and "fully".

I see what you have set up here, Laird. But as soon as I see it, why you have set it up seems to escape me.

I believe when you say "X" you are referring to what physicists call an event, as in "X happens."

Why do you think there is such a thing as "random" as you are conceiving of it here? It sounds to me as if you are assuming such a random event X can happen. You must be aware that this definition of "random" is at odds with the way one would normally use it. Simply, all random events have causes because all events do. For instance, a statistically valid random sample does not imply that the measured values included in the sample were somehow uncaused.

Note: By "has causes" I mean the same as "is fully caused."

Locke wrote:Causality, while true, doesn't explain anything to me. A thing being universally true doesn't necessarily give one insight into the underpinnings of the universe as a whole.

If a principle is universally true, by definition it cannot explain anything. One understands the principle; one then does the explaining. Not the Principle itself. If a statement is literally true about everything, then how could it have a bearing on anything in particular?

cousinbasil wrote: If a statement is literally true about everything, then how could it have a bearing on anything in particular?

This is not a bad argument. I had to think on it awhile. I suppose that I could say that an all encompassing statement can define boundaries. If we take my statement that all matter is composed of energy; then, if we encounter new matter we won't say this might be composed of unicorns. We know our boundaries.

Locke wrote:

cousinbasil wrote: If a statement is literally true about everything, then how could it have a bearing on anything in particular?

This is not a bad argument. I had to think on it awhile. I suppose that I could say that an all encompassing statement can define boundaries. If we take my statement that all matter is composed of energy; then, if we encounter new matter we won't say this might be composed of unicorns. We know our boundaries.

If you follow my reasoning closely, you will see it hinges precisely on the notion of "literally everything." "Literally everything" would have to include both matter and energy. Any statement you make about literally everything can convey no information, as information requires [at least] duality. This is just Russell's infinite set paradox. We can approach it kind of like a limit process. As the scope of your statement widens progressively to include more and more things, approaching literally everything, any meta information would be by definition outside the boundary and must be shrinking, since information is either included or not (meta).

The definition of literally everything must be zero meta-anything, including information. Hence a statement about literally (utterly) everything cannot convey anything, including this statement.

I suggested the limit process just to give a feel of getting to literally everything, without having actually to be there, because your singularity happens there.

Cousinbasil,

I think I see what you are saying. But, there is a inherit problem with paradoxical thought. They are fun to think about; but, the recursive logic locks one into an unanswerable question. If I could reword Russells's paradox; it seems that I could just say " The infinite set contains all subsets." Since I can't I have to leave the paradox as is.

The question is whether my statement is true or not? All matter is composed of energy.

If it is true, then, does the statement not encompass all matter in the universe?

If you agree that this statement applies to all matter in the universe, then isn't the statement a universal truism.

If I'm mistaken at lest the thought exercise has been fun. Thank you.

Locke wrote:The following is a paraphrased argument I had made on another thread.

Causality, while true, doesn't explain anything to me. A thing being universally true doesn't necessarily give one insight into the underpinnings of the universe as a whole.

Personally, I've always found uncovering anything that is universally true - i.e. necessarily true of all things everywhere, in all times and places, in all possible worlds - immediately triggers all sorts of insights into the nature of reality.

My example was that all things are made of energy. If I imagine the Big Bang theory of the universe to be most likely; then, everything in the universe is the same energy in different forms. This is as true a statement as all things are caused. But, adherence to this statement can be, as Laird said, dogmatic

Why don't stars in a galaxy follow gravitational rules that we observe locally? " It doesn't matter; the galaxy is me and I am the galaxy"
How does a star produce its energy? " It doesn't matter; the star is me and I am the star"
How do cells transfer energy? " It doesn't matter; the cell is me and I am the cell"

What can I learn if I know that all things originate from the same energy? I just accept it and move on; rather than try to build a philosophy upon the statement.

In each case that I say " It doesn't matter, The _____ is me and I am the _____" ; some would just replace the answer with "causality."

What can be learned from that?

The way you put it there - nothing.

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guest_of_logic wrote:

guest_of_logic: I'm not arguing that a thing might be without causes (as you define them) - I'm arguing that we can't know for certain that causal determinism is true.

David: You've lost me.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_determinism

Still lost, I'm afraid. Still can't make any sense of your comment above.

(And don't make the obvious response).

guest_of_logic wrote:

guest_of_logic: For example, it's possible that certain events, such as the decay of certain sub-atomic particles, happen entirely at random, such that they are not pre-determined.

David: How are you conceiving "random" and "pre-determinism"?

I'm conceiving of random as being not fully determined by prior events. I'm conceiving of pre-determined as being fully determined by prior events. In other words, if X is random, then it is incorrect to say, "X occurred wholly because of events prior to it"; if X is pre-determined then it is correct to say, "X occurred wholly because of events prior to it, or in general wholly because of the past state of the universe", as in the Laplace quote that Locke provided us with.

And so, why do you want to believe this? Why the unnecessary injection of this artifice?

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cousinbasil wrote:

Locke wrote:Causality, while true, doesn't explain anything to me. A thing being universally true doesn't necessarily give one insight into the underpinnings of the universe as a whole.

If a principle is universally true, by definition it cannot explain anything. One understands the principle; one then does the explaining. Not the Principle itself. If a statement is literally true about everything, then how could it have a bearing on anything in particular?

The best principles are so universal that they take us beyond understanding and the need for explanation.

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cousinbasil wrote:I see what you have set up here, Laird. But as soon as I see it, why you have set it up seems to escape me.

Oh, really? I thought I was pretty transparent.

cousinbasil wrote:I believe when you say "X" you are referring to what physicists call an event, as in "X happens."

Yes, or, stretching it a little: as an effected material object or idea or other entity.

cousinbasil wrote:Why do you think there is such a thing as "random" as you are conceiving of it here?

I don't think there necessarily is such a thing, I'm just speculating on it as a possibility.

Determinism entails absurdities, and so I'm exploring the possibility that the "ultimate" paradigm is not purely deterministic. The "random" possibility that I've presented here might not be a very intuitive one, but who knows whether it's the only possibility? What would make us so bold as to say, in spite of the absurdities that determinism raises, "OK, this is the be-all and end-all: the universe is wholly deterministic and we will never in our ever-expanding understanding of reality encounter a paradigm shift"?

cousinbasil wrote:It sounds to me as if you are assuming such a random event X can happen.

I'm assuming it as a logical possibility, not necessarily a physical possibility. Determinism entails assumptions too, though - for example, how do you truly know that any one thing is caused (and I'm still referring only to temporal causes) by some other thing? There's always the possibility that an apparent causal link is merely that: apparent and not real. Causal links are assumed.

cousinbasil wrote:You must be aware that this definition of "random" is at odds with the way one would normally use it.

Well, I'd say that it's a little more specific (in the sense that it entails a lack of cause), and because of that I sometimes refer to it as "truly random".

cousinbasil wrote:Simply, all random events have causes because all events do.

There's that bold assumption. :-)

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David, you're probably lost because of a conflation that seems to happen in your mind. I'll explain what I mean in relation to the relevant parts of the exchange, which are here:

guest_of_logic: Oh, but I don't see how I could ever know causal determinism to be true in the first place, short of some sort of mystical or omniscient knowledge.

David: As I say, it is logically impossible for a thing to be without causes. [You then go on to present two types of things that you consider to be causes of a thing: its constituent parts and its environment]

guest_of_logic: I'm not arguing that a thing might be without causes (as you define them) - I'm arguing that we can't know for certain that causal determinism is true.

David: You've lost me.

All along I've been referring to causal determinism, and suggesting the possibility that it is false. You attempted to refute that possibility by writing that it's logically impossible for a thing to be without causes, where you listed as causes constituent parts and environment; however: those types of causes have nothing to do with causal determinism. That's why I provided you with a link: so that you could see what type of causes actually are entailed by causal determinism. The first few paragraphs of the article should have clued you in that causal determinism is about prior causes; in other words it is about temporal causes, and not about the non-temporal types of causes that you listed (constituent parts and environment), which have no bearing on the truth of causal determinism.

The conflation, then, that I referred above to you making is that of temporal causes with the non-temporal causes that you listed. So, if you really want to refute the possibility that causal determinism is false, you will have to stop conflating these types of causes and find a way to prove that, in the temporal causal sense and ignoring the causal senses you listed, every event is fully caused by prior events.

There: are you found again?

David Quinn wrote:And so, why do you want to believe this? Why the unnecessary injection of this artifice?

See my explanation to cousinbasil above.

Hi Laird,

I'm having trouble following your line of reasoning which I think, in part, stems from the fact that we have different notions of the definition of the word "random", which, using your example of radioactive decay, in essence, means "unpredictable". While it's true that scientists can't predict the order of decay, they can predict the rate of decay quite precisely. They also know the causes for decay, what specific interactions are occuring at a subatomic level.

Also, I'm still not clear why you say that causality contains "absurdities". The only possible paradox I see is the original one, i.e. that "The Totality" itself is uncaused/self-caused. I'm not sure if there's anyway around this, except maybe to think of the Totality as the sum total of all causes and effects, but that may be a superficial fix as I'm not sure if this allows for "infinity"? ...or it may be that "The Totality" is inherently paradoxical in nature. This seems more logically viable to me, but I'll have to ponder it a bit more...

It's very straightforward. The "totality" simply means utterly everything. Nothing at all is excluded from it. All the questions you pose are quickly resolved when you work through the logic of this.

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David Quinn:
It's very straightforward. The "totality" simply means utterly everything. Nothing at all is excluded from it.

Carmel:
...hence the name, "The Totality"!

So, that would include (seemingly)paradoxical concepts...yes?

Of course.

Thoughts occuring in the mind are caused, expect 'things' to flow in an orderly predictable fashion, and they mostly so, when a paradox occurs it can seem random and chaotic, but it's not.

For example what happened on September 11,2001 was shocking and seemingly random and senseless to most, who were oblivious to the years of planning (causes) that went into it.

Carmel wrote:David Quinn:
It's very straightforward. The "totality" simply means utterly everything. Nothing at all is excluded from it.

Carmel:
...hence the name, "The Totality"!

So, that would include (seemingly)paradoxical concepts...yes?

It's includes everything.

"Paradoxes" don't really exist, except in the human imagination (which, yes, is part of the Totality).

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Hi Carmel,

Carmel wrote:I'm having trouble following your line of reasoning which I think, in part, stems from the fact that we have different notions of the definition of the word "random", which, using your example of radioactive decay, in essence, means "unpredictable".

Yep, although I don't use that word in this context on this forum because there's an argument floating around that even under full determinism everything is in principle unpredictable (I forget how it runs exactly although I seem to remember that it has something to do with the machine being used to do the prediction being part of the variables of prediction, and also those variables being infinite). I need a word that contrasts with determinism though, so I choose random instead. If you can think of a better word then please let me know. Basically I mean "not predetermined".

Carmel wrote:While it's true that scientists can't predict the order of decay, they can predict the rate of decay quite precisely. They also know the causes for decay, what specific interactions are occuring at a subatomic level.

That might all be true - all I'm saying though is that it's possible that some part of those events is non-deterministic.

Carmel wrote:Also, I'm still not clear why you say that causality contains "absurdities". The only possible paradox I see is the original one, i.e. that "The Totality" itself is uncaused/self-caused.

The other one that I've mentioned is the absurdity of the experience of free will being an illusion.

Carmel wrote:I'm not sure if there's anyway around this, except maybe to think of the Totality as the sum total of all causes and effects, but that may be a superficial fix as I'm not sure if this allows for "infinity"?

It seems to me that it allows for it - i.e. if the sum of all causes and effects is infinite. Or did you have some objection to that in mind?

Carmel wrote:...or it may be that "The Totality" is inherently paradoxical in nature.

Could be, although letting paradoxes in deprives the fishermen of their can of worms.

guest_of_logic wrote:

cousinbasil wrote:Why do you think there is such a thing as "random" as you are conceiving of it here?

I don't think there necessarily is such a thing, I'm just speculating on it as a possibility.

You're chasing a red-herring here. This is an all-or-nothing kind of issue. It doesn't admit of any kind of grey. Either all things are caused, or none of them are. There can be no in between. This automatically rules out the situation you are trying to imagine - which is that some things could be uncaused.

The reason for this is that causality is ultimately a logical truth, not an empirical one. Causality is literally a corollary of existence.

It is not something which can be proved or disproved empirically. It is either proven logically, or not at all.

All along I've been referring to causal determinism, and suggesting the possibility that it is false. You attempted to refute that possibility by writing that it's logically impossible for a thing to be without causes, where you listed as causes constituent parts and environment; however: those types of causes have nothing to do with causal determinism. That's why I provided you with a link: so that you could see what type of causes actually are entailed by causal determinism. The first few paragraphs of the article should have clued you in that causal determinism is about prior causes; in other words it is about temporal causes, and not about the non-temporal types of causes that you listed (constituent parts and environment), which have no bearing on the truth of causal determinism.

It seems like a very limited definition of determinism to me, given that it excludes many categories of deterministic causes. You would need to justify this seemingly arbitrary division and exclusion.

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guest_of_logic wrote: The other one that I've mentioned is the absurdity of the experience of free will being an illusion.

You're conception of causality is still very crude, which is what generates the "absurdity". There is actually no clash at all between causality and the experience of free will when these things are properly understood.

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David Quinn wrote:You're chasing a red-herring here. This is an all-or-nothing kind of issue. It doesn't admit of any kind of grey. Either all things are caused, or none of them are. There can be no in between.

David, feeling depressed? :D

David Quinn wrote:This automatically rules out the situation you are trying to imagine - which is that some things could be uncaused.

The reason for this is that causality is ultimately a logical truth, not an empirical one. Causality is literally a corollary of existence.

It is not something which can be proved or disproved empirically. It is either proven logically, or not at all.

OK, so go ahead and prove logically that, ignoring the other types of causes you've mentioned, every event is fully caused by prior events.

David Quinn wrote:It seems like a very limited definition of determinism to me, given that it excludes many categories of deterministic causes. You would need to justify this seemingly arbitrary division and exclusion.

It's a standard definition of causal determinism. It doesn't really matter though, because whether we use a standard definition or some definition of your own devising, the above challenge to you is the same.

David Quinn wrote:You're conception of causality is still very crude

Why do you do this, man? Is there really any need for this kind of condescension?

David Quinn wrote:

guest_of_logic wrote: The other one that I've mentioned is the absurdity of the experience of free will being an illusion.

You're conception of causality is still very crude, which is what generates the "absurdity". There is actually no clash at all between causality and the experience of free will when these things are properly understood.

It wouldn't seem so absurd if the claim was that our wills are under the total control of a higher will, such that our decisions are actually willed by that higher will even whilst we (under the power of that will) believe them to be our own, but to deny the existence of free will at all anywhere in the universe leaves us effectively as unwitting actors acting out a pre-written script - and then you would claim that the script itself wasn't willed... and so we are left with the absurdity of being actors acting out an "unwritten" script. I don't expect you to agree but to me this doesn't add up.

Laird:
That might all be true - all I'm saying though is that it's possible that some part of those events is non-deterministic.

Carmel:
What reason do you have to think that? I honestly don't see how any of those events could possibly be uncaused.

Laird:
The other one that I've mentioned is the absurdity of the experience of free will being an illusion.

Carmel:
ok, but it's almost like you're basing your assumptions about the "experience of free will" on a feeling, rather than making a logical argument for it. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

Laird:
It seems to me that it allows for it - i.e. if the sum of all causes and effects is infinite. Or did you have some objection to that in mind?

Carmel:
no objection.

Laird:
Could be, although letting paradoxes in deprives the fishermen of their can of worms.

Carmel:
The paradoxes are in! ... which is not necessarily problematic, I'll address this point later...

guest_of_logic wrote:.. and so we are left with the absurdity of being actors acting out an "unwritten" script. I don't expect you to agree but to me this doesn't add up.

Consider giving it away Laird, you are actually affirming causality with every stupid utterance that you make.

Laird: That might all be true - all I'm saying though is that it's possible that some part of those events is non-deterministic.

Carmel: What reason do you have to think that? I honestly don't see how any of those events could possibly be uncaused.

I mean that it's logically possible, which means that it doesn't imply a contradiction, and the reason I have for thinking it is that I can't see that it implies any contradiction.

Laird: The other one that I've mentioned is the absurdity of the experience of free will being an illusion.

Carmel: ok, but it's almost like you're basing your assumptions about the "experience of free will" on a feeling, rather than making a logical argument for it. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

How would I go about making a logical argument for an experience? An experience isn't something you can argue for, it's something that you... well, experience!

I think I see what you're getting at though, and yes, I'm not making a purely logical argument, but then, I don't believe that there's a purely logical argument for determinism either: it's an empirical question. By the way, you might have missed my post just prior to your last whilst you were responding to me - it fleshes out a little bit more what I'm trying to get at.

Carmel wrote:The paradoxes are in! ... which is not necessarily problematic, I'll address this point later...

Somebody call the workplace anti-discrimination officers. You hire paradox but you don't hire non-determinism.

Laird:
I think I see what you're getting at though, and yes, I'm not making a purely logical argument, but then, I don't believe that there's a purely logical argument for determinism either: it's an empirical question. By the way, you might have missed my post just prior to your last whilst you were responding to me - it fleshes out a little bit more what I'm trying to get at.

Carmel:
yes, that was the case, I'll go back and read it. I'll get back to you later...

Laird:
Somebody call the workplace anti-discrimination officers. You hire paradox but you don't hire non-determinism.

Carmel:
lol! I'll try to get back to you on this, too. I have to clarify my own thoughts on this before I can address.