Contradiction in the Law of Identity

[Cahoot]

I think that if you eliminate "to be" from a piece of writing, you will not only discover its dispensability, you will find that the writing attunes more closely with the thought/intended meaning, thus enhanced transmission and reception. The absence amplifies.

I believe that you will find that every meaningful proposition comprises a subject, a predicate and a copula, which relates the subject and predicate in some meaningful way. However, if you disagree, perhaps you could provide an example?

"To be" need not exist solely as the primary connector. In fact, its existence as such becomes as habitual as a crutch, for thought. Intellectually, descriptions of qualities without that mind crutch narrows the gap between actual and intended communication.

Writing without the verb reveals the examples.

When awareness awakens to "to be," then the use of the verb becomes a conscious experience, as opposed to a crutch-like habit.

Verbs denote relations, and as such, are abstract objects that cannot exist independent of those other things (i.e., relata) between which the relation holds. The verb “to be” denotes the relation of identity, and so must have both a subject and a predicate.

A well-stated reason to let being, be, conceptually undivided. Being, free from the mundane dualistic tedium of verby work.

[Dan Rowden]

I mean, you know, you don't go around sitting on pikes just because you think everything is ultimately composed of spheres.

Talk about holes and fillers. Damn.

You are hung up on the words instead of the meaning :
Holes and fillers = Emptiness and form

No it emphatically does not. No wonder you're making the mistake of taking this bloke seriously.

[Dennis Mahar]

Cahoot,

A well-stated reason to let being, be, conceptually undivided. Being, free from the mundane dualistic tedium of verby work.

It appears you're trying to get at the ontological sense of language, the 'being of' language as an access.
Language in its 'personality' uncannily assumes an objective existence in its splitting of subject/object.

[Cahoot]

Cahoot,

A well-stated reason to let being, be, conceptually undivided. Being, free from the mundane dualistic tedium of verby work.

It appears you're trying to get at the ontological sense of language, the 'being of' language as an access.
Language in its 'personality' uncannily assumes an objective existence in its splitting of subject/object.

By golly, you got it. Thank you for putting it into words so that others may see.

[Dennis Mahar]

I had to submit my passport to an org the other day as proof of identity.
While at the desk, I was struck by and near fell to my knees in astonishment yet again by the recognition of the language game going on.
The unconditioned essence of reality stood out loud and clear in it's silence in the background against which language shows up as a generator for you and me to play.

[Pincho Paxton]

I mean, you know, you don't go around sitting on pikes just because you think everything is ultimately composed of spheres.

Talk about holes and fillers. Damn.

You are hung up on the words instead of the meaning :
Holes and fillers = Emptiness and form

No it emphatically does not. No wonder you're making the mistake of taking this bloke seriously.

You have such a superiority complex. Either swear or insult, either comes naturally to the superior delusion.

There is nothing serious about holes, and fillers, they are the simplest things you can imagine. Therefore easy for the Universe to just happen.

Being as they cover all things Kunga is not wrong. Holes and fillers are the example of everything in one go.

You open your hole, and out comes this annoying ear filler. That's you.. the annoying bloke who has to get his angry tuppence out of his mouth. Unless you are a woman... that would be frightening.

[Dan Rowden]

You are hung up on the words instead of the meaning :
Holes and fillers = Emptiness and form

No it emphatically does not. No wonder you're making the mistake of taking this bloke seriously.

You have such a superiority complex.

I think what you mean is my superiority is complex.

Either swear or insult, either comes naturally to the superior delusion.

You have zero basis for responding to my post. Zero. You, a) admit yourself you don't even understand the "eastern" metaphysics being discussed on this board; b) you think non-duality is nonsense.

There is nothing serious about holes, and fillers, they are the simplest things you can imagine. Therefore easy for the Universe to just happen.

Non sequiter.

Being as they cover all things Kunga is not wrong. Holes and fillers are the example of everything in one go.

You are being foolish. Emptiness/form is precisely about non-duality which you dismiss as nonsense. It has no relationship whatever to your quaint little children's ontology of holes and fillers (which you disingenuously try to pass off as some sort of science even through it does not conform to or meet any of the various epistemological demands of actual science). Please understand that Kunga doesn't understand anything you say and wrongly interprets it in terms of "eastern" metaphysics and ontology - basically for the sake of emotional convenience.

You open your hole, and out comes this annoying ear filler. That's you.. the annoying bloke who has to get his angry tuppence out of his mouth. Unless you are a woman... that would be frightening.

I freely admit I'm sick of your blather. You give me no reason to be tolerant of you, therefore I am not. Your history precedes you, Sir.

[Leyla Shen]

Jehu wrote: I'm sorry Leyla, but I simply don't understand where the problem lies. I have said from the start that the Law of Identity is a phenomenological principle, and that it concerns the appearance of things (phenomena), and if the essence of a thing is that set of perceptible characteristics that are essential to the thing's being what it is, then essence too has to do with the appearance of things (phenomenology), and not with things in themselves (ontology).

Ok. Can you explain to me, 1) the difference between "the essence of a thing is that set of perceptible characteristics that are essential to the thing's being what it is" and the "thing in itself", and 2) how this difference arises?

[Jehu]

Ok. Can you explain to me, 1) the difference between "the essence of a thing is that set of perceptible characteristics that are essential to the thing's being what it is" and the "thing in itself", and 2) how this difference arises?

Simply put, the “self” of a thing is that which is real and gives rise to the appearance of the thing, while the “essence” of a thing is merely that set of qualities (sensual perceptions) that arise in the minds of those cognisant agents who perceive that thing. Now, if these two (essence and self) were not different aspects of a thing, then each thing would appear exactly alike to each cognisant observer irrespective of such extrinsic conditions as: angle of view, distance of the observer, availability of light, etc. In other words, the essence of a thing is that set of qualities and features that are essential to its being recognized (identified) as the kind of thing that it is, while, its self is that which is necessary and sufficient to its being that kind of thing.

[Leyla Shen]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

[Leyla Shen]

Aren't you just saying that our experience is limited by our senses?

[Jehu]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

Philosophical essentialism is not an ontological doctrine, as so many have wrongfully supposed it to be, but a phenomenological one, for it describes only the appearance of things – the phenomenon. This appearance comprises a unique set of sensual impressions (qualities) and mental concepts (features) which are generally accepted to be properties of the mind itself. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people tend to posit the true origin and cause of the phenomenon to something that exists independently of the perceiving mind – the noumenon. However, the adherents of this view (i.e., materialists and physicalists) have never been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to exactly how such a state of affairs might be possible.

[Pincho Paxton]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

Philosophical essentialism is not an ontological doctrine, as so many have wrongfully supposed it to be, but a phenomenological one, for it describes only the appearance of things – the phenomenon. This appearance comprises a unique set of sensual impressions (qualities) and mental concepts (features) which are generally accepted to be properties of the mind itself. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people tend to posit the true origin and cause of the phenomenon to something that exists independently of the perceiving mind – the noumenon. However, the adherents of this view (i.e., materialists and physicalists) have never been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to exactly how such a state of affairs might be possible.

I disagree with that last sentence. It's not hard to describe how something is physically real. It is more likely that some philosophers will ignore the examples.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

Jehu when you say:

• the essence of a thing is that set of qualities and features that are essential to its being recognized (identified) as the kind of thing that it is

That looks like just another way of talking about inherent existence but with a few decentralized essential parts. The chairness of a chair now living in head space, Plato's ideal form rearing its ugly head, inside the head. The thing is that this supposed "set" of qualities and features cannot be said to be essential, not solid or static in any way. It would be just fragmented essence, thingness and inherent existence in that relative instance. But things do not have essences, only understandings do, being essential in nature.

[Jehu]

I disagree with that last sentence. It's not hard to describe how something is physically real. It is more likely that some philosophers will ignore the examples.

On what logical grounds do you assert that physical things are real? How exactly are you defining the term "real"? For if you are merely assuming physical things to be real, then you are are committing the logical fallacy of "begging the question".

[Jehu]

Jehu when you say:

• the essence of a thing is that set of qualities and features that are essential to its being recognized (identified) as the kind of thing that it is

That looks like just another way of talking about inherent existence but with a few decentralized essential parts. The chairness of a chair now living in head space, Plato's ideal form rearing its ugly head, inside the head. The thing is that this supposed "set" of qualities and features cannot be said to be essential, not solid or static in any way. It would be just fragmented essence, thingness and inherent existence in that relative instance. But things do not have essences, only understandings do, being essential in nature.

The Law of Identity, being a linguistic principle, pertains to only linguistic identity, and governs what we may rightfully say or think with respect to things. To understand a thing is to know that set of characteristic qualities and features that make the thing what it is. For example, a “lawyer” may be defined as: “a person qualified and authorized to practice law”, and a "definition" is nothing other than "an expression of the essence of that thing which a given linguistic term denotes". In other words, the essential characteristics of a thing are equivalent with its defining characteristics.

[Leyla Shen]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

Philosophical essentialism is not an ontological doctrine, as so many have wrongfully supposed it to be, but a phenomenological one, for it describes only the appearance of things – the phenomenon. This appearance comprises a unique set of sensual impressions (qualities) and mental concepts (features) which are generally accepted to be properties of the mind itself. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people tend to posit the true origin and cause of the phenomenon to something that exists independently of the perceiving mind – the noumenon. However, the adherents of this view (i.e., materialists and physicalists) have never been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to exactly how such a state of affairs might be possible.

What I am asking you is that if the Law of Identity is a phenomenological principle (rather than an active principle of existence symbolically represented as a function of human logic and reasoning as "A=A"), as you assert, and that therefore the appearance of the thing is not the thing-in-itself (as you also assert), what is the thing-in-itself if not noumenon?

[Cahoot]

That coiled shape in the dim corner of the hallway must surely be a snake. How did it get in? Who to blame for this? What systems need overhauling to prevent future snakes? But before thinking prompts action, perhaps, investigate further.

Why, it is not a snake at all. Mis-perception caused the screams of the women, memory of a cobra caused the boy to soil his linen and foul the air, to imbue the shape with existence defined by awareness.

Hell, it's not even a rope.
It looks like a librarian, perhaps asleep, perhaps not, perhaps seriously coiled to instinctively annotate any living movement.;-{)

[Pincho Paxton]

I disagree with that last sentence. It's not hard to describe how something is physically real. It is more likely that some philosophers will ignore the examples.

On what logical grounds do you assert that physical things are real? How exactly are you defining the term "real"? For if you are merely assuming physical things to be real, then you are are committing the logical fallacy of "begging the question".

No I use physics to determine that things are real. Not physics from myself, but the physics of infinity. Infinity describes physics as they are today. And because my mind is not infinite enough to create an entire Universe, especially all of the physics... and it also helps that nobody actually understands the physics that they are seeing. If physics were created by you for example, how come you are too dumb to understand them? Of course you would be created by me.

Ok so the question is how did I come up with the physics when I was 2 years old?

Ok so I was never 2 years old.

The physics of infinity I calculated by seeing certain relationships between actual events.

Cause and effect means that I had to see the events before I could calculate the physics. I was not going to start in blackness, and then calculate the physics required for infinity to self build a universe.

If I did self build the Universe I would have built it in a different way. because I had other ideas before this idea. I followed science first, and got completely messed up by Newton, and Einstein.

It is infinity that produces these physics.

[Diebert van Rhijn]

the essential characteristics of a thing are equivalent with its defining characteristics.

What is essential about them? If I define some characteristics at some point, at which point do they become "essential of that thing". You imply I cannot modify or change any of these essentials without changing the thing itself? But the defined thing persists nevertheless in a more referential sense. A reference which remains relative and subjective, that is: non-essential.

[Jehu]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

Philosophical essentialism is not an ontological doctrine, as so many have wrongfully supposed it to be, but a phenomenological one, for it describes only the appearance of things – the phenomenon. This appearance comprises a unique set of sensual impressions (qualities) and mental concepts (features) which are generally accepted to be properties of the mind itself. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people tend to posit the true origin and cause of the phenomenon to something that exists independently of the perceiving mind – the noumenon. However, the adherents of this view (i.e., materialists and physicalists) have never been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to exactly how such a state of affairs might be possible.

What I am asking you is that if the Law of Identity is a phenomenological principle (rather than an active principle of existence symbolically represented as a function of human logic and reasoning as "A=A"), as you assert, and that therefore the appearance of the thing is not the thing-in-itself (as you also assert), what is the thing-in-itself if not noumenon?

As I said before, the “self” is that aspect of a thing that is real and that underlies its appearance or manifestation; in other words, it is the cause of the appearance (phenomenon). Now, the Law of Excluded Middle tells us that there are only two possible ways in which a thing may be constituted, either it is possessed of its own intrinsic causes, or its is not; there being no intermediate alternative. Furthermore, if a thing is not possessed of its own intrinsic causes, then its causes must lie elsewhere, and be the properties of some other thing; for nothing can arise without a cause. Therefore, given that something that is devoid of any properties of its own cannot be real, but merely apparent, it follows that in order for a thing to be real, it must be possessed of its own intrinsic causes.
Do you agree?

[Jehu]

the essential characteristics of a thing are equivalent with its defining characteristics.

What is essential about them? If I define some characteristics at some point, at which point do they become "essential of that thing". You imply I cannot modify or change any of these essentials without changing the thing itself? But the defined thing persists nevertheless in a more referential sense. A reference which remains relative and subjective, that is: non-essential.

By “essential” I mean those quality or characteristic without which a thing cannot be the kind of thing that it is. For example, if we are to rightfully call a thing a “bicycle”, then that thing must have “two wheels”, for having two wheels is an essential characteristic of that thing we call a bicycle; the term "bicycle" being the linguistic identity of that particular kind of thing.

[Pincho Paxton]

How can the essence of Thing A arise "merely as a set of qualities in the mind" of Thing B and be considered as the essence of Thing A at the same time?

Philosophical essentialism is not an ontological doctrine, as so many have wrongfully supposed it to be, but a phenomenological one, for it describes only the appearance of things – the phenomenon. This appearance comprises a unique set of sensual impressions (qualities) and mental concepts (features) which are generally accepted to be properties of the mind itself. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people tend to posit the true origin and cause of the phenomenon to something that exists independently of the perceiving mind – the noumenon. However, the adherents of this view (i.e., materialists and physicalists) have never been able to provide a satisfactory explanation as to exactly how such a state of affairs might be possible.

What I am asking you is that if the Law of Identity is a phenomenological principle (rather than an active principle of existence symbolically represented as a function of human logic and reasoning as "A=A"), as you assert, and that therefore the appearance of the thing is not the thing-in-itself (as you also assert), what is the thing-in-itself if not noumenon?

As I said before, the “self” is that aspect of a thing that is real and that underlies its appearance or manifestation; in other words, it is the cause of the appearance (phenomenon). Now, the Law of Excluded Middle tells us that there are only two possible ways in which a thing may be constituted, either it is possessed of its own intrinsic causes, or its is not; there being no intermediate alternative. Furthermore, if a thing is not possessed of its own intrinsic causes, then its causes must lie elsewhere, and be the properties of some other thing; for nothing can arise without a cause. Therefore, given that something that is devoid of any properties of its own cannot be real, but merely apparent, it follows that in order for a thing to be real, it must be possessed of its own intrinsic causes.
Do you agree?

This is why the hole, and the filler are so important. They break this rule, and create each other.

If you dig a hole, you have a filler, and a hole. Two effects from one cause. The hole is identified by its surrounding filler. So it is unlike bicycle wheels, it is created by its surroundings. The filler identifies the hole as its opposite, like black against white.

Say you dig a black hole out of white paint, now you can see the black hole against the white paint. If all of the surface were white you would not really see anything but white. Just seeing white you could say that you see nothing, because white paper has nothing on it.

Being as you are fed up with me talking about holes, and fillers, I will let Steven Hawking explain it. Go to 26 minutes...

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JOk0fGYf5g4

[Diebert van Rhijn]

for having two wheels is an essential characteristic of that thing we call a bicycle; the term "bicycle" being the linguistic identity of that particular kind of thing.

So you have here a "bikeness" quality? The ideal bike shape with at least two circular wheely things. In linguistics however that does not fly. But in Platonic ideal worlds -- it does, as you have a fundamental "bike in itself". Do you see why it looks like you're doing that here?

[Jehu]

for having two wheels is an essential characteristic of that thing we call a bicycle; the term "bicycle" being the linguistic identity of that particular kind of thing.

So you have here a "bikeness" quality? The ideal bike shape with at least two circular wheely things. In linguistics however that does not fly. But in Platonic ideal worlds -- it does, as you have a fundamental "bike in itself". Do you see why it looks like you're doing that here?

I'm not exactly certain as to what you think I am saying, but I assure you that what I have said is linguistically correct, and has nothing to do with Platonic forms. If I tell you that I am in possession of a vehicle that has two wheels mounted one behind the other, a handle bar, a saddle seat, and is propelled by the action of a rider’s feet upon pedals, you will immediately recognize that I am speaking of a “bicycle”, for I have expressed the essential characteristics of a bicycle. However, if you happen to speak a language other than English, you will identify the same thing by some other equivalent term. Still, none of this is a bicycle-in-itself, it is merely description of how a bicycle appears to a cognisant agent.